'A  N 

EXAMINATION 

Of  the  late  Reverend 
PRESIDENT 

E  D  W  A  R  D  s's 

'  Enquiry  on   Freedom  of  Will  ;* 

More  cfpecially  the  FOUNP  \TlON  PRTN"-: 
CIPLE  of  his  Book,   w      ^       TENDENCY, 

and  CONSEQUENCES^^      ..e   Reafoniog 
therein  contained.  ^   , 


IN    THREE 


pS.rts. 


Part.  L  Of  the  fappofed 
connexion  of  volitiqa  with 
the  higheft  motive, 

PAViV  II.  Of  the  indif- 
fo'uble  conae£ltoa  of  mo- 
ral caufcs  and  efFc^s. 


* 


Part  IIL  Mora!  libeF-^ 
ty  belongs  to  moral  agents. 
Or  Mr.  Edwards's  neceffi- 
ty,  if  true  in  theory,  is  not 
applicable  to  pra^ice* 


With  an  APPENDIX,  containing  a  fpecimen  of 
coincidence  between  the  principles  of  Mr.  Edwards's 
Book,  and  thofe  of  antient  and  modern  FATALISTS. 

Seek  not  after  thai  which  is  too  hard  for  thee^  £kii& 
fearch  not   into  things  that  are  above  tlsy  Jlrength. 

SONofbiRACH, 

//  ;;  not  of   him  that  willetk. 

St.  PAULi 


BOSTON: 

■printed  by  Daniel  K?jeeland,  oppofit?  *the 
Court-Houfe  in  Queen-Street,  fir  Tkom.^ 
.Leverett,   in  Cora-.Hili,       .M>D£CjLxx« 


PREFACE, 


f  rrVlE  puzde '  attending  difputes  on  fncK 
X  kind  of  lubjcas  as  Mr.  EDWARDS's 
•book  treats  of-,  is  probably  the  principal  rea(()a 
why  n3  animadverfions  on  his  difcourfe  have 
been  yet  publilhed.  It  was  prefumed,  that  fe\T 
vrho  might  read  it  would  beftow  attention  enough 
fo  undcrftand  it ;  and  of  thofe  who  fhould  aiten- 
JKively  read  and  underftand  .it,  few  would  admit 
its  foundation  principles.  The  author  of  the  pre- 
fent  examination  is  not  without  apprehenfion, 
thiat  the  rcafon,  which  hath  difliiaded  others,  will 
be  thought  fufficient  to  have  difTuaded  him,  froni 
fuch  an  undertaking.  He  acknowledgeth  that  he 
Kvas  difcouraged  with  only  reading  this  elabo- 
rate and  intricate  performance  /ome  years  fince. 
yet  from  the  great  reputation  of  Mr.  Edwards ^ 
5^nd  prevalence  of  his  dodtrine,  he  came  to  a  re- 
jblution  of  giving  this  book  another  and  attentive 
reading  :  In  confequence  of  which,  the  following 
^remarks  were  drawn  up '  the  motive  'of  his  *prefenc 
5vricing '  and  publication  *  is  a  perfuafion  of  the 
falfhood  of  Mr.  Edwards^s  *  fcheme  -,  and  this 
perfuafion  *  he  *  grants  and  fees  is  neceffary,"  he 
f  cannot  help  this  judgment.  '  ^  And  as  he  hath 
po  manner  of  doubt  but  the  foundation  princi- 
ples of  the  book  before  him  are  falfe,  fo  he  efteem? 
|hqm  of  moft  dangerous  tendency. 

^  J*5kfon  on  hum?n  liberty,  ia  «ifvv;«c  to  Cato's  letter?; 


iv  PR  E  F  JC  E. 

In  a  fpeculative  and  metaphyfical  view,  the  fulj- 
jeft  hath  been  largely  difcuffed  by  fome  of  the 
ableft  writers.  The  reader  may  be  afTured,  that 
as  little  metaphyfical  reafoning  as  pofTible  is  ufcd 
in  the  following  pages.  For  fuch  reafoning  the 
author  hath  neither  abilities,  inclination  orleifure; 
befides  that  there  is  no  great  occafion,  and  that, 
he  perfuadts  himfelf  it  would  not  be  edifying. 
His  principal  aim  is  to  conGder  the  fubjeft  iri  z 
fra5iical  view.  In  ibis  view  of  liberty  and  ne- 
cefTity  there  is  no  puzzle,  whatever  difficulties  at- 
tend the  fubjedt  when  confidered  abftradly.  •  Thc^ 
inquifitive  may  find  a  fuHanfwer  to  the  principal 
arguments  of  Mr.  Ed'u:;ards[s  book,  fpecnlatively 
copiidered,  in  Dr.  Samuel -Clark^^  Gemonftrati- 
on  of  the  being  and  attributes  of  GOD,  in  ahfwcr 
to  Holbsy  Spiyi'oza,  znd  their  followers;  in  th^ 
fame  learned  v/riter's  replies  to  papers  from  Mr. 
Lethnitz^  and  remarks  on  hir.- Collinses  book  oni 
human  liberty  -,  in  Jackfpn\  defence  of  liberty 
againft  Cato's  letters,  and  vindication  of  the  fame 
fubje6l  in  anfwer  to  Collins,  To  whom  the  author 
gladly  refers,  as  having  faved  him  a  tafk  to  which 
he  pretends  not  to  be  equal.  Others  might  be 
mentioned,  who  have  anfwered  fimilar  argument? 

|wo  thoufand  year?  ago. 

<  '     '  ' 

xAlS  we  are  immediately  confcious  of  liberty,  as 
it  is  a  truth  of  the  higheft  importance,  no  embar- 
rafiments  in  theory  attending  the  admifTion  of  it, 
can  oblige  us  to  give  it  up — cfpecially  as  the  de- 
nial of  It  plungeth  us  into  a  deeper  labyrinth. 
The  human  intelieft'is  Imperfe^l ;  cqnfequendy, 
things  may  be  confillent  though  vve  cannot  f(^c 
J?P':c'.  The  principal  pu rpofc  meraphy ficks  cart 
.fcrve  on  pradical  fubjc6ls  is  to  obfcure  them. 


P  R  E  F  AC  t.  V 

Mr.  Edwards   indeed  profefleth  himfclf  an  ad- 
vocate for  liberty.     Had  he  profeffedly  denied  ir, 
ihe  author  would  not  have  engaged  in  this  intri- 
cate difpute  :  For  he  eftcems  the  denial  of  iiberty 
a  like  abfurdity  and  extravagance  as  the  denial  of 
^motion  ;  or  a   material  world  ;    botk    which  have 
been   denied,    and  the  contrary  pretended  to  be 
demonilratcd,  again  ft  the  univerl'al  experience  of 
mankind.     Thofe  things  which  no  man  can  deriy 
^without   impeachment  of  abfurdity  and  extrava- 
Ijgahce  ;  it  feems  abfurd  to  attempt  a  formal  proof 
^pf.     Should  a  man,  for  example,    endeavour  to 
convince  one  who  might   require  a  ftririg  of  fyl- 
Jogifrris  to  prove,  that  the  fun  fhines  in  a  clear 
day,  at  twelve  o'clock,  he  would  have  a  very  idle 
'imployment  :  Let  him  that  queftions   it  open  his 
eyes,  and  he  cannot  want  convidion.     Let  a  man 
look  into  his  own   breaft,  and  he  cannot  but  per- 
^ceive   inward   freedom^ — Inward  freedom — For  if 
^Freedom  be  not  in  the  mind^  it  is  no  where.    And 
liberty  in  the  mind  im^plks/elf-delermimllon. 

This  y^/Wof  liberty  our  author  denies.  In  this 
fcnfe  of  liberty  alone  hath  he  any  controverfy  with 
the  writers  he  oppofeth.  His  difagreemenc  with 
Lord  Kaims,  -f  is  rather  in  words  than  any  thing 
real,  notwithftanding  what  our  author  hath  pub- 
lifhcd  to  fcreen  himfelf  from  the  imputation  of  be- 
ing in  the  fame  fcheme.  Their  general  reafoning 
is  the  fame.  They  reafon  on  the  fame  princi- 
ples, and  only  differ  about  the  meaning  of  the 
.^ord  ueceffity,  and  a  ifew  other  words  and  phrafes. 
Mr.  Edwards  affirms,  that  every  volition  and  mo- 
ral adion  is  determined  by  a  moral  neceflity,  which 
is  as  abfolute  as  natural  s  and  that  moral  habits 

arc 

J  Author  of  the  cflays  on  the  principles  ofnioraiity 
and  natural  religion* 


tl  P  M  E  F  A  C  g; 

are  owirrg  to  the  nature  of  things.  He  allows  ort-f 
ly  o^  external  liberty,  fuch  as  is  the  cfFedt  of  nc- 
cefTuy  in  the  will — and  eonflantly  denies  a  powef 
of  felf-determination.  Lord  Kaims  and  Mr. 
Hume  affirm,  '  that  nian  hath,  in  no  cafe,  a  pow- 
er of  rdf-deternninaiion  •,  but  is,  in  all  his  afliondy 
determined  by  a  moral  neccflity' — which  neceffity 
they  hold  to  be  as  real  as  any  other.  The  only 
difference  is,  that  Lord  Kaims,  while  he  allows 
that  GOD  has  implanted  in  man's  nature  an  in- 
vincible feeling  ot  liberty,  maintains,  that  this 
feeling  is  fallacious  :  And  Mr.  Hume  denies  the 
fubfiftence  of  any  fuch  relation  as  we  fignify  by 
the  words  caufe  and  eiTeft.  But  whether  liberty, 
as  maintained  by  Mr.  Edwards,  be  not  altogether 
hypothetic,  may  appear  from  the  following  pages. 
And  as  to  his  notion  of  caufe  and  of  effed,  when- 
ever he  ufes  the  former  word  for  any  antecedent^ 
or  the  occafron  of  an  event  or  thing,  and  the  latter 
for  the  con/'::que7tce  of  another  thing  (as  he  tells  us 
he  fomctimes  doth,  p.  58.  59.  jhe  fo  far  agrees 
with  Mr.    Hume  in  words  as  well  as  ftnfe. 

The    author  hath  only  given  the  outlines  of 
fome  (  among  many  other)  arguments  which  oc- 
cur'd    to    his  mind  to  evince    the  afped  Mr.  Ed-- 
wards's   fchcme   hath    on    the  rnoral  perfedbions 
and  government  of  GOD,  and    its    confequenc 
pradlical    tendency.     Had  he  enlarged  on  them> 
it  would  have   lengthened   out  the   enfuing  exa- 
jnination    much    beyond  what   cither  he  or   Che 
reader   would  chuie.     The   number  of  pages  is, 
now  double   to  what   he  at  firft   defigncd.     He 
hopes  for  the  patience  and  candor  of  the  public; 
to  whofe  opmion   he  fubmits  ihefe  remarks.     If 
they  are  juft,  they  need  no  apology  •,  if  not,  no 
apology  can  be  of  any  fcrvice*    if  any  Ihould 
*  "      "        fuppofe 


:P:R  E  F  AC  E.  vli 

fuppofe  that  in  .one  refpefl.at  left  an  apology 
Ihould  be  made,  viz;  for  undertaking  to  criticize 
the  writings  of  fo  diftinguiftied  an  aurhor  as 
Mr  Edwards  •,  the  aniwer  is,  that  if  the  par- 
ticular defign  of  the  propofed  examination  is 
properly  purfued  and  executed,  and  that  refpeft 
preferved  which  is  due  to  the  charat^er  of  * 
gentleman  of  Mr.  Edwards's  merit  and  cmi* 
nence,  the  author  hath  no:  tranrgreffed  :  But 
of  thefe  he  is  not  himfelf  a  proper  judge  ; 
though  he  hopes  to  be  acquitted  (in  the  lat- 
ter of  thefe reipc6lscfpecially)by  everyone  chans. 
Whatever  reception  his  performance  may  meet 
with,  he  is  confcious  of  the  redicude  of  his 
.•wn  intentions. 


ti    i««liill|iiM«l 


CONTENT; 
8 


T  H  E    C  O  N  T^E  N  T  S: 

Introduction,  exhibitirg  a  general  view  of 

Mr.  Edwards's  fcheme ;  with  the  defrgn  and  mc^ 
thod   propofed  in    thefe  remarks. 

Part  1.  On  the  conncdion  of  volitron  with 
the  highed  motive. 

Sect.  I.  Mr.  Edwards  hath  not  fhewn  where- 
in the  ENERGY  of  motive  confifts. 

Sect.  11".  The  will  not  neccfiarily  determined 
by  the  higheft  motive. 

Sect.  III.  Exfernal  ad:icn  not  determined  by 
the  will,  upon  Mr.  Edwards^  fcheme. 

Fart  JL  An  examination  of  Mr.  Edwards^s 
doflr'ns  refpcfling  the  indiiToluble  conne^^tion  of 
moral  caufcs  and   efTedt'S.         - 

Sect.  I.  Whe-ther  the  v^ ill  be  nccefTmly  de- 
termined by  an  exfrwjjc  caufe. 

Sect.  II.   Or  by   an  inirr/i/ic  cziife. 

Sect.  III.  Upon  Mr.  Edwards's  own  fcheme,. 
there  cannot  be  natural  liberty  without  moral. 

Sect.  iV.  Of  GOD's  being  ths  author  of  fin r 
upon  Mr.  Edwards's  fcheinc  of  nectlTiiy  ;  and  irv 
what  fenfe  he  admits  this  to  be  the  confequence 
cf  his  do6>rine. 

'Sect.  V.  On  thz{\:x'^'^o{^A  advantage  of  mcY><il 
evii  to  the  univerfe. 

Sect.  VI.  Cohidi\n\ng gemral  ohfcrvations  and 
vffflrpfiom  on  the  Icheme  of  ncceffity  CAhibited  in 
Mr   Edwards's  bock. 

Part  ITI.  Shewing  that  moral  liberty,  asdiftin- 
pruilhed  from  natural^  belongs  to  moral  agents  : 
Or  admitting  Mr.  Edwards's  fcheme  of  neceflir)' 
to  be  true  in  iheor)\  it  is  not  applicable  to pradice^ 

Sect.  1.  i«/fr;7^/liberty  belongs  to  moral  agency. 

Sect.  II.  Jnternal  liberty  confiitent  with  the 
influence  cf  motives,   &c. 

Sect.  IIL  Mr.  EJw^r^j's  neceflity,  if  true  in 
theory y  r.ot  applicable  io  tra8ice. 

INTRODUCTION 


INTRODUCTION. 


"Exhibiting  a  general  view  of  Mr.  Edwardsh 
Icheme  ;  with  the  defign-aiid  method  propo- 
fed  in  thele  remarks. 


IT  IS  quite  befide  the  purpofe  of  the  following 
remarks  to  encjaire,  Whether  th^  general 
icheme  of  doftrlne  Mr.  Edwards  intended  to 
eftabliHi  in  his  enquiry  be  rational  and  fcriptu- 
ral.  It  is  only  the  foundation  principle  we  aim  to 
confider  :  The  lylkm  built  hereupon,  whether 
true  or  falfe,  is  nor,  by  the  generality  of  Cal- 
viniftic  Divines,  made  to  depend  on  the  fame 
bafis. 

The  principal  fubjed  of  the  book  before  135 
is,  '  What  determines  the  will  ?'  And  through 
the  wh;:>le  performance  great  pains  is  taken  to 
demonftrate,  that  moral  ncceffity  and  liberty  arc 
convertible  terms.  The  perplexity,  confufion, 
and  uncertainty,  which  difquifitions  of  this  fort 
are  attended  with,  is  fufficiently  known.  We 
fhail  endeavour  to  keep  out  of  the  clouds  as 
much  as  the  nature  of  the  fubjed  v/ill  admit. 

'The  pofition  of  chief  importance,Vwe  are 
told  is.  That  the  loill  is  necejfariiy  determined  by  the 
Jirongeil  motive  ;  meaning-  by  the  ftrongeft  mo- 
tive *  that,  which,  m  the  mind's  prefent  viev/., 
hath  the  greaisll  appearance  of  good.*  '  Every 
ad  of  the  will  hath  a  certain  fixed  connedioa 
rlicreA'ith,  and  depends  hereupon,  as  it*s  caufe — - 


V         INTRODUCTION. 

or  ^he  ground  and  rcafon  of  it.'  ^  In  fuppor-t 
of  which  it  is  faid,  that  'nothing  ever  comes  to 
pafs  without  a  proportionable  caule- — that  the 
adts  of  the  will,  and  material  things,  have  a  like 
necellary  dependance  on  a  caufe  without  them- 
felves— that  moral  caufes  may  be  caufes  in  as- 
proper  a  fenfe  as  any  caufes  whatever — and 
morai  ii^celEty  may  be  as  abfulute  as  natural.'  f 

Indeed,  by  the  word  caufeMr,  Edwards  ex- 
plains himfelf  to  mean,  not  only'  that  which 
Jiath  a  pofnive  efficiency^  or  influence  to  produce  a 
thing,  or  bring  it  to  pafs  i'  but  '  fomctimes  any 
antecedent,  cither  natural  or  moral,  pofitive  or 
negative,  on  which  an  event,  either  a  thing,  or 
the  manner  and  circupr.flance  of  a  thing,  fo  de- 
pends, th^t  it  \^  ihc  ground  and  reajon^  in  whole, 
or. in  part,  why  it  is  rather  than  not  ;  or  why  it 
is  as  It  -is,  rather  .than  oiherwife.'  J  At  the 
fame  time  he  aiTerts,  that  every  ad  of  the  will 
is  an  '.effect  neceirarily  dependent  and  confe- 
quent  on  a.  caufe,  which  he  calls  an  efficient  caufe  ; 
to  whofc'  determination  and  command  volition 
Js  as  m\^c\i  fubje^^  2iS  the  motions,  of  the  hands 
and  feet  to  the  volitions  which  determine  and 
command  them — that  the  a£ts  of  the  will  are 
as  ''  paffive  with  reipedl  to  the  antecedent  caufe, 
ground,  or  reafon  of  them.' §  He  maintains, 
upon  the  whole,  an  univerlal  neceffity — that  all 
beings,  all  even  s,  the  m^anner  and  ail  the  cir- 
cumiianctrs  of  things  are  neccfisrily  determined. 
Yet  he  proftfTcth  himfelf  an  ad/ocate  for  liberty, 
and  labours  a  dillindion  be:ween  natural  and 

moral 

=♦  Enquiry  part  i.  k£\.  2.     t  Enquiry  p.  30,  40,  48, 
58,  01,    06,    '^<^   pafTi.u.       X  Enquiry  p.  57,   5S, 


I  N  r  R  0  D  UC  no  N.      .^5 

.moral  ncceflity,  which  diftinAion  he  apprehends 

important — natural  necefTuy   being  incGnfiftenC 

with  praife  or  blame,  while  moral  is  nor.     The 

liberty   he  admits  is,  however,  merely  external, 

;.and  the  refult  oi  neceffity  in  the  mind. 

This  is  a  general  idea  of  his  plan,  fo  far  as  it 
will  fall  under  prefent  confideration.     I;i  purfu- 
^ ing  our  remarks  on  which,  we  fhall. 

First,  Examine  the  fuppofed  connedloxipf 
vvolition  with  the  higheft  motive. 

Secondly,    The  indiflToluble  conpedlion  of 
J  moral  caufes  and  effedls,         i 

Thirdly,  Shew  thart  internal,  moral  liberty, 
,as  diftinguilhed  from .  external,  or  natural,  be-, 
longs  to  moral  agents  2  Or  admitting  Mr.  Ed- 
waras^s  fcheme  of  necefllty  to  be  true  in  theory^ 
it  is  not  applicable  to  praofice.  It  is  alfo  pro- 
pofed  to  add,  in  an  appendix,  a  fpecimen  of  coin- 
cidence  between  Mr.  Edwards  and  fqme  celc- 
ibrated  infidels,  antient  and  modern. 

N.  B.   We  have  made  ufe  of  the  Lond»n   edi- 

t  tion.     Wherever  the  reader  finds  particular  pages 

referred  to  by  numerical  figures    inclofed  in  a 

parenthefis,  fuch  place  in  Mr.  Edwards^s  enqui- 

;ry  is  meant,  unlefs  notice  is  given  of  our  reter- 

ing  to  Tome  other  author. 


^ART 


PART    I 

On  the  'Connexion    of  Volition  with  the  ihlgh- 
,efl  Motive, 

SECT.    I. 


Mr.   Edwards  hath  not  fiicwn  wherein  the  entr- 
gy  of  motive   confifts. 

THE  enquiry  in  this  place  is  not,  Whether 
the  higheft^notive  hath  always  a  caufal 
influence  on  the  will  ?  But,  admitting  this  to  be 
the  cafe,  v/hat  it  is  that  caujeth  any  fuppofed  mo- 
tive to  he  higheft  in  the  mind's  view  ?  wherein 
doth  its  energy^  or  power  confift  ?  In  the  next 
ledlion,  we  fhall  examine,  whether  the  will  is 
jndeed  determined,  in  every  a<^,  by  the  highcft 
.motive* 

« 

When,  between  two  or  more  6bje6ls  in  the 
mind's  view,  one  appears  mofl:  agrea'ole  \  (from 
whatever  caufe,)  this  appearance  is  the  highcft 
or  flrongetl  motive,  according  to  our  author. 
Now  as  there  is  a  manifctl  difrerence  between 
an  objeft's  a 51  unliy  appearing  molt  agreable,  and 
the  caufe  of  this  appearance  ;  the  proper  quefiion, 
in  the  firft  place,  is.  What  is  the  ground,  Teafon, 
or  cauftt  of  the  agr.?able  appi-arance  ;//^//.  For 
admitting  the  ftrorg-ft  motive  to  be  the  more 
immediate  caufe  of  volition,  how  doth  this  prove 
;that  it  h  the  original  caufe  ?  IVhcnce  is  it  that  any 
propofed  objctt  hata  the  gr».^ate[l  appearance  of 
^Qod  ?  From  what  caule  ?  t-iicher  we  muft  w///- 


r.  On  iBe  Ccnne5lion  of  Volltm' 

mately  recur  for  the  ground  of  volition  ;  [PcfTibfy 
not  ftop  here]  Till  ihcanfwer  to  this  quefticn  is 
found,  the  original  ground  of  volition  is  not  dif- 
covered.  For  if  every  circumftance  of  things 
hath  an  anTwcrable  caufr;  then  there  is  a  caufe 
why  this  or  that  motive  is  highcfl.  ^ 

Though  Mr.  Edwards  fuppofed  the  refoluti- 
on  of  this  queOion  was  *  not  nectfTary  to  his  pur- 
pofef,'  J:  yet  he  hath,  in  feveral  particulars,  re- 
marked what  he  apprehended  may  '  have  in- 
fluence' in  caufing  '  the  objediS  of  volition  to  ap- 
pear agrcabie  to  the  mind.*     He  i-fTigns,  for  in- 

fiance, 

*  *In  the  quefiion,  Jir/>fl/  deicrmines  the  uUI ?  it  is  ta- 
ken for  grsntcd,  ihzt /cmethtrg  dcteimir.cs  it.     And 
the  controveify  on  this  head  is,  where  the  fcurdation 
of  the  will's  determirsation  is,'  (p,  56.  )  MT.Eduards 
faith  cxprcfly,  '  That  the  aft  of  volition  itfeif  (or  the 
will  )  is  always  determined  by  that  in  the  mind's  view 
of  an  objcd:,  which  ccufes  it  to  appear  moft  agreable.* 
('p.   11  )      Here,  then,  is   the  foundation  of  the 
will's  determination.     Mr.  Edwards's  bufmefs,  there- 
fore, according  to  his  own  ftate  of  the  qutftion,  wa», 
to  point  out  what  caufeth  an  cbje^    to  appear  moft 
agreablc.     For  if  that  which    causeth //)/;  appear^ 
ance  be  the  real  caufe  of   volition,  then  the   agreablc 
appearance  itself  cannot  be  the  caufe.     Thcagre- 
ab!e  appearance,  or  highcft  motive,  as  he  cbfcrvcs,  is 
nothing  dijUn£i   from  volition,  but  the  very  things  as 
will  be  particularly  (hewn  in  the  ncxtfeftion.      We 
would  here  juft  hint,  by  the  way,  that  Mr.  Edwards 
hath  given  ample  teftimony   againft  *  the  pofition  of 
<?hicf  importance   in  bis  difcourfe.*     For   that   the 
highcfl  motive  doth  not  always  determine  volition,  is 
pretty  apparent,  if  it  is  always  determined  by  that  in 
©r  about  an  object  which  caujeth  it  to  be,  and  appear^ 
moft  agreable.     The  will,  in  no  inftancc  whatfocver, 
is  determined  by  the  agreablc  appearance,  but  by  tho 

-  caufe  of  fuch  appearance, 
+  p.    12,— I  ^, 


Cn  ihe  Connexion  of  Volition  ^ 

jKance,  *  the  apparent  nature  and  circumftances 
of  the  objcd — the  manner  of  the  mind's  view  of 
it — the  ft  ate  of  the  mind,  by  nature  or  educati- 
on— or  the  fcame  it  is  in  on  a  particular  occafi- 
.on.'  But  how  is  thi^  any  anfwer  I  Doth  not  the 
queftion  immediaccly  arife,  i^^fi;  comes  the  ob- 
ject to  have  fuch  a  particular  appearance  to  the 
mind  I  Whence  is  it  apparently  circumftanced  as 
it  is  ?  Whence  doth  the  mind  view  it  in  fuch  a 
particular  w^w»(?r  ?  Or  from  fuch  a  particular /W^^ 
of  it,  whether '  faint,  or  clear,  ftrong  and  lively  ?' 
Whence  is  i\xt  fiate^  temper y  ox  frame  of  the  mind 
what  it  is  ?  Until  thcfe  things  are  fblved,  the 
queftion,  Whence  is  it  that  '  a  pcrfon's  pleafure 
is  wrong'  or  right  ?  hath  received  no  anfwer, 
unlefs  '  a  very  impertinent  one.' 

*  There  is  no  great  difficulty,  faith  Mr.  Ed^ 
v^ardu  in  fnewing,  not  only  that  it  mufi  needs  ht 
fo^  but  alfo  how  it  is  fo^  that  the  mmd  muft  be 
influenced  in  it's  choice  by  fomething  that  hath 
a  preponderating  influence  upon  it.'  *  But  if 'a 
preponderating  influence  on  the  mind*  implies 
that  ibe  choice  is  already  made^  it  may  *be  a 
matter  of  no  fmali  difficulty'  to  fhew,  how  the 
mind,  in  making  it's  choice,  can  *  be  influenced 
by  fomethtng  that  hath  a  preponderating  influ- 
ence upon  it.* 

While  writing  the  firft  part  of  his  book,  Mr. 
Ed'-J^ards  feems  to  have  been  fenflble,  is  was  no 
very  eafy  matter  '  to  ftiew  how  it  is  fo^  or  why, 
that  the  mind  is  always  determined  by  the  high- 
eft  motive.  His  words  are,  (p.  it.)  *  Particu- 
larly to  enumerate  all  things  pertaining  to  the 
mind's  view  of  the  objsdts  of  volition,  which 

have 


'wilh  the  kighejl  Mcti-ife,-  ^ 

have  Influence  in  their  appearing  agrrable  to  the 
iHind,  would  bs  a  matter  of  770  Jmall  d:ffiaih\y  and 
might  rtquiie  a  trcatifc  by  itltlf,  and  is  not  ne- 
ceflkry  to  my  pfefent  purpofe.'  But  (v/ithout 
tarrying  to  reconcile  i\-\\%  fetming  contraft)is  this 
a  matter  attended  with  greater  difilcuhy,  or  of 
lefs  importance,  or  would  it  requir'e  a  larger  trea- 
Tjla,  than  to  fiiew,  what  determines  the  will  to 
this  fide,  cr  that  ? 

We  allov'vv  that  '?h^  commm  people  do  rot  af- 
ccnd  up  ivH  ili-ir  refit clions  and  abilradions  to 
the  mttaphy/ical  Jources^  relations  and  dtpendencits 
of  things,  in  order  to  form  their  notion  of  faulci- 
nefs— They  do  not  wait  uW  they  have  decided 
by  their  refinin^s,  what  firft  determines  the 
will  ;  whether  it  bs  determined  by  fomething 
extrinfic  or  intrinjjc.  If  this  were  the  cafe,  mul- 
titudes, yea,  the  far  greater  part  of  mankmd, 
nine  hundred  and  ninety  n'me  out  ofathou- 
iand  would  live  and  die  v/ithout  having  any 
fuch  notion  as  that  of  fault  ever  entering  into 
thtir  beads  5  or  without  {o  much  as  once 
having  any  conception,  that  any  body  was  to  be 
either  blamed  or  commended  for  any  thing. 
They  do  not  take  any  part  of  their  notion  of  iauic 
or  blame  from  the  refolution  of  any  fuch  q-efti- 
ons.' *^  A  fuller  acknowledgment  M.r.  Edwards ■ 
could  not  have  made,  that  the  erand  queftion, 
the  main  fubjedt  of  his  book.  What  determines 
the  will  ?  is  a  fubtle  and  unprofitable  one.  We 
are  therefore  at  a  lofs  for  the  motive  of  his  wri- 
ting an  elaborate  volume  to  determine  a  pjinc 
not  to  be  determined — at  lead,  by  his  own  de- 
claration, of  no  life  to  one  sut  ef  a  ihoujmi  of 
mankind. 

C  P.  19>  4-9^. 


"4'  On  the  ConneBien  of  Volition ■ 

P.  39,  40.  Our  author  obferves,  that  ^  into 
the  meaning  of  the  Vv^ord  liberty  \s  not  taken  any 
thing  of  the  caufe  or  original  ot  choice — how  the 
pcrfon  came  to  have  fuch  a  volition  ;  whether  it 
was  caufed  by  ib me  external  motive,  or  internal, 
habitual  bias  •,  v/hether  it  was  necefiarily  connec-: 
ccd  with  fomcthing  foregoing,  or  not  connedled. 
Let  \hz  perfon  come  by  his  volition  or  choice 
how  he  will,  yet,  if  he  i§  able,  and  there  is  no- 
thing in  the  way  to  hinder  his  purfuing  and  ex- 
ecuting his  will,  the  man  is  fully  and  perfectly 
flee,  according  to  the  primary  and  common  no- 
tion of  freedom'. 

It  hence  appears,  that  Mr.  Edwards  edeem- 
ed  it  neither  recenary  nor  ufeful  for  us  to  know 
the  caufe  or  criiin  of  the  will's  determ^ination— 
*  how  a  perfon  comes  to  have  fuch  a  volition.* 
And  yet  it  was  a  main  point  in  his  view  to  fhevv, 
that  the  (Irongelt  motive  is  the  immediate  caufe 
of  every  ad  of  choice.  Now,  as  was  before  ob- 
ferved,  it  is  juft  as  neceflary  and  important  to 
know  the  orighial  and  ultimate^  as  the  next  and 
more  immediate  caufe  of  volition.  The  nexc 
and  immediate  caufe  is  but  the  effedV  of  fome/>r^- 
ceedi?2g  caufe  -,  this  of  another,  and  fo  on.  'The 
determination  of  the  v^iil,  faith  Mr.  Edwards, 
fuppoferh  an  effed,  which  nmfl  have  a  caufe.  If 
the  will  be  dettrm'ined^ihtxQ  mud  be  a  determiner^ 
^  Granted.  And  if  the  ilrongeft  motive  be  the 
determiner,  this  alfomuft  be  determined  by  fome 
preceeding  caufe.  There  is  a  caufe  or  reafon  of 
its  being  ilrongeil — fomething  from  which  it  de- 
rives, and  wherein  lies,  its  great  flrength.  If 
therefore,  it  was  of  any  impciranGC  CO  Ihcw,  (con- 
formable 

*  P.  ?; 


wiii  the  higheft  Motive,  5 

■formable  to  Mr.  Edwards's  defjgn)  what  deter- 
mines the  will,  and  to  provs  thaC  the  flrongefl: 
motive  doth  in  •,  it  was  at  leaft  of  equal  impor- 
tance to  pomt  our,  v;hat  it  is  that  caufeth  fuch 
moti/e  to  be,  or  appear,  (irongefl:.  The  real 
caufe  of  volition  is  not  found,  till  this  matter  is 
explained.  The  enquiry  is  not  purfucd  to  the 
end,  and  the  plan  ot  Mr.  Edwards*^  book  buc 
-^alf  executed, 

'  Suppose  a  chain  hung  down  out  of  the  Hea- 
vens, frO;Ti  an  unkncjun  height,^  and  although 
•every  link  of  it  gravitated  tov/ard  the  eanh,  and 
what  it  hung  upon'  was  not  vifible,  yet  it  did 
not  defcend,  buc  kept  its  fituation  :  And,  upoa 
^  this,  a  ^quelcion  fhould  arife.  What  fupporred  or 
kept  up  this  chain  ?  Would  it  be  a  Tuakicnc 
anl.ver,  to  fay,  that  the/o^,  or  loweft  link  hung 
upon  the  fecond,  or  that  ntiit  above  it  ?*  without 
proceeding  to  fnsw  what  the  iecond  hung  upon: ; 
'  or  rather,  iht  firfl  and  fee  on  d  together  ;'  and  lb 
on,  until  it  was  found  '  whac  fupported  the 
sfjhols.  Thus  it  is  in  a  chain  of  ciules  and  ef- 
fects. The  lall  or  lowed  IS  7'^//)^;jr/t'ii  upon  the 
cauf-  above  it.  This  again,  \^  it  be.  not  the  firil 
caufe,  is  fufpended,  as  jm  efiecl,  upon  •  fome- 
thing  above  it,  &i\''^  The  original  (thdc  is, 
the  tru:  and  reel)  caufe  of  volirion  is,- therefore, 
yet  t,o  be  explainedi  For  if  it  b,^  liie  immedi- 
ate eitecl  of  motive,  (liU  this  caufe  is  an  effcdl:  in 
regard  to  f^iieihing  preceeding—and  v/hatever 
is  ih.:;,n:-xt  or  imo-)CJ!ate  caafe  ot  the  iirenofth 
or  energy  of  moti^'e  iilclf,  this  sgain  is  an  tfiVct 
in  relatjoii  10  a  eaufc   prcc.cjing,  as  wi:ll  as  ,a 

""^  Wslla/li'ty  p.  ^$7. 


'$  Cm  the'Connefilcn  cf  Volition 

canfe  ni  relation  to  motive— And  thus  the  en* 
qurty  ma.y  .be  purjued  in  inf.nilwtn.  (Which 
fhevvs,  by  the  way,  x.htfuti!:ty^:M  leall,  of  entering 
en  fuch  an  enquiry  as  that  which  is  the  fubjed  of 
Mr.  Edzvardy^  bo«ok  )  S.-iould  ir,  be  faid,  tiiat 
the  energy  of  motive,  in  t:very  cafe,  is  t3  b^  at- 
tributed tothe  Erll  and  fuprcme  cauie,  as  ihe  im- 
mediavc  tlTicient-^rh^s,  -'kideci,  is  making  (liort 
work  •,  but  it  is  cutting  the  knot,  rather  thaa 
untying  it.  Haweve-s  whc,n  jt  ihall.be  {hc-^\n, 
that  e/ery  atlof  will,  in  every  creature,  is  an  im- 
mediate, neceflary  effect  of  the  fa premecaule,  the 
aif]^:u:e  will  at  once  be  at  r.n  endc 

'^  The  vulgar  noihr,  of  blan^evvorthlnefs,  fays 
Mr.  Edwards^  is,  a  perfon's  having  his  he.irc 
wrong,  and  doing  wron^  -frum  the  heart  '  ^ 
Now  hath  he  :flievv'--n,  ivhince  a  .perfon's  heart 
comes  to  be  wrono;  ?  He  tikes  nonce  ofchis  de- 
fed  in'  the  Piithor  of  the  efTiy  on  the  frecaoqi 
0L  the  w^ll  in  GOD  and  the  cr<?araTes,'  that  he 
had  not  given  a  rcafm  why  cm  cM  of  the  will  is^ 
er  why  H  is  hi  this  manner,  rather  than  another^  -^ 
Now  haw  hath  Mr.  :Edwards  lupply rd  this  de- 
fed  ?  is  what  h?  hath  faid^  a  reaibn  why  an  a6t 
of  the  Vvriil  is,  or  why  it  i  •  in  ihis  manner  V  Sup. 
pofe  ihe  higheit  n,:.Gi:ive  decermines  the  v/di,  he 
Cviplains  motive  to  be  the  apparent  good  in  an 
objedt — Now  what  is  it  thfit  makes,  or  caufes  an 
•objec:r  to  appear  good  ?  For  this,  by  his  own 
principles,  is  what  deterGi:nes  the  will.  He 
'  fpeaks  of  a  certain  jcvereignty  inniorive,  v^here- 
by  it  has  power  todefcrmine  volicion.  Wherein 
c-onfiils  '  t-iis  fuppokd  .fov^reigniy  r'  From  whac 


c^ule 


**P..2^S.     .t  P.  71,:^: 


witly  the  hlghfc   Moiivi]  ;^ 

Oiifc  doth  it  proceed  ?  From  what  *  excrclfe'  of 
it  can  either  its  Ibvereigncy,  or  its  caufe,  be  in- 
ferred ?  *  '  And  To  the  queftion  returns  in  in-^ 
finituniy  and  the  like  aiifwer  mull  be  made  in  in^^ 
finitum?  For  granting  that  an  objed's  appear-^ 
ing  agreable  to  the  rnind  is  the  ground  of  the 
mind's  choice,  what  account  is  this  of  the  agre- 
sble  appearance  icfcif  ?  Is  it  a  r^afon  why  aa 
(!)bje6l  appears  beautiful  or  deformed,  agreable 
©r  difagreable  •?  Doth  it  fhcw  us^  -why  '  it  is 
Ji'joil  agreable  .to  fome  men,  to  follow  their  rea- 
son I  and  to  others,  to  follow  their  appetites  ?* 
Not  at  alL  Nor  coBfequently,  doth  it  (hew  us 
'  wherein  confiils  the  (Irength  of  motive'-—* 
whence  the  motive  that  determines  the  will  is 
prepollcnt— jf  what  antecedent  caufe  its  deter- 
mining power  is  tihc.efiv<fl.  Every  circumftance 
of  things,  ic  is  pleaded,  mud  ha.ve  a  caule.  Vo- 
iicion  then  is  the  effjcit  of  motive — the  latter  the 
f.fed  of  foine  prior  caufe-^this  of  another — and 
this  again  of  another,  idc.  &'c.  &c.  Where  then 
.are  we  to  feejc  far  the  true  and,  original  caufe  of 
va^olition  ? 

Although  Mr.  Edwards  eurforily  pafletK 
thQ  QueRion,  Wherein  confilts  the  energy  of  mo- 
live  ?  as  befide  '  the  purpcfe  of  his  difcourfe  j* 
yet  we  moll  think,  that  his  main  '  pofition,'  and 
'  the  thing  of  chief  importance'  upon  his  fcheme, 
abrokitely  required  a  clear  '  eKplanatioa' and  full 
difcuflion  of  this  -queftion.  It  is  the  hinge,  on 
;ivhich  the  controvCi  fy,  as  Hated  by  Mr.  Edwards^ 
muft  finally  turn.  He  appears  to  have  been 
:fcrupul3us,    whether   he  h.*d  not  ^failed  in  ex^ 

plaining 


#  On  the  Connexion  of  VoUtmt 

plaining  this  thing,'  from  his  hint  that  if  he  had, 
it  did  '  not  overthrow  the  pofidon  itfelf,  which 
wai.  the  thing  of  chief  importance'  in  his  enqui- 
tf\  •*  viz.  That  the  will  is  always  deterfnined  by 
fitg  firon^eft  moiiveJ*  "^  This  pofition  may  noc 
be  overthrown  by  a  failure  in  '  explaining  where- 
in the  ftrength  of  motives  confifts  •,*  but  w« 
inighr  have  expected,  and  (hould  have  been  glad 
£6  have  fecn,  a  rationale  of  the  pofition.  If 
true,  there  is  a  caufc,  g'-ound,  or  reafon  of  its 
truth.  That  caufe  hath  not  been  affigned,  or 
difoovered  to  our  apprchenfion.  It  is  Toon 
ttiough  to  fay,  v/hether  the  pofition  is  true  cr 
laile,  when  the  foundation  of  ic  is  underftood. 
But  whether  it  hath  a  folid  fupport,  or  is  ever- 
?krov?n  by  Mr.  Edwards  himieif,  may  appear  in 
the  following  fedlion  :  We  conclude  the  prefenc 
.mx\i  this,  remark. 

{.,  Altkough  we  have  no  right  to  require  an 
anf\i^er  to  fo  fubtil  a  quedion  as  this  [What  de- 
termines the  will  ?J  from  any  but  fuch  as  under- 
take GJ  their  own  accord  to  explain  the  matrcr  ,; 
yet,  from  Mr.  Edwards\  known  abilities,  ws 
might  have  expe£led  a  more  fatisfadtory  and  ra- 
tional anfwer — efpecially  as  he  feems  to  have 
2jpprehended,  that  the  general  qnefticn  conccrn- 
Inrg.  liberty  was  thoroughly  examined  and  de- 
cided in  his  difcourfe  upon  it.  But  fince,  after 
what  Mr.  Edwards  hath  faiJ,  it  (lill  remains  ab- 
flrufe  and  undettrmined,  we  conclude  ir  mull  re- 
main lo.  .  For  no  author  we  have  fccn  hath 
wrote  upon  the  fubjed  with  greater  ftrength. 
And  we  cannot  but  obfc-rvci    thai  Mr.  Edwards 

in 


*  P. 


y» 


Of. 


mib  the  high  eft  Motivel  r,^ 

in  fome  parts  of  his  book,  appears  (o  have  been 
quite  fenfible  that  no  fubjcd  is  more  intricate 
and  puzzling  than  this  concerning  the  determi-i 
nation  of  the  will,  confidered  in  a  fpeculaiive 
view.  Should  any  '  find  fault,  that  we  have  gone 
into  metaphyfical  niceties  and  fubtilties  ;'  our 
reply  is,  that  Mr.  Edwards* %  enquiry  is  *  a  me- 
taphyfical fubtilty,  and  muft  be  treated  accord-;' 
ing  to  its  nature.'  t     «. 


^'  347-^ 


%• 


S£CT. 


^-O  O^  the  Cchmni'sn  cf  Vollficn 


SEC  T.    IL 


.The   will   not    neceiTarily   determined   by.    the 
ftrongeft    ivlotive. 


IT  is  not  always  the  nature  of  the  object:'  /;?  ;?- 
felf^  or  '  what  reafon  dictates  to  be  oelt,  and 
molt  for  the  perfon's  i?<^/)^i«f/j,  taking  in  the 
whole  of  his  duration/  that  is  the  ft r on ged  mo- 
tive ;  fince  the  di(5iate  of  reafon  '  is  o/ten  over- 
come by  the  greater  v;eight  of  other  confidera- 
tions.^  And  indeed  were  the  diciate  of  reaicn 
always  thfi  ftrorvgeft  motive^,  and  were  the  will 
invariably  dttermined  by  motive  taken  in  ih's 
fenfe,  it  is  plain,  that  fm  would  never  havs  en- 
tered into  the  world.  Now  the  preferableneis 
of  the  objed  in  its  own  nature,  and  as  appre- 
hended by  reafon,  not  being  always  t'he  ground 
or  caufc  of  its  appearing  moil  agreable,  buc 
fomething  diverfe  or  contrary,  in  many  inftan- 
ces  ;  the  queiTion  is,  How  came  beings  made 
\ipright  to  miftake  their  happinefs  upon  the 
whole  ?  For  midake  it  they  mud  ;  (by  fuppo- 
fition)  or  otherwife  in  the /;y^  ad  of  fin  they 
could  not  be  determined  by  the  greateft  appa- 
rent good. 

Here  we  may  enquire,  Whether  In  innocence 
any  thing  but  conformity  and  fubjedlion  to  the 
Creator  could  appear  to  be  the  greateft  good  > 
If  not,  then,  on  Mr.  Edit-ards's  hypothefis,  an 
innocent  creature  could  never  rebel.     If,  on  the 

^ther 

*  P.  17J 


with  the  higheli  Motive.  it 

other  hand,  rebellion  againfl  the  fupreme  caufe 
had  the  appearance  ot  the  greaiefl:  good  to 
Mam  in  innocence,  and  to  apoftale  angels  be- 
fore their  fall,  how  doth  this  eonfift  with  the 
general  opinion  that  hath  been  entertained  of 
the  original  extent  of  their  rational  faculties, 
and  the  fpiritual  image  of  GOD  with  whicii 
they  were  endowed  ?  The  powers  of  intellect 
ifi  innocent  Adam^  for  example,  have  been  fup- 
pofed  fo  great,  that  confiftently  herewith  it  can- 
not be  doubted  but  he  had  the  fulled  view  of 
duty,  and  of  his  higheft  intered  as  connedcd 
with  it  ;  and  confcquenfly  could  have  no  appa- 
rent fuperior  motive  to  tranlgrefs.  If  in  in- 
nocence he  could  not  hefitate  but  ic  was  his 
higheft  duty  to  refrain  from  the  forbidden  fruit, 
he  could  not,  (by  .fuppofition)  hefitate  but 
fuch  acl  of  forbearance  was  alio  his  higheft  hap- 
pincfs.  Therefore  the  greateft  apparent  good 
was  to  recain  his  integrity.  Confcquentiy,  ia 
tranfgrefiing,  his  will  was  not  determined  h)\ 
but  againjl^  the  higheft  motive.  Nor  can  we 
conceive  of  ^  prefampuous  fmner,  on  any  other 
fuppofition- — meaning  hereby,  one  who  a6ts 
zg'um^prejent  convidtion---ov  dire^ly  in  oppofuion 
to  the  light  be  hath  in  the  very   article  of  finning^ 

It  will,  perhaps,  be  faid,  that  innocent  AdanC^ 
higheft  good  was  to  forfeit  his  integrity.  And 
indeed,  on  any  other  hypothefis,  the  controver-, 
fy  fcems  to  be  brought  to  an  iftlie,  and  the  opi- 
nion of  being  always  neceflarijy  determined  by 
the  higheft  motive  given  up.  Now  ftiould  this 
be  faid,  (which  is  at  leaft  imply'd,  if  not  expref- 
fed,  in  what  Mr.  Edwards  hath  remarked  ^  on 
D      '       ""  the 

*  Part  iv.  Sc§.  9« 


12         The  will  not  neceffarily  determimil 

the  advantage  of  fin  to  the  creation)  we  might 
a(k,  whether  fin  could  appear  moft  agreable  to 
an  innocent  creature  from  the  nature  of  the  ohjeo} 
in  itjetf  ?  This,  we  prtfumc  Mr.  Edwcrds  would 
not  fay.  And  if  it  could  noe  thus  appear  from 
its  nacure,  it  will  l>i  difficult  to  (hew  how  fia 
could  b^,  in  any  lenfe,  the  creature's  highefl 
good — Or  how  an  innocent  creature  could  appre^ 
hend'ii  to  be  fo.  But  whenever  it  can  be  (hewn, 
that  innocent  man,  or  rebel  angels  before  their 
fall,  had  a  fall  view  cf  the  fuperior  advantages 
cf  fin  above  innocence  and  righteoufnefs,  we  be- 
lieve no  body  will  think  it  worth  while  to  con- 
trovert farther  about  any  doctrine  of  religion. 
An  hypothcfi^i  ioeAtraofiiinary,  requires  extra- 
ordinary proof.  We  (hall  have  occadon  to  refume 
this  point  under  anoiher  part  of  our  reiiiarks. 

I.H  regarj  to  the  fiiR  entrance  of  fin   into  the. 
world,  we  acknowledge  it  is  an  eVenr,  which  alt 
denonVmaiions  of  p-rofefilng  chriQ'uws  are   cq-ially 
ho)den   to    account    for— yea,   ddfts  2i%   much  as 
(hrillians.     Even  atkdfis  are  no  ofhcr^'ife  excu- 
fcd  than  as,  by  their  principles,  they  are  not  obli- 
ged to  account  for  any  thing      The   truth  is,  no 
bLi^i  can  folve  this  matter.      But  if  xhtfirH  Jinfut 
volition    was  the  necefiliry  produdt  of  (he  iiighelt 
motive  \  then  rebellion  againll  GOD  was  difcer- 
ned  to  be  ihe  highedgood,  whsn  rcafon  andjudg' 
ment  fy(e'y  dilated  and  2^QVirned)  which  they  cer- 
tainly did   whi.s  the  creature  continued  innocent* 
Yea,  ic  follows,    that  the  higheft    motive  to  the 
C/rJator^  as    well  as  creature,    was   in  behalf  of 
moral  evil.       Hov/   then    is  fin    fuch   an   vtfinit^ 
evil  as  we  have  been  rciUght  to  belitve  it  }   Does 
it  n^  t  turn  out  an   i^^mi^ good  ?    Rather,  how 
can  chat  d<;rcrve  the  name  of^J;;,  which  appears 


hy  the  Jircngeji  Mollvu  >g 

ynxjft  agrcaUt  even  to  the  Deity  himfclf  ?  Or 
allowing  fin  to  be  the  greatell  evil,  that  man 
muft  have  an  hard  tafk,  who  un Jertakes  to  fhcw, 
that  it  is  alio  the  grcaieCl  good  :  And  if  not  the" 
greattrt  good,  hosv  k  could  have  this  appearance 
to  creatures  in  a  Hate  of  reditudt:— and  even  to 
Almighty  GOD  himfeif.  Or  if  it  could  noc 
bave  this  appearance  to  any  being  in  a  Rate  of 
rectitude,  how  v/as  it  then  pofuble  for  beings 
niade  upright  to  fall  -,  on  fuppofuion  that  no 
infiance  ot  volition-  cm  be  mentioned  but  what 
is  the  effcCl  of,  or  determined  by,  the  greateil 
apparent  go')d  ?  The  very  idea  of  moral  /<fr- 
feUion  appears  t )  be  loft,  if  we  purfue  ta  the 
end  fuch  an  enquiry  as  Mr.  Edwards  hath  led 
us  into, 

"  That  the  will  always  follov^s  the  lad  prac- 
tical judgment  of  the  underilanding,  hath  paf- 
itA  current  as  a  ma.iim  in  the  fchools  :  So  thac 
if  a  fick  man  fhall,  in  contradidlion  to  his  phy- 
fician's  judgment,  and  his  own,  ind'jlge  his  ap- 
petite for  mtat  or  drink,  he  mud  be  fuppofed 
previoudy  to  have  convinced  himfeif,  that  his 
pr..T^nt  indulgence  is  of  more  value  to  him  than 
his  health,  or  even  his  life.  If  other  men  in- 
dulge their  unreafonable  inclinations  at  the  ex- 
pence  of  intereft,  reputation^  inward  peace,  and 
everlaftmg  falvation,  they  muit  be  fuppofed  to 
judge  with  themfelves,  that  this  vicious  indul- 
gence ought  to  be  preferred  to  interefc,  repu- 
tation, peace  of  conicienee,  and  evcrlafting  fal- 
vation :  This  way  of  thinking,  which  palTcrth  fo 
eafiiy  with  the  learned,  goes  mighty  ill  djwn 
With  m.^n  of  plain  undcrdanding  ;  who,  on  the 
conirary,  incline  to  believe,  that  in  the  pradtice 
of  vice  cucn  ciUier  do  not  think  a;  all;  but  aa 

-like 


14  ^he  will  not  nerejjnrlly  determined 

like  mere  animals  by  the  blind  impulfe  of  ap* 
petite  and  afFedlbn  ;  or  if  they  attend  to  what 
they  are  doing,  that  they  bafely  and  ablurdly 
prefer  a  prcfent  gratification  to  what  ihcy  know 
to  be  their  moft  valuable  interefts  4n  this  life 
and  the  next. 

The  truth  is,  that  man  is  a  compound  of  ra- 
tional and  animal  afFcdions,  that  without  at- 
tending to  himfelf,  fometimes  the  one,  and  at 
other  times  the  other,  ,rnuft  of  necefTity  prevail, 
as  they  happen  to  be  ftrongeil  ;,  and  that, 
through  the  love  of  prefent  pleafure,  and  aver- 
fion  to  prefent  pain,  or  through  mere  pufillani- 
mity,  we  too  often  decline  the  combat ;  and,  in 
contradiction  to  our  reafon,  ourronfcienee,  and 
all  the  mod  weighty  confiderations  of  honour 
and  .inrerefl:,  refpedmg  this  life  and  the  next, 
fuffer  the  animal  to  prevail  over  the  rational 
.affedtions. 

For.  the  remedy,  then,  of  this  greateil  of  all 
.evils,  it  is  not  enough  the  judgm.ent  be  well  in- 
formed, ;  bccaule  however  dcfirous  we  are  of 
having  the  authority  pf  our  judgment  for  what- 
ever we  do,  and  however  much  we  will  en- 
deavour to  reconcile  our  judgment  wich  our  in- 
clination ;  yet  when  that  cannot  be  done,  we 
will  too  often  purfue  our  inclination  in  contra- 
didion  to  our  ju Jgmenr,  The  only  remedy 
thercfoie  under  heaven  is,  to  endeavour,  by  all 
means  .in  our  power,  to  make  our  raiional  a 
match,  and,  as  much  as  pofilble,  an  overmatch, 
for  our  animal  affedions  :  In  which  employ- 
jTjent  we  have  a  title  to  all  the  aiTiilance,  which 
the  teachers  of  xiiankind  can  afford  us  -,  and  to 

ftimulatej^ 


h  the  flrongeft  MotiDel  i^ 

Emulate,   direiSl,  and  fupport  us   in  this   ardu- 
,ous  tafk,  Teems  to  be  their  chief  bufimfsy  ^ 

*  The  thing  of  chief  importance  in  his  dif- 

courfc/ 

*  Dr.  OfwaJd^s  appeal   to  common  icnfe  in  behalf  of 
religion,  p.  156,  7,  8.  margin. 

«  The  perception   or  laft  judgment  of  the  underftand- 
ing,  is  as  diftin^t  from  the  actual    e;>certion  of  the 
felf-motivc  power,  as  feeing  the  way  is  from   walk'^ 
ing  in  it»       Nor  will  it  follow,    becaufe   the  percep- 
tion of  the  underftanding  is  denied  to  be  the  imme- 
diate, efficient,  neccflftiry  caufe  of  the  exertion  of  the 
felf-motive  power,  that  therefore  umntelligent  matter 
maybe  capable  of  fel  f- motion  ;    any   more  than  it 
will  follov/,  if  a  man's  eyes  be  denied  to  be  the   im- 
mediate, efficient,  neceiTiry  caufe  of  his  walking, 
that  therefore  the  man  ipay  be  capable  of  walking, 
though  he  has  neither  legs  nor  life.      A  man's   un- 
derftanding judges  of  what  he  is  to   do,  as  his  iyes 
difcern  the  way.      But  a  blind  or  winking  man  has 
power  to  walk  without  feeing.     What  refemblance 
is  there  between  an  aSiion^  and  a  perceptian  of  the 
Wiind  ?  There  muft  therefore  be  fome  diftindl  prin- 
ciple of  motion  and  aflion,  independent  on  the  per- 
ceptive faculty.      That  *  exertion  which  makes  ac' 
tion  to  be  a^ion  is  entirely  a  diflin£l  thing  from  that 
perception  ox  judgment^  by   which   a  man   determines 
beforehand  concerning  the  reafonabUnefs  or  iitnefs  of 
what  he  is  about  to  aft  :    An  agent  not  afting  ac- 
cording to  the  lafl  judgment  of  his  underftanding,  is 
like  a  man  {hutting  his  eyes,  and  walking  at  a  ven- 
ture down  a  precipice.*      (Dr.   Samuel  Clark's  an- 
fwer  to  a  third  letter  from  a  Gentleman  of  the  Uni- 
verfity  of  Cambridge,  annexed  to  a  colle^ion  of  pa- 
pers between  Mr.  Leibnitz  and  Dr.  Claris) 

It  fs  no  uncommon  thing  *  for  men  to  rM  againjl 
ihe  light,  nat  which  they  do,  they  allow  not.  The 
J2W  in  the  msmb^rs  warcth  againftths  iawin  the  mind. 

Jiiftea4 


l6  ^hs  wl/l  not  mceffarily   deter mmd 

courfe,*  M%  Edwurd;  tells  us  is  this,  *  That  the 
will  is  always  determined  hy  the  ftrongeft  motive* 
This,  he  infifts,  '  is  the  previous  ground  and 
reafm  of  every  a^  of  volition  \  io  that  in  the  na- 
ture of  ihin^s  volition  cannot  take  place  without^ 
hut  is  connefled  with  it,  as  the  producing,  ef- 
yiciENT  caujc*       la  this  principle  his   whole 

fcheme 

—Video,  mellera  proboque  ; 
Dettriora  fequor. 
Infteadof  fayingithatprefumptuous  ofFenders  followthe 
laftjudgment  of  their  underjiandingywhen  their  thcughts 
the  mean  while  accufe  tkem^  it  is  more  proper  to  fay, 
that  they  follow  the  didlateof  /«//,  pafflon,  or  appe- 
tite. Mr.  Edvjards  allows,  that  men  cio  not  always. 
follow  the  dictate  of  r/^n  :  (p,  17)  They  there- 
fore fometimes  follow  the  dictate  of  forne  other  fa- 
culty, diJlinSl  from,  and  in  oppofition  to  it.  Mr. 
Edwardsy  indeed,  includes  more  than  reafon  and 
judgment  in  the  phrafe,  the  dictate  of  the  undcr- 
ilanding  :  But  taking  the  unJetftanding  in  his  fenfe 
for  *  the  whole  facultv  of  perception,*  it  is  as  difte- 
lent  from  animal  affection  and  appetite  as  any  two 
things  can  be.  Ani  '  \^  it/ict  propriety  of  fpeccl;  be 
infiftcd  on/  a  man  muit  be  faid  \o  fo'low  the.  di(5tate 
oi  that  faculty  which  h.^.t!)  il^e  afcendant  at  any  time  ; 
whether  it  be  the  UM^erftindinii  or  linimai  appetite  : 
Otherwife  we  confound  V\t  ^'ift.rid-^ii  between  that 
faculty,  in  refpc<5t  of  wh^ch  GOD  hath  taught  us 
more  than  the  bsafis  of  the  fitid^  and  the  appetites  he 
hath  ^iven  us  in  conimon  with  them. 

*  Inteu.igent  beings  vQi  fometimes  on  the 
view  oijitcng  motivej,  fomit  mes  upon  -iveak  ones, 
fometimes  wnere  things  are  abfolutely  indifferent. 
In  which  laft  cafe  there  may  be  very  good  reafn  to 
fl^,  though  two  or  more  w^vj  <?/ sdtmg  may  be  ab- 
folutely indifferent  :  Ihe  Twtive^  or  thing  ccnfidered 
as  in  \\tw,  is  fometh'ng  exirinfic  to  the  mind.  ]  he 
'tmprejjvm  made  upon  the  mind  by  the  motive,  is  the 
perceptive  quality^  m  which  the  miad  is  piuQivc  :  The 

doing 


ly  the  ftrengefi  Mctivel  1 7 

fcheme  is  founded^ — (wlthcut  having  ihewn  what 
it  is  that  gives  Ibcn^th  and  energy  to  the  n;o- 
tive  thac  dercrmioes  the  .wili— what  it  is  thac 
gives  or  confti-utes  the  agreable  appearance  in  an 
objtd  of  iluiice — to  whii*:  t*)e  prtpcDuerancy*  or 
efficiency  of  it  upcn  the  will  is  to  be  afcribcd) 
Let  us  enquire  how  this  "  pofuion  of  chief  imr 
pcrrancc'  is  fupported. 

As  no  authority  can  be  of  equal  weight  to 
overthrow  this  main  pofition  as  the  authors  own, 
we  beg  the  reader  wou'd  confider  the  following 
pafTage  •,  which  is  ^o  full  10  our  purpofe,  thac 
we  are  faved  the  trouble  of  a  laboured  confu- 
tation of  the  principle  alluded  to.  '  I  have 
rather  chole  to  exprefs  myftlf  thus,  that  the 
will  always  is  as  the  greatelt  apparent  good,  or 
AS  what  appears  molt  agreable,  is,  than  to  fay, 
that  the  will  is  determined  by  the  greatefl 
apparent  good,  or  hy  what  Teems  mod  agreable  : 
Bccaufe  an  appearing  mojl  agreable  ;  or  pkafing 
10  the  mind,  and  the  mind's  preferring  and  chu- 
fing,  feem  hardly  to  be  properly  and  perfedly 
DISTINCT.  If  i\ndi  propriety  of  fpeech  be  in- 
fifted  en,  it  may  more  properly  be  laid,  that  the 
voluntary  action,  which  is  the  immediate 
PRuiT  and  CONSEQUENCE  of  the  mind's  voli- 
tion 

doing  of  any  thing  vpon  and  after ^  or  in  conff  quence 
of  that  p<'rception,  ti.is  is  the  power  cffelf-moucn^  or 
aaion — Which,  in  a!)  animate  agents,  \s  fpantaneity  ^ 
and  in  moral  agenti,  what  we  call  liberty.  The  not 
dijiir.guijhing  thefe  things,  but  confounding  the /nc- 
live  with  \X\t  principle  oj  at^icn,  and  denying  the  mind 
to  have  any  principle  of  cMicn  befides  the  motive^  is  the 
ground  of  the  whole  error.*  Papers  between  Mr* 
L(ihnit%  and  l^u  Clark ^  p.  181  >  28  j. 


1 8         ^ifg   will  not  nscejarily  deter  mned 

tio«  or  choice,  is  determined  by  that  which* 
appears   mqft  agreabU,  than   tae  preference   or 

choice  ITS£LF.' "^ 

Here  it  is  fully  declared,  that,  ^  properly 
fpcaking,'  voiition  and  the  hightft  motive  are 
not  DISTINCT  things — that  the  former  is  only 
as  the  laiicrr,  and  not  determined  by  it.  Motiye 
cannot  be  the  grouTid  and  dete/miner  of  volition,'' 
and  at  the  fame  time  the  a3t  of  volition  itjelf. 
It  is  not  the  cauje  of  volition,  but  the  things  *  if 
llrid:  propriety  of  fpecch  be  infifted  on.*  In- 
Itead  of  the  ftrongeft  motived  being  the  caufe  of 
volition,  the  real  truth  is,  that  volition  is  the 
caufe  of  external  d^ion.  It  is  this  only,  '  wh^ch 
is  the  immediate  fruit  and  conffqucnce  of  the 
mind's  volition,  that  is  determined  by^  the  ftron- 
geft  motive.  The  reafon  is  obvious  :  '  For  an 
appearing  mod  agreabie  to  the  mind,  and  the 
inmd*s  actually  preferring  and  chuf^ng^  are  not  aij- 
tinot^  but  thejame  thing.  *  It  is  not,  therefore, 
good  fenic*  to  lay  the  former  determines  the  lat- 
ter—^to  ipeak  of  motive  as  the  previous  ground, 
reafon^  or  cauje  of  the  exertion  of  an  ad  of 
the  will- — that  volition  cannot  take  place 
v/ithout  this  as  the  antecedent  caufe.  *  It  is  not 
good  fcnle  tofpeak  of  volition  as  from  motive — 
PROM  THE  INFLUENCE  of  the  motivc^  and  from 
the  mflue^ice  that  the  motive  hath  on  the  man  for 
the  production  of  an  a6i  of  volition,  ■\ 

V/hen  Mr.  Edzvards  faith,  '  it  is  the  volunta-^ 
ry  a^ion^  and  not  the  will^  which  is  determined 
by  the  higheft   motive,'  there  can  be  no  doubc 
but  he  means  corporeal  adion  :  For  thus  he  ex- 
plains 

!!*  P,  llall,  t  P«l*2>   I23?. 


by  the  firongefl  Motive:  29 

plains  himfelf,  '  the  voluntary  aflion,  which  is 
iht  fruit  ^nd  confiquence  of  the  mind's  voliiion 
or  choice' — cxprelsly  diftinguifhing  it  (as  in  the 
next  following  words)  from  '  the  adl  of  voliti- 
on, or  the  preference  and  choice  iifclf  *  Inftead 
of  fhewing,  therefore,  (as  he  undertook;  what 
determines  the  will,  Mr.  Edwards  hath  only  la- 
boured ta  prove,  that  the  will  determines  the 
a£lions  of  the  tody — For  inftance,  '  the  will  de- 
termines, by  an  ad  of  volition  or  choice,  which 
way  the  hands  ^nd  feet  fhali  move.'  *  Bodily 
adlion  is  the  ^<?^?,  fruity  conjequence  of  the 
will's  determination,  dependent  on  it,  and  con- 
neded  with  it,  as  its  caul'e  and  determiner.  The 
will  itjelf\%  exerciled  m  prefering,  chufing,  de- 
termining -,  the  body  in  thofe  motions  aiid  ope- 
rations, which  are  tne  effect  of  the  will's  deter- 
mination. 

Thus  volition  being  nothing  diverfe  fron?)  the 
ftrongeft  motive,  but  the  fame  thing  with 
it — it  being  improper  to  fay,  that  the  will  is  de- 
termined by  the  ftrongeft  motive ;  there  can  be 
•  no  fuch  relation  between'  motive  and  volition 
'  as  is  fignified  by  the  terms  caufe  and  effe^^ 
We  are  '  brought  to  the  contradi<::tion  of  a  caufe 
and  no  caufe  ;  that  which  is  the  ground  and 
rcafon  of  the  exiftence  of  a  thing,  and  at  the 
fame  time  is  not  the  ground  and  reafon  of  its 
exiftence' — (^p.  103,  103)  the  ftrongeft:  motive 
*is  dererminer  and  determined  -,  mover  and  mov- 
ed ;  a  caufe  that  adts  and  produceth  eftcds  up- 
on itfelf^ — (p.  7)  *  volition  is  from  a  caufe,  and 
no  caufe  5   the  fruit  of  motive,  and  not  the  fruit 

£  9| 

■    2?.  474 


sh        ^he  fvrllmt  ncceffarily  diisrmhed 

of  motive;   the  beginning  of  motion  and  eier- 
Eion,  and  yet  confequeht  oh  previous  exertion  5 
feif- origin  a  ted,  and  hath  its  original  from  fome- 
thing  cife.     Catife  and  eKTedt,'  though,i*tcrfns  of 
oppofite  fignification/  are  the  fame  thing—''  Vo- 
lition  is  ihe  efFedl  bf  volition,  and  the  caufe  of 
volition— ch(6ice  is  fubje(5l  to  choice,  command- 
ed by,  and  the  prbcfucc  of,  an  antecedent  adt  of 
choice.*      Motive  '  is  th«  previous  ground  and 
rea/o?i  of  the  adls  of  the  wili^ — ^^Yea,  the  neccfTary 
ground  and  reafon  of  their  exertion  ;    without 
which  they  will  not  be  iexerred,  and  cannot,  ia 
the  nature  of  things,  take  place  :    And  they  do 
excite  thefe  a'As  of  the  tv'iH,  and  do  iIms  by  s 
prevailing  ihf^tiehce  5    yea,  an   infiuence  which 
prevails  to  the  produdVion  of  the  a6l  of  the  will, 
and  for  the  difpofing  of  the  mind  to  it.     NoW  if 
mocives  difpofc  the  mind  to  adlion,  then  thty 
caufe  the  mind  to  be  difpofed  ;  and  to  caufc  the 
ifnind  t©  be  difpofed,  is  to  eaufe  it  to  be  willing ; 
^hd   to  caufe  it  to  be  vviHing,  is  to  caufe   it  to 
will    ',    and  that  is  the  fame  thing  as  to  be  the 
eaufe  of  an  aft  of  t^e  will.     And  yet  it  is  hardly 
proper  to  fuppofe  motive  to  be  a  eaufe  of  an 
ad  of  the  v^^ill  ;    or  that  a  principle  of  will  is 
moved,  or  caufed  to  be  cx'erted  by  it  -,    or  that 
ft  has  any  catifality  in   the  prbdudtion   6f  it  :' 
And  that  for  this  very  good  i^eafon^   that  thcjr 
:5rc  not  distinct.  * 

W^  *  hbpcr'  ^c  *  need  n^  iibdw  jit  ill'  to 
fhew  the  abfurdity'  of  this  fche'mh  *  and  whac 
ah  v/hole  heap  of  rhCohfi'ftHicieJ  we  haVe  htrr. 
The  matter  is  -already  lb.  pT^iify,  Ws  t^  render  any; 
fcafoning  upon  it  impertinent/ 

Mr; 


iy  th  JiroH^eJl  Motive:  «"? 

"Mr.  Edwards  aflerts,  as  well  as  Mr.  Chuh^^ 
*that  volition  is  not  governed  by  fuperior  ftrcngtli 
of  the  motive  that  is  followed,  beyond  motives  to 
the  contrary,  previous  to  volition  itfelf.'  p.  12^) 
It  appears,  on  Mc,  Edwards's  '  fuppofuion,  that 
volition  mud  be  without  any  previous  ground 
in  any  motive  •,  thus  :  If  it  be,  as  he  fuppofeth, 
that  the  will  is  not  determined'  by  the  gr^atcO: 
.apparent  good' — that  this  is  nothing    '  didind* 
from  volition  5  then  volition  cannot  be  owiiig  to 
any  previous  ground,   or   caufality,  or  f^iperior 
flrcngth  of  the   motive  that   is   followed,   any 
more  than   on  the  fuppofition  <5f  the  wiU's  d^- 
tcrmining  itfelf, :  there  being  no  diftin^ion  be- 
tween the    higheft  motive,  and  the  adl  of  voli- 
tion.      To  fay,  therefore,   that  the   former  de- 
termines the  latter,  is  to  fay,  that  the  will  is 
felf-dctermined.    Yet  Mr.  Edwardi  fays,  '  There 
is  fuch  a  thing  as  a  diverfity  of  flrength  in  mo- 
tives to  choice  previous  to  the  choice  iiftlf.'  (p»' 
125)     He  has  not  (hewn  us  wherein  this  diver- 
fity  lies  \  or  how  motives  have  a  ftrength  pre* 
xlous  to  choice,   and  yet  are  not  dijiind  from  it. 
Would    he   fay,  that  motives    have   a   fuperior 
ilrength  ^rm</^^j   to  their  ftarjing  in  the  mind^s 
view  ?    or  is   their  appearing  flrongeft  to   the 
mmd  antecedent  to  the  choice  -,  or  co-temporary 
v;ith  it.       The  latter   doubtlefs  :  For   th;s  ap-; 
pearance  is  not  dillin'fl  from  the  mind's  choice.' 
tiad  Mr.    I^divards  proved,  (as   be  aflerts)   that 
there  is  a  *preponderancy  of  the   inclination  previa 
ous  to  the  acl  of  choice/  (p.  260)  it  might  have 
cleared  the  matter.     Bot  '•  certainly,  there  is  ;no 
need  of  multiplying  words.     We  prefume  there 
is  nothing   more  unintelligible,  and  void  ofdif- 
iiaGt^  coaiiftenc  meaning,  ia. all  the  v/ntings  cf 


±1  Th  will  mi  necejfarlly  determined 

UDuns  Scotus^  and  Thomas  Aquinas.'*  *  (p.  122) 
That  we  have  not  taken  advantage  of  a 
paffage  madvcrtent'y  wrote  by  Mr.  Edwards^  the 
reader  may  lee  by  taming  to  it.  (p.  11,  12) 
He  is  there  txbrhUin^  his  pian^  and  intimates  his 
care  to  exprels  himielf  with  precijjon,  and  fo  as 
i3ot  to  be  milaf^prehcnded.  It  is  at  his  en- 
trance on  his  work.  Says  he,  '  1  have  rather 
chojen  to  expr^fs  myfelf  (hus^  that  t.he  will  always 
is  as  the  greacell  app,^rent  good, than  to  lay,  ihc 
will  is  ditermined  by  the greateftapparenr good'.; 
and  proceeds  to  afiign  a  r^fl/^«  for  his  ihus  je^pref- 
iilnghimfelf:  ^Becaufean  appearing  moft  agreable' 
to  them  nd,  and  the  mind*s  chufing,  leem  nardiy 
to  be  properly  and  perfediy  dijiin^.  If  firi5i 
fropriety  iif  Jpeecb  be  infifted  on,  it  may  more 
properly  be  faid,  that  the  voluntary  action^  which 
is  the  fruit  and xonj^quen^e  of  the  rpind's  choice, 
is  determined  by  that  which  appears  moft  agrea- 
ble,  than  the  preference  ov_<:\\o\ct  it felf*  Who 
will  fay  Mr.  Edwards  hath  not  here  *.expre fled 
himfclf  with  ftridt  proj.ricty,'  and  given  a  good 
reafcn  for  '  exprefTing  himlelf  thus  ?' 

*  Feom  things  that, have. been'  rcrparked,  vye 

think 

♦  <  It  is  indeed  impoffible  to  offer'  Mr.  Edwards's  <  ar- 
gument without  overthrowing  it  •,  the  thing  fuppofed 
in  it  being  incopfiftcnt  with  itfelf,  and  thct  which 
denies  itfelf  (p.  82}  Motive  goes  b^fcrey  and  is  the 
^r^'tf'z/^,?,'' of  volition,  \K\\\Q.h  follows  i\  but  is  liOtdiSiin^f 
from  it.  By  hif  argument,. '  the  /ry?  fin ful  volition 
was  detfti mined  by  aforegoing  (infu)  vo'ition  j  the 
£rft  fm'u!  a<El  of  choice  was  before  the  firft  finful 
a<ft  of  cloice  ^arc'  chofen  and  determined  bv  it.* 
(p  377.8J  For  the  hip^heft  ni«tivc  is  the  fame  as 
vo'ition,  and  th'-  fiiftfm^u]  volition  (prang  from  th.c 
hij^ncfl  mctive  :  M.,  Edvjards  alio  fpcaks  of  chufmg 
^s  a  man  pleajdh'^u  c.  as  he  du/a/j* 


fy  the  Jlronge/I  Motive:  s^ 

ihlnk  it  clearly  follows,  th^z  Mr.  Edwards  hath 
equally  failed  in  pointing  out  the  more  immedi- 
-att  caufe  of  volition,  as  its  original  czui^.  By 
his  own  declaration,  the  will  is  not  determined 
hyy  but  the  fame  thing  with,  the  ftrongeft  mO' 
tive.  H«  hath  only  {hewn  wriat  determines  ex^ 
iernal  action  or  condu5f — a  point  very  different 
from  the  «  ecemiination  of  the  will.  And  hence 
(according  to  IMr.  Edwards^  own  reafoning)  the 
enquiry,  '  What  deteimines  the  will  ?'  is  pre- 
cifely  the  fame  with  this,  *  What  caujeth  an  ob- 
je^  to  appear  moft  agreable  ?*  A  very  different 
enquiry,  furely,  irom  this.  Whether  volition  is 
^^,  or  according  to,  the  agreable  .appearance  of 
an  objedl  ?  unlefs  we  will  confound  caufe  and 
effcd.  The  agreable  appearance,  faith  Mr. 
hdwardsy  is  the  mind'^  preference,  choice,  or 
determination.  :Buc  antecedent  to  the  mind*s 
view  of  the  object,  there  muft  be  romething  in 
it  fthe  objt^]  to  caufe  it  to  appear  agreable 
whea  viewed-r-fonieihing  independent  on,  and 
prior  to  the  view— or  the  mind  muft  be  in  fuch 
a  particular  (late,  frame,  or  temper — or  view 
the  object  under  fuch  and  fuch  ci  re  urn  fiances,  in 
ordtr  ^o  it^s  appearing  thus  and  thus  agreable. 
Now  when  It  can  be  diilindly  ihewn,  what  that 
is  in  any  objedl  it/elf,  or  iii  the  ftate,  manner, 
and  circumllances  of  the  mind  viewing  it,  which 
caafcth  (produceth)  the  agreable  appearance  ; 
then,  perhaps,  the  determining  caufe  of  volition 
may  be  dilcovcred.  That  which  caufeth  the 
agreable  appearance,  produceth  the  highell  mo- 
tive, that  is,  volition.  Upon  Mr.  Edwards's 
own  {late  of  the  queflion,  there  is  no  making 
any  fenfe  of  his  words,  to  fay,  that  the  higheft 
motive  is  the  caufe,  or  determiner  of  volition; 
—  "       -"-    ^         This 


t4         ^^^  ^^^^'  ^^^  fiecejjarily  diiermmd 

This  he  hath,  in  exprefsA&rms  demcd.  And  y«t 
great  part  of  his  book  was  wrote  to  prove  it. 
It  is  the  *  pofition  of  chief  . importance  ii\  his 
difcourfe/ 

It  will  pdlTibly  be  faid,  *  There  is  no  need  of 
fuppofing  the  ftrongtft  niotive.  to  be  prior  to,  or 
4ijiin5l  ixom^  volition  •,  but  that  the  latter  is  de- 
termined by  the  former  in  the  very  a6t  of  voli- 
tion'.     To  this  it  is  fvifficienf  to  anfwer  in  Mr. 
JE^ze^arJi's  own  wojds,  *  that  the  will  is  not  de* 
Urmined  hy  the  greateft  apparent  good,  but  the 
a6kion,  v/hich  is  the/ra//  ot  vohtion.  Is  deter- 
mined hereby'.     Thc^ugh  we  Riay  infift  on  this 
as  a  full   reply  to  the   objedtion  ;    yet  we   may 
.  alfo  add,  with  much  propriety,  Mr.   Edwards's 
remarks  *  on  the  fcheme  of  his  opponents,  with 
the  fmall  aUeration,which  the  reader  will  obferve 
by  the  words  not  included  under  inverted  cam- 
mas. 

First,  *  |f  the  determining  aft'  (the   highefl: 

.  motive)  '  be  before  the  determined  in  order  of  na- 

ture,  being  the  caufe,  ground,  or  reafon  of  its 

pxiftence,  this  as  much  proves   it  to  be  dill\n^ 

from  it,  2^vy(Mndeptndent  on  it^  as  if  it  were  in  or- 

i  der  of  titm\ 

SECONDLY,  *If  the  determining  ad'(the  (Ircn- 

■geft  motive /is  not  before  the  determined, inorder 

,  c^  ^me  or  nature,  nor  dlflind  from  ic — 1   would 

..  99    this  obfcrvc,  that  the  thing  in  queftion  Teems 

to  be  forgotten,  or   kept  our  of  fighf,  /;;  a  dark- 

■  nefs^  and.unintelligiblenejs  of  fpeech.    The  quellion 

ih 


?y  We  Jtrongeft  Mott^l  ^l 

IS,  Wliat  influenccth,  dircds,  oi-  dctfrmincs  the 
rnind  or  will  to  come  to  fuch  i  choice  as  it  does  I 
or  what  is  the  caufc,  ground,  or  rrafon,  whyit 
coticludcs  thus,  and  not  othcrwife  ?  Now  it  muft 
be  anfwercd,  according  to,  Mr.  Edwards's  'no- 
tion, that  the  will  influences,  orders,  and  deter- 
mines itfelf.  For  the  will  is  determined  by  the 
ilfongcfl;  motive,  and  this  is  nothing  dijlinrt  from 
volition.  Now  that  the  ftrongeft  motive  *  cau- 
feth,  influenceth,  and  determineth  the  will,  and 
yet  is  not  antecedent  to  it  •,'  nor  diftind  from 
it,  *is  a  eontradidion,'  To  fay  that  one'  thing 
is  the  caufe  or  reafon  of  another,  is  to  fay,  tliac 
the  former  is  prior  to  the  latter.  The  caufe  is 
diilind  from  the  efFe(51:,  and  prior  to  it.  To  fay, 
that  the  ftrongeft  motive,  'orders,  influences, 
determines   the  ad  of  volition,'   and  yet  is  not 

*  properly  diftind,  is  to  make  the  exertion  both 
caufe  and  efFedl.  The  queftion  is.  What  is  the 
caufe  and  reafon  of  the  lours  exerting  fuch  an 
ad  ?  -To  which  the  anfwer  is,  the  foul  exerts 
fuch  an  adj  and  that  is  the  caufe  of  it.  And  fo, 
by  this^  the  exertion  muft  be  prior  to,  and  dif- 
tind  from  itfelf.* 

ThiR&ly,  *If  the  meaning  be,  that  volition 
has  no  caufe,  and  rs  no  efled:,  bat  comes  into 
exiftehce  of  itfelf^  without  any  ground  or  reafon'; 
Mr.  Edwards  then,  'dorh  nothing  but  confound 
himfelf  and  others  with  words  without  a  mean- 
ing. *  There  is  a  great  noifc  made  about  'mo- 
tive's 

*  Mr.  Edwards  had  a  common  right  with  others  to  ex- 
prefs  his  thoughts  in  his  own  way.  But  we  fhould 
Ka^e  been  gla^,  if  he  had  fixed  a  prccife  meanirg  to 
^is  oWa  tenant    And  tliou.gh  he  hath  fpcnt  a  large 

number 


t4  Tie, will  net  necej/arily  ieterfnined 

tive's  fovereigDty  and  energy',  as  the  fource  of- 
all  ads  of  the  will  j  biu  when  the  matter  comes 
to  be  explained,:  the  meaning  is,  that  thefe  adts 
arile  from  nothing,  no  caufe,  no  power,  no  in- 
fluence, being  at  all  concerned  in  the   matter.' 

And 

number  of  pages  (  from  p.  i,— '4}.)  in  explaining 
terms,  yet  nis  definitions  are  fo  lengthy  and  lax,  his 
ufe  of  fome  words  fo  different  from  what  is  common, 
yea,(o  differently  does  he  himfeif  ufe  the  fame  terms, 
that  the  reader  is  almoft  unavoidably  confounded  in  a 
jumble  of  indeterminate  words  and  phrafes.  Wc 
fliall  give  a  few  inftances.  l^he  term  tiUl  is  forae- 
times  ufed  for  an  ahjirall  power,  property,  or  faculty  ; 
(p.  38,  39.)  bomctimes  it  is  confounded  with  mo- 
tive-t  (p.  II,  12.)  while  at  other  times,  and  indeed 
more  generally,  it  is  ufed  to  denote  the  agent — As 
where  the  will  is  faid  to  be  the  fuhjfH  of  commands^ 
gee  — where  the  a£is  of  the  will  are  fpokcri  of— 
wh-rc  motives  are  reprcfented  as  infiuencing  and  dtter- 
viining  it,  i.  e.  the  agent.  (  For  motives  do  not  in- 
fluence mecr  properties.) 

By  motive  ( the  higheft  )  he  explains  himfelf  to 
mean  the  fame  as  volition -y  fp.  li.  n.)  while 
he  alfo  undcrftands  by  it  fomething  extrinfic  ftanding 
in  the  mind's  view,  and  having  a  tendency y  by  the  ap- 
pearance it  makes,  to  excite  and  engage  the  mind  to 
fuch  and  fuch  volitions — i.  e.  to  incline  and  difpofe 
it  to  fuch  and  fuch  a  choice.  Again,  he  means  by 
motives,  inclifiaiicn  or  difpofuion^  and  exprefly  blends 
•moral  motives  and  inducements*  with*W;/;  and 
difpofnnni  of  the  heart,*  making  them  the  fame.  (  p. 
319,  31.)  That  is,  motives  are  fomething  without 
themfclvfs,  and  have  a  tendency  to  excite  and  engage 
10  thtmfelves,  and  arc  uot  diJiinSi  from  thcmfelvc$» 
(p.  8,9,  II.) 

In  like  manner,  while  he  is  taking  pains  to  make  out 
a  diftin^ign  betwcea  naturel  and  mgrd  neceffity^  \a 

C9af»uncla 


hy  thg  flrongeft  M9ttvel  tf 

And  yet  it  is  maintained,  that  *  all  a£^s  of  voli- 
tion have  a  prior  ground  and  rcafon  of  their  par- 
ticular exiftence  ;  a  caufe  ;  which  antece- 
dently determines  them  to  be,  and  to  be  jufl: 
as  they  are.  Now  how  can  thcfe  things  hang 
together  ?' 

Wr.  Edwards  criticifeth  Dr.  Clark  for  ad- 
m'tting  '  the  neceflary  connedion  of  volition 
With  the  lad  diftate  of  the  underftanding  •,'  and 
yet  'fuppofing  the  latter  not  to  be  diverfe  from 
the  adt  of  the  will  itfelf/  He  hath  this  re- 
mark on  the  Dodor,  *  If  the  d  date  of  the  un- 
derilanding  be  the  v try  fame  with  the  determi- 
nation of  the  will  or  choice,  then  this  determi- 
nation is  no  fruit  or  effcd  of  choice.'  And  on- 
wards :  If  thefe  '  be  the  fame^  then  liberty  con- 
fifts  in  the  mind's  having  power  to  have  whac 
diktat  s  of  the  underftandmg  it  pleafes,  having 
opportunity  to  chufe  its  own  didates  of  under- 

F  {landing/. 

confounds  them — (at  leaft  in  our  apprchenfion.  Part 
I.  Sea.  4.) 

The  term  caufe^  as  it  hath  bsen  generally  ufed,  denotes  ^ 
efficiency^  and  has  relation  to  an  eiFcd  produced — And 
Mr.  Edwards  himfelffays  (after  Spinoza  and  Hohbs) 
*  that  if  it  be  not  fufficient  to  produce  the  cfFed,  or 
doth  not  always  necejfarily  produce  it,  there  is  no  (uch 
relation  fubfifting  as  wc  fignify  by  the  terms  caufe 
and  effed.  That  which  fcems  to  be  the  caufV ,  can 
be  no  caufe.*  Yet  he  tells  us,  'that  he  fometimcs 
ufcs  the  word  caufe  to  fignify  any  antecedent^  which 
is  perhaps  rather  an  occafton  than  a  caufe  of  an  event 
or  thing  ;  and  the  word  effeSf^  for  the  conjequence  of 
another  thmg*.  (p  58,  59,  103)  But  whoever  fup- 
pofcd  the  mccr  oicafiQn  oi  a  thing  or  evcHt  to  be  the 

fnufi 


2^         7hs  will  not  necejfarily   dettrmlmd' 


ftanding.'  "^  Might  not  cne  in  Dr.  ClarBs 
behalf  Uius  reply  ?  '  Mr.  Edwards  fuppofcth  that 
volition  hath  a  necefTaiy  conne^lion  with  the  high- 
eft  motive — and  that  the  later  is  not  properly  dif- 
tindfiom  theadof  rhe  will.  If  the  higheii  motive 
be  the  very  y^;?/^  with  the  determination  of  the  will 
or  choice,  then  this  determination  is  x\o  fruit  or 
effe.l^  of  motive.  Moreover,  Mr.  Edwards  hath 
•  csprell'<;d  himfclf  thus,  it  is  not  proper  to  fayv 
^  that  the  acfl:  of  volition  itfelf  is  determined  by 
•the  higheft  motive.'  If  thefe  be  the  fame,  then 
liberty  confifts  in  a  man's  having  power  to'  have 
what  motives  he  pleafcs,    having  opportunity  to 

chuls 

£aufe  thereof,  in  fach  a  fenfe  as  trjat  the  thing  or  e- 
vent  is  necejjurih  dependent  on,  connected  with,  and 
proceeds  from  the  occ2fiQnofit  ?  Our  Lord's  co- 
ming was  the  antecedent  and  occsfion  of  difcord  and 
war.  Did  thefe  neceffarily  proceed  from  his  coming  I 
Was  there  no  more  in  the  confequent  than  in  the 
antecedent  ?  Had  Mr.  Edwards  ufed  the  terms  occa- 
fion  and  confequence,  inftcad  of  caufe  and  eftlct,  in 
thofe  parts  of  his  book,  where  (by  his  own  acicnow- 
ledgement)  the  former  would  have  been  more  pro- 
per, he  m.ight  have  been  better  underftood,  and  would 
have  taken  a  iikdicr  method  to  '  cut  offoccafion  from 
cavillers  and  objectors.*  (p.  59,  393,  .q^,  mar- 
gin.) 

The  reader  will  a?fo  take  notice  of  the  promlfcuous  ufc 
of  the  words  caufe^  ground^  rtafon.  So  far  ai^  an  zdd- 
on  is  conformable  to  right  reafon,  fo  much  reafm 
there  is  for  it,  and  no  more.  Every  inftance  of  the 
divine  condua  hath  2i  Jufficicnt  vcs^ion  :  It  is  not  fo 
with  the  condua  of  the  creature.  As  much  y^;z  as 
there  is  in  the  world,  fo  much  adioa  there  is  without 
reafon, 

t  P.  ix4>  1x5. 


l>y  the  firGngeft  Motive^.  f'lf 

chufe  his  own  motives.  But  this  is  abfurd  : 
For  it  fuppofcth  the  choice  is  already  maJe,  be- 
fore the  motive  has  its  efFe6t  •,  and  that  the  vo- 
lition is  already  ex6t ted  :  That  is,  choice  is  prior 
to  choice.  Mr,  Ed^wards  recurs  to  the  old  ab- 
furdicy  of  one  decerrn-nation  before  another,  and 
the  caufe  of  it  ;  and  another  before  that,  deter- 
mining that  ;  and  fo  on  in  infinitum.^  Thus 
mighc  his  cricicifm  on  Dr.  Clark  be  replied  to. 

Upon  the  whole  :  The  queftion,  What  deter- 
•miaes  the  will  ?  is  '  unanfwered,  and  yet  re- 
turns'  For  aught  that  appears  from  Mr.  £i- 
wards^s  difcourfe,  the  will  is  not  properly  deter- 
mined ac  all.  'Inftead  of  folving  the  difficult 
ty^  or  anfwering  the  queftion  wuh  regard  to 
volition,  namely,  How  it  comes  to  exift  ?  (as 
he  propofcch  ic)  he  forgets  himfeif,  and  anfwers 
another  queftion  quite  diver fe,  and  wholly'  re- 
mate,  nan?*ely,  What  determines  ;;?^/m^/a6Hon  ? 
The  queftion  is,  How  volition  itfelf  comes  to 
exiit  ?  By  v/Iiar  caufe  it  is  produced  ?  '  Why 
the  foal  exerts  fuch  an  aft,  and  not  another  ? 
Or  why  it  adis  with  fuch  a  particular  determina- 
tion ?  Why  its  action  is  thus  and  thus  limited, 
directed,  determined  ?'  If  it  be  laid,  its  a£ts  pro- 
ceed from  the  ftrongeft  motive,  this  is  faying, 
they  are  fulf-determined  -,  (the  ftrongeft  motive 
and  volition  not  being  diftiniij  which  is,  upon 
the  whole,  faying,  they  exift  without  a  caufc. 

Therefore  the  fuppofed  ftrengfh  of  motive 
■■*  affords  no  relief  from  the  difficulties,  which' 
•Mr.  Eiwards's  '  notion  of  2 /elf-determimng  pow- 
cerin  the  will  is  auendcd  wiih  .^  nor  will  it  help, 

.ia 


'30      ^he  will  not  nscejfarily  determined^  Sec. 

in  the  leafl,  its  abfurdities  and  inconfiden- 
cies.'  *  Whether  corporeal  adion  be  always 
determined  by  the  will,  or  the  greateft  appa- 
rent goodj  we  Ihall  briefly  enquire  in  tjie  next 
fcdion. 


♦  P.  67,  63,  71, 


:SECT. 


S  E  C  T.    III. 


External  JSflon  or  Cofidu5f  not   dfter mined  by  the 
JVtli^  upon  Mr,  Edwards'j  Scheme, 


ALL  moral  good  or  evil  confifting  in  ihc 
diffoftiion  ov  Jlate  of  the  mind  or  will^  ic  is 
of  iraall  moment,  comparatively,  what  deter- 
mines  material  adion.  Suppofe  this  is  indeed 
determined  by  the  will,  the  enquiry  of  chief 
importance  is,  What  determines  the  will  irfelf. 
The  queftion.  What  determineth  the  motions 
and  adions  of  the  body  ?  is  (\u\iq  foreign  to  the 
fubjed.  But  as  Mr.  Edwards  affirms  that  the 
Willis  the  true  caufe  uf  external  action  or  con- 
dud,  and  makes  the  whole  of  liberty  to  lie  here, 
we  will  examine  this  pqfition,  on  his  own  prin- 
ciples. 

*The  voluntary  adion,  which  Is  the  fruit 
and  confequence  of  volition,  is  determined  by 
that  which  appears  moil  agreable  -,'  or  by  the 
Will  which  '  always  is  as  the  greateft  apparent 
good,'  and '  not  properly  diftindt'  from  it.  '  Li- 
berty is  a  power,  opportunity  any  one  has  of 
doing,  or  conducing  according  to  his  will,  be- 
ing tree  from  external  hindrance  or  compul- 
fion. — Or  a  power  of  executing  his  will.  There 
are  two  things  that  are  contrary  to  liberty.  One 
is  conliraint ;  the  fame  is  otherwife  coWtd  force 
and  coa^ion  ;  which  is  a  pcrfon's  being  nccefTi- 
tated  to  do  a  thing  contrary  to  his  will.  The 
other  is  refiraint.  ;  which  is  his  being  hindered, 
^nd  ijoc  having  power  to  do  according  to  his 

will^ 


'|i       External  Anion  net  determined  ly  tie 

will"*  In  the  determination  of  the  will  /V 
feif^  he  fuppofeth  a  man  cancioc  be  fice.  *  To 
talk  of  liberty,  or  the  contrary,  as  btlonging  lo 
the  very  will  i'fJf^  is  not  to  Ipeak  good  {tn\c.'\ 
He  Genfures  Dr  Whitby  as  faying,  '  Ibat  a  man 
cxercifeth  liberiy,  not  only  in  txier?ial  adtions, 
but  in  the  adls  of  the  will  thdmjelves'  J  Tp.  y6^ 
77)  He  luppofech  there  is  a  caufe,  ^rz^r  to  the 
vwiirs  own  ads,  detern:i!ning  volirion.  '  Let  the 
perfon  come  by  his  voliiion  how  he  will,  if  there 
is  nothing  in  the  way  to  hinder  his  ptrfuing  and 
executing  it,  he  is  fully  and  pcrfedly  Iree'.  Up- 
on tne  whole,  liberty  coafills  nor  in  a  power  of 

willing 

•^  Parti.  St-a.  5.     t  Part  II.  Sea.  i.  J  P  76^  77. 

J  Qucere,  When  St.  Fdul  faith,  ^To  will  h  prefent  with 
ine  ;  but  how  fo  perform  that  which  is  gc^od  I  find 
net*,  is  he  to  be  undeifl'  od  as  fpeakir.g  oi  external  zt 
.internal  impediment  ?  if  of  the  iarter,th;rn  th^re  are 
other  thin-s  oppofcd  to  liberty  befidc  outward  con- 
ftraini.  or  rtitfaint.  If  o/  the  former,  this  wholly 
frees  from  moral  blame.  When  he  alfo  fpeaks  of  a 
man's  *  having  powc:r  oyer  his  own  will'?  (in  a  par- 
ticular inftance  alluded  to)  doth  he  mean  power  o\'"er 
the  external  acfts  ?  U  this  be  the  meaning,  cou-d  a 
man  have  power  here  withouc  fi  R  purpoftng  in  his 
heart  to  refiain  in  the  thing  ipokm  of.  And  if  in 
this  purpofe  he  hath  not  pow.^r  over  hiinfcU  (  i.  c.  if 
it  be  not  his  own  purpoft)  how  could  he  be  faid  to 
have  power  ever  the  outward  a6t  I 

Again,  the  fame  apoftle  obfervrs,  'The  fpirit  lufteth 
againft  the  fl^'fh,  and  the  fl^fn  agair.ft  the  fpirit,  fo 
th'it  ye  cannot  do  the  thing:  which  ye  would,*  Is  this  to 
be  unde-ftood  q{  external  in.pedimeni  ?  If  the  Maw 
in  the  m -mbers  v/arring  .i£>;ain{l  the  'aw  of  the  mind/ 
2n  external  'uw  ?  *  The  ;>ood  that  I  would,  I  do  not  : 
But  the  evil  which  I  \%ould  not,  that  I  do/  Is  this 
-meaflt  of  an  e^^uniul  wilt  I 


Willy  Upon   7kfr  Edward^'j  SchemQ        3,3, 

willing,  hwl  \i^  an  opportunity  oi  dcliig  wh^it  Is 
already  willed — of  ex^cut'ng  a  choice  already 
made,  not  in  a  power  oi'  tbu/mg.  it  is  nor  ac 
all  applicable  to  the  ?;//«{*.  1  he  /f<^/^  of  the 
will  is  fixed  by  nectiTicy — and  irora  hence  pro- 
ceed external  adions. 

Now  how  is  it  pofTible  that  a6lion  and  con- 
dudl  fhould  be  free  and  yet  be  the  efftfts  of  a 
necefTary  caufe  ?  *  There  is  not  more  in  the  ef- 
fedl  than  in  the  caufe.  Thofe  things  which 
areindifTolubly  connected  with  other  things 
that  are  necefTary,  are  themfelves  necefTary/ 
How  is  corporeal  aflion  determined  by  the  will, 
when  '  the  will  in  no  inflance  is  ics  own  determin- 
er', conl'cquently  net  in  the  particular  detfrmi- 
naiion  to  move  the  body  ?  At  lead,  the  will  de- 
termines this  no  otherwife  than  as  it  is  itfelf  de- 
termined hereto  by  an  antecedent,  neceilary 
caufe.  Or  how  can  that  be  called  a  voluntary 
determination,  which  is  the  effect  of  neccfTity  ? 
or  that  a  voluntary  adion  to  which  a  man  is  ne- 
cefKirily  determined  ?  If  the  ad  of  the  will, 
which  is  fuppofed  to  determine  and  fix  the  exter- 
nal ads  of  the  body,  be  not  itfelf  free,  accord-^ 
ing  to  Mr.  Edwards's  own  reafoning,  the  adi- 
ons proceeding  herefrom  cannot  be  io.  ^  '  An 
ad  of  the  will  is  an  ad  of  choice'.     Now  if  there 

be 

*  Kad  Mr.  Edwards  attended  to  his  own  rcsfoning:, 
he  would  not  have  afHrmed,  that  external  adions 
might  be  Utc^  when  thew  11,  which  determines  them, 
is  fubjed  to  necefTity.  For,  fays  he,  *- \i  \h^  deter^ 
mining  ad  be  neccflary,  the  man  cannot  be  the  fub- 
jcd  of  command  or  government  in  his  external  anions; 
l)ecaufe  thefe  are  all  necefTary,  being  the  ne«ceil'iry 
cffeds  of  the  ads  of  the  wilfthemfclves*.  (P»  ^124, 
ai5,  256,    alio  p.  46,  47,  48.) 


34     External  Action  not   determined  hy   tie 

be  no  liberty  exercifed  in;chu^lng,prefcr^ing,whe^- 
inisllbcIxye;ie^ci^eGat  all  ?  What  ib€hoice  didindt 
from  liberty  ?  Yet  we 'are  tcid,  that  liberty  is 
cxf  rciitd  only  in  the  execution  of  choice.  That 
"we  nave  not  a  power  of  election  or  liberty  in 
the  ad  of  volition,  at  lead  not  in  the  firtt  and 
leading  ad  of  choice,  which  determines  all  the  reft. 

If,  therefore,  freedom  be  net  in  the  will,  we 
fhould  be  glad  to  know  where  it  is  ?  Whether 
any  being  can  be  faid  to  do,  or  condutl  according 
to  his  pleajure  or  choice.  Choice  and  pleafure  (Jo 
called)  is  fixed  by  a  pievioos  ncceiTary  caufe — 
and  doing  or  conduding  fixed  by  volition — Now 
the  immediate  f  roit  and  coniequences  of  volition 
muil  be  of  the  fame  nature  with  their  caufe — 
alike  nccefTary.  In  other  words,  the  will  is  no 
caufe  at  all.  For  a  neceiTaiy  caufe  is  not  pro- 
perly f[:eaking  a  caufe  ;  it  is  nothing  diftinct 
from  a'  meer  infirun^ier>r.  A  caufe,  ftriclly  fo 
called,  mult  bt  free  -,  at  lead  fo  far  as  praife  or 
blame,  reward  or  punidimenr,  belong  to  it. 

Upon  the  whole,  external  actions  mud  ulri- 
marely  be  determined,  not  by  the  will,  but  by 
that  caufe  which  determlneth  the  will,  agreable 
to  our  author's  own  principles.  The  will  being 
in  no  indance  it's  own  determiner,  there  is  in  no 
indance  a  power  or  capacity  of  choice  in  man- 
kind. For  choice  is  the  fame  as  the  will's  deter- 
mination :  A  power  or  capacity  of  choice,  there- 
fore, would  be  a  power  of  felf-determination, 
which  Mr.  Edwardi's  whole  fchemc  is  dcfigned 
to  fnew  the  abfurdity  of. 

The  fum  of  Mr.  Edwards^  fchemc  appears  to 
be   this.     Liberty  confids  in  ^  man's  power  to 

cs  scute 


WilU  upon    Mr  Edwards'^  Scheme,         35 

execute \\\%  will — ^o  d(r  cr  <ri>^^«^  according  to 
what  is  willed.  His  will  is  (not  dtttrmined  by^ 
but  is)  the  greateft  apparent  good.  And  yet 
every  volition  is  the  necefiaiy  effc5l  of  the 
greateft  apparent  good,  produced  and  determined 
by  it  as  the  efficient  CdxS^ — which  caufe,  however, 
is  nothing  diftmct  from  the  efFefl  produced. 
From  what  particular  caufe  any  objedl  comes  to 
have  the  greateft  appearance  of  good  is  yet  a  fe- 
cret,  of  no  ufe  to  be  known  to  nine  hundred  and 
ninety  nine  out  a  thoufand  of  mankind.  Forthe 
fatisfadion  of  the  thoufand th  pcrfon,  Mr.  'Edwards 
has  laboured  to  explore  this  fecret  -,  and  yet  his 
*  having  failed  here  doth  no:  overthrow  the  po- 
fition,  which  was  the  thing  of  chief  importance  in 

his  difcourfe  ;*  for  it  only   remains  to  be— -1 

explained  and  proved.  Antecedent  necefilty  de- 
termines the  will  •,  this  determines  corporeal  alli- 
ens ;  and  aiflion  is  voluntary  -,  i.  e.  is  Willed,  or 
caufed  to  be  willed — there  is  no  outward  compul- 
fion  or  reftraint  in  the  cafe,  but  only  a  neceffary  in^ 
ward  determination.  Liberty  is  indeed  necefTary 
to  praife  or  blame.  But  the  a£ts  of  the  body  be- 
ing free  from  outward  coaftion  or  impediment, 
there  is  no  need  of  liberty  in  ihe  mind^  as  a  foun- 
dation of  moral  government. 

These,  as  near  as  we  can  come  at  them,  are 
Mr,Edward>^s  fenciments  :  The  mention  of  which, 
fufficiently  expofeth  the  abfurdityof  the  fcheme — 
it's  repugnancy  to  itfelf ;  to  common  fenfe,  toall 
morality  and  religion  ;  and  confequently  the  per- 
plexity and  folly  of  applying  metaphyfical  reafb- 
ning  to  a  fubjedl,  which  can  be  obfcured  only  by 
the  fubtilty  of  argument. 


g  PART 


I?  Frinctpks  conf.dered  as  data 


PART    II. 

^jf  ex^fBinalion  of  Air,  Edwards';  do^irinerefpe^- 
ing  the  indijjoluhle  conm5iion  of  moral  caufts 
and  effe^s. 


w 


ERE  we  remarking  on  the  writings  of 
an  avowed  Fatalist,  a  fomewhat  diffe- 
rent method  might  be  expected  from  what  we 
Ihali  purfue.  But  our  controvcrfy  being  with 
un  eminent  christian  divine,  feveral  things 
may  be  taken  for  granted,  which,  in  arguing 
with  a  fatalift,  would  need  proof.  According- 
ly we  dtfire  thefe  few  obvious  principles  of  «^- 
i'liral  religion  not  lefs  than  chriftianity^  may  be 
eonfidered  as  dala  in  the  prcfent  argument. 

First,  That  there  is  an  intelligent,  dffigning 
author  of  nature  ;  or  original  eaufe  of  all  beings 
and  things ;  who  (by  the  terms)  is  uncaujcd — ex- 
iting prior  to,  and  exclufive  of,  all  defign  con- 
tributing, to  his  CAiilence.    ^  Whence  \i  follows. 

Secondly^ 

f  Mr.  Edwards  has  intFrnated,  incTeecT,  '  that  there  Is 
in  the  nature  of  things  a  foundation  for  the  know- 
ledge of  the  being  of  a  GOD,  without  any  evi- 
dence of  it  from  his  tvorks' — but  adds,  '  We  have 
not  flrength  of  mind  to  comprehend  '  his  exiftence* 
in  thiS'-i/idef^endint  manner'.  The  way  that  mankind 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  his  being  is  that  which, 
the  apoftle  fpeaks  of,  i^<7.v;.  i.  20.  Wc  hr  A  a  fund 
and  prove  a  po/lerioriy  or  fiom  effi£is^  that  there 
maft  fee  an  eternal  caule.  And  then,  fecondly,  prove 
by  argumentation,  not  intuition,  that  this  being  muft 
be  nectfTarily  exiflent.  And  then,  thirdly,  front 
the  proved  neceffity  of  his  exigence,  we  may  defend^ 
aiid  p«gve many  gf  his pcrfe^ions  ap-'ion'  (P.  60,6 i.^ 


in   the  prefent    argu-men^^  3.7 

Secondly,  That  all    things    are    originally 

'wbd*  tlM  creator  mad',  them ^and  intended  they  [kouid. 

he.     Whether  animate  or  inanimate,  rational  or 

irrational,   throyghout  all  worlds — they  have  all 

fuch  powers  ana  properties,   fuch  relations,  con- 

nedlions 

•But  is  it  2.xi\\\K\<i  a  frior'i  to  srgue  from  fffc5li  ?  '  If  ftri(3: 
propriety  of  fpecch  be  infiftsd  on,'  doth  not  this  pe- 
culiar kind  of  argument  fuppofe,  that  the  being  of  a 
GOD  may  be  proved  '  without  any  evidence  of  it 
from  his  worki  V  If  fo,  there  fecms  to  be  fome  jumble 
^n  dif  ending  to  this  argument  'from  the  proved  neceffi- 
ty  Of  GOD's  exiftence*.  We  cannot  but  take  no- 
tice, that  in  what  we  have  here  extra(5led,  the  terms 
are  changed  in  the  latter  part  of  the  paragraph  from 
what  they  were  in  the  beginning  of  it.  it  is  firft  gi- 
ven as  the  author's  opinion,  that  there  is  a  foundati- 
on in  nature  for  our  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
BEING  of  a  GOD,  without  any  evidence  of  it  from  hi: 
works.  But  at  the  clofe  of  the  paragraph  it  is  obfcr- 
ved,  that  '  from  the  proved  necellity  of  his  exijlence.^ 
we  may  prove  many  of  his  perfections  a  priori.*  in 
the  Lmz  place  Mr,  Edwards  obferves,  'we  argue  his 
beings  from  our  own  being,  and  the  being  of  other 
things' — which  is  the  only  medium  to  prove  the  being 
of  a  GOD  fp.  386  )  What  'foundation  is  there 
then,  in  the  nature  of  things,  for  the  knowledge  of 
the  BEING  of  a  GOD,  without  any  evidence  of  i£ 
from  his  works'  ?    What  medium  of  proof  I 

j3r.  SAMUEL  CLARK,  in  h:s  '  demonflration  of  the  be- 
ing and  attributes  of  GOD,'  undertakes  to  prove, 
that  he  '  exifts  by  a  necelTity  abfolute  in  the  nature 
of  the  thing,  itfeif^ — '  a  neceflity  antecedent,  (in  the 
order  of  nature,  and  of  our  ideas,  though  not  ot  time) 
to  the  fuppofition  of  his  exiftence* — which  neceffity 
he  affigns  as  '  the  natural  ground^  foundation^  caufe^  or 
reafon  of  GOD's  being.' 

J^Jov/  thouih  we  wou'd  not  chafe  to  difUnt  from  fuch 
.»  maftvr  of  leaion,  yet  the  enquiry  in  a  manner  for- 

cetk 


3§  Principles  conjtdend  as  data 

nefllons  and  deftinatlcn,  as  the  great  former  of 
tiicm  has  given  and  iniended.  Caufes  and  efFcds 
can  be  trac.-d  .no  higher.  We  mull  liop  at  iHe 
author  of  nature,  the  firft  and  original  caufe. 

Thirdly,  BeHdes  abfolute  or  natural  perfe6l- 
ions  (as  ciemity,  ielf  exiftence,  independance, 
infinity,  ^c.)  the  Bril  caufe  is  a  being  of  a  par- 
ticular r».i?r^/ charadter— is  immutably  jud,  holy 
good,  true,  &c.  Fourthly, 

ceth  itfflf  upon  us,  Where  is  the  propriety  of  fup- 
pofing  any  thing,  in  any  fcnfe,  to  be  the 
PRIOR,  ground  of  the  txillepce  of  the  fiift  caufe  I 
"Doth  not  this  convey  the  idea  o{  an  effect  produced  P 
''I  he  Dr,  rtrnssks  on  Sphczas  d(  €ti'u\c  of  neccflity, 
(or  'the  neceffary  foliowine;  of  an  cir.ci  from  it's 
caufe')  that  *  this  riecclTity  rnuft  ftill  b;:  determined 
by  fcmethins;  anteo dent ^  and  fo  en  inft-utely.^  Might 
not  a  Spinczift  reply,  that  that  nccefiity,  which  Dr. 
Clark  faith  is  the  cauie  oi  the  exiftence  of  GOD  mufl 
be  determined  by  fomething  antecedent  ?  and  fo  on'  ? 

The  Dr.  takes  his  rife  to  the  neceUity  of  the  divine 
exiftence  from  hence,  Thst  Hhtre  hath  exifted  from 
eternity  Tome  one  independent   being,  the  author  of 

all  other  beings.'  (  via.  p.   8, 15.  Edit.  iOth.) 

On  this  po/iuiatum  he  proceeds.  Hence,  and  from 
things  faid  in  his  icv  nth  letter,  it  is  probable  he  re- 
ally meant  not  to  prove  the  ce-'  lam  cxijhnce  of  GOD 
a  priori^  but  his  part'cu'ar  perfel'ioni.  '  The  irfiai- 
ty,  eternity,  unity  of  GOD,  cic  mull  be  dcmonftra- 
ted  from  the  nature  cf  neceil-iry  exiftence;  from  the 
nature  and  confequences  of  that  nectflity,  by  which 
the  fi  ^  caufe  cxifts.'  And  yet,  fpt aLing  of  the 
*fch-x)  aftic  way  of  proving  the  existence  of  the  felf- 
cxillent  being,  from  the  abfolute  perfection  of  his  na- 
ture,' the  Dr»  remarks,  '  All  or  any  perfedlons  pre- 
fupp'^'je  ex'iience  ;  which  hpetitio  prificipi't.  But  bare 
neccility  of  exiftence  doth  not prefuppoff^  hwt  infer ^ 
exiftence.  In  this  cafe,  here  muft  yiothing  be  pre/up- 
frjcd^  no  nature  whatjoevfrj'  ^Letter  6th,  p,  49c,  49 -' «> 


In  the  prefent  argument  I  gg? 

Foup.THLV,  That  the  moral  perfcflions  of 
GOD  correfpond  to  the  moral  difcemment  be  hath 
given  to  us.  For  when  wc  fay,  God  is  holy,  juft, 
good  &c,  we  fpeak  altogether  unmtellig^blyjif 
we  fuppo(e  thele  perfedions  in  him  to  beeffenti- 

ally 

Why  then  did  theDr.  lay  down  his  two  nrfl:  propofitions 
(  p.  8,  1 1,  j  as  the  media  of  proof  ?  if  neceflity  *  doth 
TiOt  pr£juppofe.,  but  irfer  exif^encc  ;  yet  the  method  the 
Dr.  takes  to  prove  this  necelTitv  presupposes  a  na- 
ture and  exiftence  :  It  fuppoitth  that  tnere  exijis  an 
eternal,  independent  being — the  author  of  ail  other 
beings.  The  very  thing  tp  be  proved. 

Admitting  the  Dr's  poiition,  that  necrffity  is  the 
caufe  of  the  divine  exiitence  ;  to  what  purpofe  is  it 
wiih  an  atheift  ?  Ittalces  for  granted  the  thing  in 
.q'jeftion.  The  ei-quiry  is  not.  How  GOD  exifts  ? 
but,  H'hether  he  exifls  ?  Exillsnce,  and  the  caufe  of 
exiftence,  are  very  diftindt.  An  enquiry  about  the 
latter  plainly  prefappofcth  the  former.  So  that  while 
the  Dr.  endeavours  to  prove,  that  GOD  exifts  'from 
a  caufe  within  hinrifelf,'  he  takes  for  granted,  that 
there  is  a  GOD 'y  and  only  accounts  for  a  peculiar 
circumjfancey  or  this  mode  of  his  exiftence,  that  it  is 
*  by  a  necciHty  of  nature.'  Whereas  the  fubjedt  of 
enquiry  between  an  atheift  and  a  theift  is  not  the 
niodui  of  exiftence,  but  the  fimple  truth  or  fa£i — is 
there  in  reality  '  an  eternal,  independent  being,  the 
author  of  all  other  beings  .''  Now  from  what  can  this 
point  poflibiy  be  argued  but  from  the  phenomena  of 
nature  1  if,  from  furveying  vifible  creation,  the  atheift 
is  not  convinced  that  GOD  iS,  how  can  we  go  a 
ftep  farther  with  him  ?  Mufl  he  not  think  it  imper- 
tinent, and  petitio  principii,  if  we  undertake  to  Ihew 

him 'HOW  GOD    exifts  ?  Or  to  aflign  z ground 

and  reafon  of  an  exiftence,  which  he  believes  nothing 
of  ?  But  if  from  the  frame  of  nature  he  is  convinced 
of  the  certain  exi/ience  of  GOD,  he  is  no  longer  an 
atheift,  and  therefore  needs  not  the  argument  a  priori 
/or  hi^  coavi<5tion. 

Or 


^o  Principles  confJered  as   data 

ally  different  from  the  perceotions  implanted  m 
Isjs.  .  Not  but  the  d^ity  prffrffe  h  tnefc  moral 
perfr^l  ons  in  a  dt^rte  far  above  finite  concep- 
tion i  yef  as  m  thele  he  propofeth  his  own  ex- 
ample to  our  imication,  io  that  which   may   be 

known 

Or  fuppofe  the  ath?ift,  for  argument's  fake,  to  a^mtt 
th.it  GOD  is,  but  ^cmands  to  have  the  caufe  ox  ground 
of  hii  exiilfnce  adi/.n'd  and  explained.  Is  any  theiil 
holden  to  (hew  hm,  how  the  divine  beinsr  ex'fted 
from  eternity  ?  Can  this  be  done  f  Hath  Dr.  Clark 
attempted  it  ?  In  one  word,  are  the  phaenomena  of 
natu-e  fufHcient  to  prove  the  being  and  perfect  ons 
•of  r]OD  ?  if  th'v  arc  ;  what  need  of  any  other  ar. 
•gu  !i':?iU  than  that  a  p?/ieriori}  If  they  are  not,  it  is 
certain  the  argument  a  priori  can  produce  no  con- 
viction ;  For  this  refolves  itfelf  into  the  argument 
a  po/ierjori. 

That  the  being  of  a  GOD  is  indeed  neceffary,  eve- 
ry thing  round  us  o'eclares.  If  the  things  that  are 
fren  were  cheated  and  made y  the  fclf-exiftence  and 
Cternitv  of  the  creator  is  proved  beyond  d.>ubt  For 
whatever  hath  a  beginning  exifts  from  fomc  caufc 
without  itfelf.  Now  as  this  can  nor  ipe  faid  of  the 
creator  o(  all  things  and  beings,  it  follows,  tnat.h» 
muft  h^Jelf-exiflent  and  iter nal. 

The  Dr.  tells  us,  that  '  the  eiernliy  of  GOD'  (eltheir 
M  parte  cnts^  or  a  parte  pofi)  'can  no  otherwife  be  p;o- 
vcd  than  by  the  argument  a  priori.'*  But, .admitting 
an  author  of  naiure^  doth  ic  not  foUow,  that  he  cx- 
ifttd,  not  mecriy  from  tie  bej;inn=nor  of  the  phreno- 
mena  of  nature,  but  from  evsrlajlmgl  aa-i  bemg  in- 
dependent, mail  alwa  s  continue  to  fXiit.?  Do  not 
thefe  things  fol.ow,  without  cofiii.ierine  the  '  intrin- 
iic  nature  o^  neiejjary  txijUnce"  \  (which  is  allowed 
to  be  inexplicabU  )  Do  not  they  follow  from  this 
.fimple  conficieration,  that  the  ori;^inal  caufe  exiils 
from  no  external  cauf-  ?  St  t^aul  fuppofeth  fic 
Mfrnity  of  GOD  is  no  lets  evident  from  .the  th;i?gs 


in  the  'prefent  a^gumeni,  41 

known  of  God  in  this  regud  is  manifcfl:  from 
the  moral  faculy  in  man,  whtrcrby  he  is  a  iaw 
to  himfelf  (Not  meaning  10  exclude  the  help 
and  imfrovement  derncd  from  reveUiticn) 

Fifthly,  That  the  moial  (haradter  (.fGod  is 
ih2ii  foundation  of  religion^  as  the  moiai  liactrd  of 
Rian  IS  o[  his  accountablenefs 

Onj  the  tooting  c^f  ihelc  principles,  we  fhall 
proceed  to  examine  Mr.  tdwards\  dodlrinc  of 
neceffity. 

Sect.' 

that  are  made,  than  his  exiftence,  power,  and  god- 
head. J  he  inviJlbU  things  of  him  j  horn  the  creation  of 
the  u-orld-^  are  CLEav^LY  Jeen^  bting  under Jhod  by  the 
the  things  that  are  ma<le^  EVEN  his  eternal  power 
AND  GODHEAD  ;  fo  th&t  they  arc  without  excufey 
who  will  not  admit  this   proof. 

The  Dr.  obferves  upon  th«  whole,  that  « the  proof 
a  priori  is  capable  of  being  underftood  only  by  a  few 
attentive  tninds  ;  btcaufe  it  is  of  ufe  only  aoau.ft 
learned  and  metaphyfical  difficulties' — while  the  proof 
apojleriori  is  level  to  ailnicns  capacities' — that  this, 
therefore,  'is  by  far  the  mo/?  generally  ufeful  argu- 
ment, and  what  GOD  cxpeds  moral  agents  ihould 
be  determined  by*  But  if  the  eternity  2nd  immorta  ity 
of  GODcanaot  be  proved  a  po/ieriori,  how  is  this 
argument  fufficient  with  commoh  people  ?  Do  not  they 
reed  an  argument  to  prove  that  GOD  is  eternal  and 
immortal  as  well  as  philofophers  f  Are  the  generali- 
ty incapable  of  receiving  any  proof  o;  this  point  f  Or 
is  it  the  privilege  of  the  learned,  that  '  GOD,  as 
moral  governor,'  does  not  '  expedt  they  {hould  be  de- 
termined by'  that  evidence,  whereby  '  mora/  agents 
fliould  be  determined'  ? 

What  the  Dr.  favs  concerning  the  unity  and  irfinitf 
of  GOD,  that  they  are  provciible  only  a  priori^  we 
thinic  liable  to  much  the  lame  exceptions.  Mcta- 
phvfical  reafoning  on  tnis  rubje6t,  as  well  as  fcmi 
*ri>^r  points  of  theology,  infiead  of  relieving  any  phi- 
lolophic  difficulty,  hath,  on  the  contrary,  ^w^Vi 
great  advantage  to  iiii(idelity. 


SECT.     I. 


Whether  the  *will    le  necejfarily    determined    ly 
an    extrinfic  caufe  ? 


MR.  Edwards  ^o\Ad  hzv^  his  readers 'oh- 
ferve,  that  when  he  fpeaks  of  connexion 
of  caufes  and  efe£is^  he  hath  refped  to  moral 
eaufes,  as  well  as  thofe  char  are  caHcd  natural  m 
diftindion  from  them — that  the  ads  oi  the  will 
mzyh^  ^scer I airJy  and iuoijlc'hii^iy count ded  with  the 
moral  cauie,  as  natural  effcds  with  their  natural 
caufes — ^thac  the  connedion  is  as  fure  and  perfect 
between  moral  caufes  and  efitds,  as  natural  5 
that  moral  necefTuy  may  be  as  abjolute  as  natural 
jFiecefTity.'  *  Yea,  he  advertifeth  us,  that  '  where 
he  ukth  this  diilinction  of  moral  and  natural  ne- 
ceffity,  he  would  not  be  undcrfiood  to  fuppoie, 
that  if  any  thing  comes  to  pafs  by  the  form.er 
kind  of  nectlfsty,  the  nature  of  things  is  net  con- 
cerned in  it,  as  well  as  in  the  latter.  I  do  noc 
mean  to  determine,  that  when  a  moral  motive  is 
fo  flrong,  that  the  ad  of  the  will  infallibly  fol- 
lows, this  is  not  owing  to  the  nature  of  things. 
I  fuppofe  that  neceffity,  which  is  called  natural, 
in  diftindioa  from  moral,  is  fo  called  becaufc 
ineer  nature  is  concerned,  without  any  thing  of 
choice  \  not  becaufe  nature  has  never  any  hand  in 
our  choice  :  For  choice  arifcs  from  nature  as 
truly  as  other  events.'  So  that,  upon  the  whole, 
much  the  fame  rules  are  fuppofcd  to  take  place 
in.  the  moral  world,    in  GOD's  government  of 

moral 

*Part  i»  Sed.  4.  p.  30,31,  3«.  ^ 


hy   an  extrlnfic   catife  ?  4j 

moral  agents  {fo  called)  as  in  ihe  adjuftment  anc 
difpolal  of  natural  things.  What  Mr.  Eduards 
intended  by  a  moral  eaufc,  we  cannot  fatisfy  our- 
felves.  Sometimes  he  appears  to  reafon  as  if  h- 
fuppofed  there  was  really  no  dijtin^ion  between  ^ 
moral  and  natural  caufc,  (^i,  32.)  or  none  to  be 
perceived  j  while  more  generally  he  feems  to 
fuppole  a  dflindion  of  great  importance  •,  which, 
however,  he  hath  not  fo  clearly  pointed  out  as 
were  to  be  wifhed. 

Indeed,  if  there  be  not  a  real  and  important; 
diftindion  between  moral  caufes  and  natural,  ic 
plainly  follows,  that  Mr.  Edwards  hath  takea 
pains  to  no  purpofe  to  fhew,  that  natural  neceffi- 
ty  wholly  precludes  from  praile  or  blame,  while 
moral  necefTicy  doth  not  at  all.  And  if  there  be 
a  real  and  important  diPdn^lion,  it  is  of  impor- 
tance that  it  be  clearly  feen. 

In  the  fedion  lad   referred  to,  Mr.   Edwards 
fuggefts,  that  'when  we  fpeak  of  choice  as   dif- 
thi6t  from    nature,   ic   is    without   refieclion  and 
rejearch  ;  names  being  given  to  things  according 
to  what   is  mod  obvious.     But  though    the  de- 
pendance  and  connexion  between  adls  of  volition 
or  choice,  and  their  caufes,  according  to  eftabli/h^ 
id  laws^  is  not  fo  fenfible  and  obvious,  as   thac 
eftabhfhed  law  and  order  which  is  feen  in  the  ma- 
terial world  ;  and  though  men  make  a  diftindli- 
on    between   nature    and  choice   as  if  they  were 
compleatly    and  univerfally  diftindt  5    yet  choice 
arifes  from  nature  as  truly  as  other  events    How- 
ever, thefe  are  the  names  that  thefe  two  kinds  of 
neceffity  have  ufually  been  called  by  •,  (viz.  natu- 
ral and  moral)  and  they  mud  be  diilinguilhed  by 
fome  names  or  other  5   for  there  is  a  diltindion 
H  or 


^4     Whether  tine  tvu)  hentcejfarlly  dster?)iintd' 

or  difference  between  them,  that  is  very  impor- 
tant in  it's  cofjfequenccs  :   Which  difference  does 
not  liefo  much  in  the  nature  oi  ih^  conne^ion^  as 
in  the    two  tefms  connived.''    The    difference   is 
important^    but  not  fevjible   and  obvious .     The 
eauk,  with  whkh  the  effed  is  connedted,  is  of  a 
|>articijlar   kind,    viz    of   a   moral  nature — the 
effect  affo  is  of  a  particular  kind,    being   of  a 
Hioral    nature.'     Bot  are  we  not  told  ii^  this  fame 
place,    that  the  effect  is  alio  conntded  with  the 
7JaturaiQ2i^k^  and  is  owing  toihie  nature  of  things? 
I'here  is    the y^/«/ influence   of  moral  and  natu- 
ral necelfity   in  moral  events — iHtir  inHuence  is 
cloiely  linktd  together.     Now  till  the  me^fure  of 
influence  to  be  afcrrbed  to  mral  nectffity  is  dif- 
t.ndly  apprehended,  it  is  jmpofllbls  ro  tell  when^ 
ar.d  how  ^r,  a  pcrfon  is  re  ward  able  or  punifha- 
ble-^nat-ural  necc»%y  (by  fuppofuion;  being  in- 
confident  wirh    reward  or  punifhment.     But  let 
any  one  e;iam^ne  Mr.    Edwards's  book,  and  fay, 
uheiher    he  hath  fhewn   when  and  how  far   the 
ads  of  ths   will  proceed  from  natural    necefilty, 
and  when,   or  how   far   fj'om  moral.     Whether 
the  fo    mueh  labour'd   dillindion,  or  difference 
between    natural  and    moral  caufes  is  not  con-  ' 
founded  and  exploded  I 

It  is  difScalt  to  determine  whether  Mr.  Ed- 
^vcards  fuppofed  the  ads  of  the  will  to  be  the  ne- 
cefiary  e^^e6ts  of  an  intrwftc  caufc,  or  an  e^.trinfic, 
Thcfe  are  ufed  fo  promifcuoufly  and  indetermi- 
nately through  his  book,  volition  beii.g  fome- 
timcs  afcribed  to  the  one,  fometimes  to  theoiherj^ 
5hat,  though  they  are  cflentially  different  and  op- 
pofiie,  it  is  hard  to  fay  which  he  moreefpecially 
intended  by  that  moral  neceflity,  to  which  he 
c.ytry  where  fuppoleih  the  will  is  iubjcd.     Either 

iaternalj, 


'£y  Ofi  extrinfic  cau/e  ?  .45 

iftternal,  original  bias,  or  fomething  ext-rlofic,  is 

the   caufe,   to   whofe  efficiency,    det^rminai-ion, 

,<:o|nmand,  decifion,   the  will  is  as  much  lubjcdt, 

as  the  motion  of  the  body  to  the  will— this  being 

*as  paftve  and  nectfiary   wjth  refpedt   to  ths  an- 

^epednt  determining  caufe  of  it,'  as  the  motions 

,of  the  hands  and  feet   with  refpea:  to  the  detef- 

,n)iiiation  pf  the  wiH.  (  »^3>  ^^4  ) 

We  rather  think  it  was  Mr.  Edwards^ 
opinion,  that  the  will  is  determmed  by  an  exirin- 
fic  caufe.  But  finccihis  is  by  no  means  certain 
from  his  book— fince  he  hath  not  exprefffd  hini- 
felf  clearly,  or  we  are  incapable  judges  of  this 
intricate  fubje6t,  we  fliall  lake  liberty.^o  examine 
his  doftrin^  on  both  fuppDruions— either  of  an 
extrinfic,  or  intrinf.c  caufe,  The  former  fhall  be 
the  iubjedt  of  ttie  prefent  fc^ion. 

Whether  volition  is  neceffarily  determined 

by  ^n  extrinfic  caufe  ?  Mr.  Edwards  afl^erts,  that 

th.e  ads  of  ibe  will  are  not  neccffary  in  ibem/ehes^ 

or  in  their  own  «^m.^  •,  but  by   their   connexion 

with   fomc   caufe  that  is  ncctfTuy   tn  itfelf.     In 

bis  OW.B  words,  they  'are  neceffary  by  a  neceffity 

o^  conferiuence:     The   only   way  that  any  thing 

that  is  to  come  to  pafs  hereafter,  is,  or  can  be,  ne- 

eJ^fTary,  is  by  a  connexion  with  fomething  thaus 

rweceflary  in  it's  own  nature,  or   fomething  that 

already   is,  or  has  be.^n  ;  To  that  the  Pne  being 

foppofcd,  the  other  certainly  follows*     1  his  alio 

is  the  only  way  th.t  all  'things  paft,   (excepting 

thofe  which  were   from  eternity)  could   be  ne- 

e-ffa-y  before  they  came  to  ff/s,  or  could  come  to 

pals  nccdlanly  •,  and  therefore    the  only  way   m 

wh  ch  any  efYedl  or  event,  or  any  thing  whatloe- 

ver  that  ever  has  had,  or  will  have  a  beginning, 

'  "  '  ha<i 


4?    Whether  the  will  he  necejfarily  determined 

has  ccme  into  being  necefifarily,  or  will  hereafter 
riectfTirily  exift.  And  therefore  this  is  the  ne- 
ccfiuy  which  efpecially  belongs  to  controverfies 
about  the  ads  of  rhe  will.'  *  From  all  which  it 
follows,  that  the  a61:s  of  the  will  are  neceffary 
ONLY  by  their  ccnnc^ion  with  the  Jelf-eiciftent  be^ 
ing.  For  he  only  exifted  from  eternity.  His 
exiftencc  only  is  nectfTdry  in  itfeif.  He  there- 
fore IS  the  necrlTary  caufe  of  all  volition — o^ Jin- 
Jul  volitions  equ^illy  as  holy  ones.  Either  there- 
fore the  afls  of  the  will  do  not  come  to ^  pais 
necejfarily^  -f  (as  Mr.  £^'«;^r^5  fuppofes)  or  GOD 
is  i)[\€:  author  znd  Jourcec^  i\\?it  neceffny  by  vi^hich 
.they  come  to  pais.  Whether  the  latter  is  recon- 
cileable  Vviih  divine  moral  rrditude,  '  let  thofa 
-whp   have   hunnan     underilanding   in    CAtrcife 

The  voluntary,  defigning  cau^e  of  the  great 
"wickednefs  creatures  are  guilty  of,  mod  be  either 
GOD  or  themfelves.  The  whole  wickednefs  muft 
be  Charged  to  the  one  or  the  other.  Now  that 
creatures  are  not  the  voluntary  defigning  caufe 
of  their  own  wickednefs  f  if  we  may  caH  it  their 
£;w«)  appears  from  hence,  that  wickednefs  lies  in 
the  jlate  of  the  v/ill,  not  in  the  cditns  which  pro- 
ceed from,  or  are  iht  fruhs  Cf  it.  Mr.  Edwards 
teacheth,  that  men  muff  be  the  authors  of  extet^ 
77^/ adions,  by  bein^  the  caules  of  them  ^7  an 
a^  of  will  or  choice,  in  order  to  praife  or  blame  ; 
but  that  no  fiuh  thing  holds  with  rejpe^f  to  (he  a5fs 

cf 

•   p.    25,  I£)2,  103. 

t  Unlefs  it  be  faidjthat  they  are  neceflary  by  a  connc^l- 

'     ion    with    this   prop  fition,  '   two    and     two   make 

four  * — -or  thi?,    ^  aii     ires    drawn  from   the  centre 

of  a  circle  to  the  circuri^faencc  are  equal.'    fp.  24-.) 


ly  an  exttinfic  caufe  ^  ^J 

cf  tie  w/7/ THEMSELVES,  that  they  are  the  de^^ 
figning,  voluntary  caufe  of  them.  (  277.  )  In 
the  internal  ad,  (viz  vohtion j  the  agent,  or  ra- 
ther fubje^^  is  not  ftlf-determined  ;  i.  e.  is  not 
the  caule  of  it,  '  Freedom  of  will  is  not  effcntial 
to  the  nature  of  winuQ  and  vice.'  (  256.  ) 

*In  external  a.6\.ions  men  are  felf-diretSled,  felf- 
determined  ;  and  their  wills  are  the  caufe  of  the 
iTiotions  of  their  bodies,  and  the  external  things 
that  are  done  ;  fo  that  unlefs  men  do  them  vo- 
luntarily, and  the  adlion  be  determined  by  their 
antecedent  volition,  it  is  no  adlion  or  doing  of 
theirs;'  (  1H6.  287.)  That  is,  rhey  are  the  vo- 
luntary caufe,  not  of  the  evil  vill  in  them,  which 
is  the  ej/ence  of  vice,  but  only  of  the  external 
adion,  which  is  the  meer  i?ody  and  form  of  it. 
The  cauTc  of  fin  is  without  themfelves.  In  what 
conftitutes  it's  nature,  they  arc  direded,  deter- 
iTimed,  by  fome  fuperipr  agent,  who  is  the  caufe 
of  every  internal  a6t  of  the  will.  For  volition 
hath  a  caufe  itfeif,  as  well  as  is  the  caule  of  cor- 
poreal adion  Any  one  fees,  that  men's  being 
the  authors  of  corporeal  a::tion  meerly^  '  is  no  mo- 
ral evil,  any  more  than  ficknefs,  or  fome  other 
natural  calamity,  which  anfcs  from  a*  natural 
*  caule'. 

Especially  when  it  is  farther  confidered,  in 
what  lenfe  men  are  the  authors  of  corporeal  adi- 
on,  upon  Mr.  tdwardi's  fcheme,  will  it  appear, 
that  they  cannot,  on  this  account,  be  changeable 
wifh  moral  evil.  '  Every  ad  ot  the  will  is  ne- 
Cf  (Tiry,  becaufe  dependent  and  confequent  on  a 
neceflary  caufe.'  ^  Therefore  the  adions  of  the 

body 

f  "  There  is  as  much  reafon  to  believe  that  all  things 
^re  voluntary,  as  that  all  things  are  mcejary  i  and  I 

clcfije! 


4^     Whether  the  w:Il  he  necejfartly  deurmmed 

body^are  necefiary,  being  dependent  and  confo 
quent  on  the  deterfnir.aiion  of  ih^  wil),  which  i^ 
dep^ndcpr  and  conicquent  on  a  prior  caulc — *in- 
difl()hibly  conneded  with  what  is  necrfTiry  in  ic*s 
own  nacurc '  Therefore  men  are  not  the  aq- 
thors,  the  caufe,  of  corporeal  adtion,  in  any  pro- 
per ienfe  at  all ;  as  tfrey  are  not  the  authors  of 
inward  volition.  For  '  ic  cannot  be,  that'  they 
•ftould  be  the  a6tive,  voluntary,  dercrtnining 
caufc  oP  their  ^ own  volitionsWor  'of  the  firff^ 
and  leading  volition,  which  deiermines  ih^wMk 
offair:    (2^4,225,70,71.) 

To  what   extrinfic  caufe  then,    or  Xo  wfaom, 
are  the  yplitipns  of  nief)..to  be  arcri|)e4,  fince  they 

.are 

defire  ^ny  one. to  ihfw  me^th^t  the  one  is  more  clc^f 
and  certain  than  the  other.       If  he  fays,  that  m:tives 
which  determine  or  cauie  the  mind  to   e^xrrt  wnat.I 
call  voluntary  jidi'ons,  arc  necejfary,  and  thertfoic  the 
eff-<9:s  or  acfl^oiis  following  t^.e  motives  are  alfo  ne- 
cefiary  ;  this  is  juft  as  true  a  conicqu  nee  as  that  bs- 
caufe  voluntary   a<3:ions  concur  to'  ihe  pro^u£lon  pf 
mcejfary  effects, therefore  th^fe  ^^.di%  Art  voluntary.  ^ 
for  example,  the  w/r/w  of    mv    prtfent  writing    is  a 
perfuafion  of  the  jaljhotid  o^  Cai9\  fcheme  ;  and  this 
ferfuafion  I  grant  an.;  fte  is  necejpiry.  1  can't  help  this 
jud^rrr.cnt ;   but  ftill,  my  writing,  i  ?Jfo  fee,  is  no  more 
mcejfary  th^n  the  encreale  of  the  motion  cf  niy    hUnd^ 
or  o' lYit  hating  of  my  pulfe  vs  voluntary  ^    though  the 
caufe  concurring  to  it  WiS    rov  voluntary   drinbnj^  4 
certain  quantitv  of  Ipints       May  i  can  with  as  much 
reafon  argu^-.that  2^\ndturah^  6i-  are  voluntary  in  their 
immediate  caufes^  or  p'-r.ceed  f  om  their    cbiice  or  wiU^ 
becaufe  GOD  their  firft  cau^'e  is   a  voluntzry  aod  free 
c^^nt  ^  z^  Cato  c^n   argue  from   the   fond    cautes  or 
rnotives  of  human  actions  beina    n^c.fliry,   that   the 
immediate  caufe,  the  mind,  is  a  nec:Jfary^  not    a  volun^ 
iary  aticnt.      But  there  is  no  end  or  ar^UyO^,  or  ratti- 
er trifling,  w.th  fuch  fort  offa^uciLS.*     J'^ckjan\  ^r. 
fence  of  liberty  a^ainft  Qau\  latteis,  p^  ^^^  t>S* 


ly  an  extrinfic  ^aufe  ?  49^ 

^e  not  the  caufe  of  them  themfelves  ?  By  whom 
or  what  i^  the  ftate  of  men's  will  determined  ? 
According  to  Mr.  Edwards,  it  is  the  ftrongefi: 
motive  horn  Without.  But  motives  to  choice  are 
exhibited  to  the  riiind  by  fome  agent  :  By  whom 
are  they  exhibited  ?  In  regard  to  finful  volitions, 
we  know  that  one  man  enticeth  another,  end 
Satan  enticeth  all  mankind.  But  this  will  nor  be 
given^  as  an  anlwer  to  ourqueftion  ;  fince  the  fin- 
ful adl  of  one  ftnner  in  enticing  another,  and  of 
Sarao  in  tempting  all  men,  mud  be  determi- 
ned by  a  previous  caufe-^an  antecedent  highed 
motive  exhibited  by  fome  other  agent.  (Though, 
by  the  way,  it  may  be  difficult  to  (hew,  how  one 
man  can  be  the  caufe  of  fin  in  anoihcr,  when  he 
cannot  be  the  caufe  of  it  himfelf;  What  we 
are  enq-iiring  after  is,  the  caufe  of  *  the  fr/l  and 
leading  finful  volition,  which  determines  the  whols 
Affair.^  Nor  is  there  any  ftop,till  we  arrive  at  the 
firft  caufe,  'whofe  immediate  condudl  Mr.  £^- 
w^j  faith,  is  firft  in  the  feri^sof  events,  con' 
nedted  with  nothing  preceeding.* 

Will  it  now  be  faid,  that  GOD  is  the  caufe 
of  thofe  difpofitions  of  heart,  and  a6ls  of  the  will, 
which  are  fo  odious  in  their  own  nature?  On 
Mr.  Edtuards*s  fcheme  this  mud  be  faid.  For 
the  adls  of  the  will,  not  being  necefliry  in  their 
iwn  nature,  but  by  connection  with  a  caufe  that 
is  fo  j  and  no  caule  being  thus  necelTary  but  he 
who  exifted  from  eternity,  it  undeniably  fol- 
lows, that  every  finful  volition  proceeds  ultimate- 
ly from  him,  as  the  caufe  and  fourcc  of  it.  And 
to  (ay,  that  the  volitions  themfelves  are  vicious, 
but  that  the  caufe  is  not  fo,  equally  militates 
agaJnft  Mr.  Edxvards'^  own  fcheme,  and  commoa 
icnfc. 

O2T 


j;o     Whether  ihe  will  he  necejfarily  determined 

On  reading  fedlion  r.  parti  V.  of  Mr.  Edwards^  s 
book,  it  was  matter  of  much  furprize  to  find  a 
gentleman  of  his  abilities  ufing  fo  weak  an  argu- 
ment, defcending  to  fo  thin  a  lubtili:y,  as  this, 
*'  that  theeffence  of  virtue  and  vice  is  nor  in  their 
caufe^  but  in  their  nature*'  The  pains  taken 
with  this,  (argument  (hall  we  call  it  ?  )  the  flrels 
laid  upon  it,  is  indeed  no  mark  of  a  good  caufe. 
But  fince  every  thing  advanced  by  fo  eminent  a 
writer  may  be  thought  to  jnent  attention,  we 
fhall  briefly  confider  the  fubj^dt  of  this  fection. 
IVir.  Edwards^  own  reafoning  will  aiTift  us  here, 
as  in  other  parts  of  thefe  remarks. 

For  'there  cannot  be  more  in  the  effedl  thaa 
in  the   caufe.'  (  bz.  )   Volition  therefore   cannoc 
be  virtuous  or  vicious  farther  than    it's  caufe    is 
fo.     We  may  not  detach    the   nature   of  effefts 
from  the   efficient.     '  It  may   be  wickedneis   ia 
the  caufe,  that  ic  produceth  wickednels.'   Suppo- 
fing  then,  that  '  the  wicked  ad  of  the   caufe   in 
producing    wickednefs,  is  one   wickednefs  ;  and 
the  wickednefs  produced  another' — what  follows 
IS,  that    in  every    finful  volition    there  are   two 
wickednefTcs —  one  chargeable  to  the  caufe,   the 
other  to  the  fubje(5l  of  the  volition.     Now  if  the 
caufe   be   'diverfc  from  the  fubjedl  oP  volition, 
how  doth  it    relieve  the  difficulty  at  all,  if  upon 
the  fcheme  of  neceffary  conneflion,  GOD  (lands 
chargeable    with   doing  wickedly  ?  And  is    not 
this  the  plain  conftquence  of  the  dodrine,  *thaC 
the  a6ts   of  the   will  are  indiflfolubly  connedcd 
with   a  caufe   that  is    neceffary   in   it*s  own   na- 
ture' ?  And   if    It   will   be   allowed,  that  GOD 
can    do  wickedly     confidered   as   the    caufe  of 
finful  volitions,  we  may  juft  as  well  afcribc  all 
moral   evil  to  him, 

SECT; 


[5'1 


SECT.     li. 


Whether   the  will  he.    necejarily.    determined  ^• 
an  iniiinfic  caufe, 

Hov/EVER  repugnant  this  hypotliefis  Is  t(> 
that  already  examined,  yet  it  is  frequent- 
ly made  in-  Mr.  Edwards's  book.  Our  bufi- 
nefs  is  not  to  reconcile  him  with  himfelf,  bus 
to  remark  on  what  we  find.  His  meaning  would 
d^ubtlels  have  been  clearer,  had  the  fubjedl  he 
undertook  been  intelligible.  He  appears  to 
have  been  bewildered  at  times  in  his  own  fubtilty. 

To  ray,that  the  a^s  of  the  will  are  necefTary  from 
internal,  original  bias,  is  not  very  confident  wit!% 
faying,  they  are  the  necefTary  effeds  of  an  extrin- 
fic  caufe.  For  what  is  this  but  faying,  they  are 
necefTary  in  their  own  nature  }  therefore  not  ne- 
cefTary by  a  necefTity  of  confcquence  ?  Yet  Mr.' 
Edwards  exprcdy  afTerts,  that  every  thing  which 
ever  had,  or  will  have  a  beginnings  is  necefTary 
only  by  a  necefTjy  of  confequence.  Now  if  the 
adlsof  the  will  areefTeds  of  an  extrinfic  caufe  on* 
ly,  then  they  cannot  be  the  efFeds  of  an  intrin- 
fic  canfe  alfo.  But  original  bia^  ^nd  inclination  is 
intrinfic.  If  this  therefore  necefTarily  determi- 
neth  volition,  then  the  other  pofition  of  it's  pro- 
ceeding from  an  extrinfic,  coniequential  neccffity," 
(an  eternal,  necefTary  caufe)  muft  be  given  upj 
For  '  how  can  ihefe  things  hang  together  *  ?  Or 
will  any  fuppofe,  that  Mr.  Edwards  when  he 
faith,  '  the  itate  or  ad  of  the  will  is  from  the 
J  deterrninatign 


52-    Whether  the  ivili  he  nicejfarlly  determined 

determination  of  an  intrinfic  caufe,'  meant  by 
this  caufc  the  Deity  inhabicing  and  a(5luating  eve- 
ry intelligent  creature  ?  by  a  pofitive  efficiency 
producing  every  volition  of  theirs  ?  Such  a  fup- 
pofition,  wc  cannot  believe  any  one  will  make, 
liowever  neCeffary  to  reconcile  Mr.  Edwards  to 
himfelf.  This  is  a  fenfc  of  GOD's  wcrking  in 
men  to  will^  and  to  do  -,  of  cur  living,  moving,  and 
jMiving  our  being  in  him,  which  we  prtrfume  none 
will  efpoufc.  For  if  it  makes  him  the  author  cf 
mrtuous  difpofitions  in  men,  in  the  mod  Jlrift 
and  abjolute  fenfc  \  it  will  be  remembered,  that 
n  alio  makes  him,  in  the  fame  fenfe,  the  author 
cf  every  vicious  inclination  and  propenfity.  On 
this  hypothefis,  there  is  properly  but  one  agent 
in  the  univerfe, 

*  Moral  necefTity,'  faith  Mr.  Edwards, 'Wcs  in 
the  will,  and  is  the  will's  propenfity.  How  then 
does  ic  lie  in  fomething  exhibited  to  the  mind 
from  without,  which  is  prior  to  the  will,  and  gives 
ic  a  necciTary  detc-rminaiiori  ?  Surely  the  will's 
propcnfiiy  is  not  prior  to  it's  propenfity.  No- 
thing /;;  the  -iiill  itjef  cm  be  the  moral^  neceflity 
by  which  it  is  determined,  if  this  neccfluy  be  re- 
ally prior  to  will.  Bcfides,  to  be  determined 
by  a  caufe  in  iifelf,  is  to  be  felf  determined,  if 
words  have  any  meaning.  And  moreover,  this 
is  making  the  will  neccltiry  in  it's  own  nature. 
Both  which  are  contrary  to  fuppofition.  What 
confoundirg.  again  of  caufe  and  effed  !  Volition 
is  the  antcccdenr,  neceffary  caufc  of  volition  ! 
The  will  is  neceffarily  determined  in  every  ad): 
by  a  necefTity  prior  and  fuperior  to  it  •,  and  yec 
this  neccfTiiy  is  nothing  diverfs  or  diflindl  fron\ 
volition' ! 

^creovcj 


ly   an   intrlnfic   caufe  ?  ^ 

•Moreover,  if  an  intrinfic  caufc,  or  origi- 
Ijal  bias  and  propenfiry,  be  that  neceiTiLy  by  which 
the  will  is  determined,  what  is  this  but  being 
<2ccermiried  by  nature  ?  For  original  propenfitf 
is  »^//<r^/propenfuy.  Original  neceflity  is  ;?^- 
tural  neccfilty.  Agrcably  Mr.  Edwards  faith, 
*  Moral  nectfCiy  is  a  fpeciesof  philofophical' — 
"^  (  Z94,  295.  30^.  )  that  '  mcvral  events  a- 
rife  from  nature  as  truly  as  othei:s.'  (31,32.) 
Therefore,  as  was  hinted  before,  moral  neceflity, 
as  truly  as  natural,  precludes  from  praife  or 
blame — and  that  for  this^ood  reafon,  that  moral 
ncceffity  is  natural.  This  is  applicable  to  the 
pectfTuy  of  the  firjl  finful  volition,  if  indeed  it 
was  neceflary  before  it, came  to  pafs- — And  con- 
fequent  finful  volitions  being  the  efFc6ls  of  the 
£ril,  it  equally  holds  as  io. thtife  alfo. 

There  feerns,  indeed,  to  be  fome  difficulty, 
m  regard  to  the  principle  impL-inced  in  the  rege- 
nerate by  the  Spirit  of  GOD,  upon  thishypothe- 
:£s  of  Mr,  Edwards.  For  he,  we  prefume, 
would  nor  deny,  that  they  were  born  in  fin  ;  anci 
that  the  bias  in  regeneration  is  changed  faom  what . 
It  w^s  by  naiure.  Confequently,  the  holintls 
^nd  perfeverance  of  the  laints  is  not  neccflliry  . 
from  native,  original  propenficy,  but  from  fome 
other  caufe. 

Whatever  may  be  faid  in  regard  to  the  in- 
ability of  fallen  m:in  \  Mr.  Ed^ardsh  principle 
bath  equal  refpe^b  to  the  moral  pov/er  of  man 
in  innocence,  and  of  the  rebel  angtjs  before  their 
fall,  iheir  original  bias  and  inclination,  it  will 
be  allowed,  proceeded  immediately  from  the  crea- 
tor, 

,.*  AVwr-^j/ phi'orcphy,  we  conclude  he  mesnr — though 
■  indeed,  it  is  alike  app'icabie  to  his    tniral  philofc^hj^, 
■t-VfM  ";h^t  of  many  iccpticks   in  cur  naiion* 


j§4     Whether  ils  will  he  necejfartly  determined 

tor.  If  then  their  fm  v;as  the  effed  cfa  recefH- 
Ty  originally  in  their  will,  or  was  their  will's  ori- 
ginal propenfity,  ic  was  fo  entirely  owing  to  the 
r,aturc  cf  thhigs,  that  (by  ruppofitiois)  it  could 
not  involve  them  in  guilt — Or  if  connefled  with 
the  eternal  caule,  who  alone  is  nectfTary  in  his 
•own  nature,  it  could  not  upon  out  author's  own 
fcheme  ;  be  their  fin.  The  whole  guilt,  if  any, 
mud  be  i^npuicd  to  the  firft  caufi^.  For  the  firll 
iin,  of  angtrls  and  mm,  was  once  future  ;  and 
therefore  could  not  be  ncctflary  in  itlelf,  but 
only  by  the  aforefaid  necefiiry  of  conkquence. 
(p.  25.  )  And  then,  whatever  . moral  impoctncy 
now  cleaves  to  mankind,  or  damned  fpirits,  ihis 
being  conneded  with  the  firll  fin,  which  v;as 
•conncdted  with  the  original,  r;eceflary  bias  of  in- 
nocence ;  it  iollows.,  that  the  fins  of  fallen  cici- 
tures  arc  necelfary  in  the  lame  way  that  the  fird 
•finful  volition  was — the  only  way  in  which  all 
things  and  events  whatl'oever,  which  are  not  eter- 
nal, are,  or  can  be  necelfary.  They  do  not 
therefore  partake  of  the  effence  of  fin  3  or  if  they 
do,   invcUe  tht  creator  in  it. 

Indeed  thefuppofition  of  be?ng  neceffarily  de- 
termined by  original,  .internal  bias,  dees,  upon 
.the  whole,  lead  to  much  the  fame  confcquences 
v/ith  that  of  fuppofifrg  the  a6ls  of  the  will  to 
be  necefiTary  by  a  necefllcy  of  conf;<juence — fince, 
agreable  to  the  fecond  preliminary  propofition, 
criginal  bias  mufi:  be  ultimately  alcribcd  to  the 
oiiginal  caufs  of  all  things.  ^Vhat  is  natural  is 
the  c  >r  fcitution  of  the  author  of  nature.  Mo- 
ral events,  Mr.  Edivards  indruds  us,  are  ow- 
ing, t  artly  at  leaff,  to  the  nature  of  things — pro- 
ceed, at  lead  in  part,  from  natural  caufes,  Nov/, 
.by  his  own  principles,, ii; far  as  the   nature  of 

"     '  things 


hy  an   intrinfic  can(e  ?  g^ 

things  operates  to  their  produdion,  neither  good 
nor  ill  defcrt  is  applicable  to  the  fubject  of  voli- 
tion. Had  he  told  us  in  whac  rtfpedls,  and 
how  far,  volition  is  owing  to  natural  nccefiity^ 
we  might  have  known  v/nerein,  and  how  t-Ax, 
the  creature  is  accountable.  For  herein,  and  fo 
far,  Mr.  Jidwards  g^:in{s/n  [volition]  js  not  pro- 
perly his  own  a6t — he  is  not- the  proper  lubjed 
of  command,  &  c.  '        * 

If  volition  be  partly  owing  to  natural  caufes, 
and  the  lubjedl  lb  far  is  not  anfwerabi?:  j 
what  IS  this  but  charging  the  moral  turpi- 
tude of  a  fmful  volition  on  GOD,  fi  far  as 
it  is  the  .  effici  of  nalural  neceffit'y  ?  Now  as 
well  may  we  attribute  the  whole  moral  turpi- 
tude lo   God,    as  xhc  haji  msiifure  of  it. 

It  moreover  follows,  that  the  holinefs  of 
the  angels,    who    never  finned,    being   among 

.thofe  moral  events  which  are  owing  to  the 
nature  of  things,  is  no  holinefs  ;  unworthy  of 
praife.  The  lame  thing  follows  with  refpedt 
to  the  holintfs  of  the  man  CHRIST  JESUS„ 
and  of  GOD  himrdf.  For  'natural  necefTi- 
ty    is  wholly    inconfiltent    with  juil    praife   and 

.  blame.'  And  would  Mr.  Edwards  deny,  that  the 
holinefs  of  GOD,  his  moral  reditude  in  gene- 
ral, is  neceffaiy  z>/  if s  own  nature  ?  And  what 
is  this,  but  to  be  necefTary  by^aw^/ar^^/necefTuy  ? 

Farther,  by  Mr.  Edwardsh  principles,  all 
virtue  and  vice  in  creatures  is  native  or  original. 
For  every  a6t:  of  volition  is  the  necefTary  effe^ 
of  internal,  original  bias — i.e.  is  owing  to  the 
original  frame  of  the  mind.  The  angels  thac 
i"eli,anJour  cornm;n  progeiiitorsj  were  there- 
fore 


g$      Whether  the  will  he  meceJJ'arily  'determined 

fore 'made  with  a  fixed,  prcvail-ng  principle  of 
fin  ixT  the  heart  *  Ochtrv^/ile  tncir  fin  proceeded 
not  from  internal,  origiiial  bias — any  more  than 
from  an  'indiiToluble  connexion  wiih  a  caufe  ne- 
celTary  in  it's  own  nature/  If  in  truth  their  ori- 
ginal bias  was  not  to  evil-^if  fhey  were  endow- 
C'J  with  the  moral  image  of  GOD,  then  their  fin- 
ful  volition  was  not  the  effect  of  original  pro- 
pcnfifcy — nor  did  the  neceiTity  of  it  lie  in  the  wilt^ 
in  it's  primitive  ftate.  Nor  confequtntly  will  this 
account  for  the  permanency  of  holinefs  in  the  an- 
gels in  heaven.  This  cannot  be  the  rationale  ^i 
the  abiding  principle  of  holinefs  in  them  ;  fince 
St  appears  from  fidl,  that  creatures  endowed  with 
•t4ie  moral  image  ofGODimay  deface  and  forfeit  ir. 

Suppose  'the  efience  of  virtue  and  vice  lie* 
In  the  nature  of  volition,  not  in  the  caufc' ;  it 
then  follows,  that  the  intrinfic  caufe,  the  internal 
bias  or  propenfity  (which  is  fuppofed  to  be  the 
moral  neceffity  that  determines  the  will)  is  not 
that  which  conHitutes  the  goodnefs,  or  wiv.ked- 
nefs,  of  th^  acts  of  the  will.  A  vicious  man's 
bias  and  inclination  to  fin,  is  not  that  which  makes 
him  finful  ;  the  tfTence  of  his  fin  Iving  not  in 
fuch  bias  or  inclination,  but  in  the  nature  of  the 
wicked  thing.  A  llirewd  folution  !  as  if  the 
<:hara61-cr  of  moral  agents  v/ere  no:  always eili- 
•mated  from  their  propenfity  to  good  or  evil.  If 
'moral  recefTity  lies  in  the  will,  and  is  the  will's 
propenfity,'  ic  either  follows,  that  there  is  no 
good  or  evil  in  any  difpofitions  implanicd  in  the 
hearts  of  men  by  nature  ;  (contrary  to  affcrtion, 
■p  3^3')  or  if  tntrebe  any  o;ood  or  evil  in  fuch 
difpofitions,  this  is  c.itirely  a  didind  goodnefs  or 
wicktdnefsfrom  the  volhioni  themiclvcs,  which 
they  arcthc  caufc  of,     'ic  would  i.Tsply  a  conirti- 

,  diCtioa 


iy  an  intrinfic    caufe  ?  ^ 

didion  to  fuppofe,  that  thefc  two  arc  the  fame  iti- 
dividual'  goodnefs  or 'wickednefs.  Thc'good  or 
•wicked  a6l  ofthc  caufe,  in  producing' goodnefser 
•wickedncfs  is  one'  goodnefs  or  'wickcdnris  ;  and 
the'  goodnefs  or  'wickedncfs  produced,  if  there  be 
any  produced,  is  another.'  Will  this  be  called 
arguing  !  What  doih  it  amount  to  ?  The  plairt 
truih  is,  that  when  we  fe:  ourftlves  to  judge  of 
human  adions,  we  mud  have  noconfideiation  of 
the  fource  of  them,  buc  entirely  detach  them 
from  th.ir  caufes.  Be  the  efficient  who  or  what 
it  will,  ail  we  have  to  attend  to  is,  the  effed  pro- 
di'ced — by  this  we  muil  eftimate  the  goodnefs 
or  wickcdntf.  of  men,  whciher  they  determine 
themielves,  or  are  determined  ab  extra — whether 
they  have  power  over  their  own  wills,  or  have 
not.  He  therefore  that  with  one  original  talenc 
makes  as  great  improvement  as  another  with 
five,  is  no  more  praifeworthy — that  is,  is  not  ac- 
cepted according  to  that  he  hath.  He  that  offends 
againft  five  degrees  of  light  originally  given,  is 
guilty  in  no  higher  degree  than  he  that  offends 
againft  but  one  degree  of  light.  The  volition. 
Or  ad,  in  both  cafes,  we  fuppofe  to  be  the  fame 
in  regard  to  the  fubjed  matter  of  duty  cr  fin — 
the  lame  alfo  in  the  general  nature  thereof. 
What  then  is  the  reafon  of  different  degrees  of 
punifhmenc  for  the  fame  crime  in  different  per- 
fons  ?  Not  the  nature  of  the  crim^e  as  abfirad- 
cd  from  tr.c  circmnftances  of  the  agent,  but  as 
ccnneded  and  compared  herewith.  Now  if 
men  are  not  the  caufe  of  their  own  volitions, 
then  a  determination  to  fin  againft  ten  degrees 
of  light  differs  not]iing  from  the  like  determ,ina- 
tion  againft  a  fingle  degree  of  light  :  In  both 
cafes,  the  determination  itfelf  is  alike  neceffary 
^i^d  un^yoidablc.     So  that  there  is  no  foundaiioa 


5?     Whether  the  will  he  necejfarily  determined 

for  different  degrees  of  guilt  ;  becaufe,  though 
we  are  won't  to  fpeak  of  luperiorand  IcfTtr  ad- 
van-ages,  yet  there  is  no  real  ground  for  this 
dlftin(5lton,  intelligent  creatures  being  in  no  cafe 
the  cut-Ivors,  the  ..vol unrary  dcfigning  caufe  of 
iheir  in.wfard  determinmions  ;  at  lealt  not  of  the 
firil  and  leading  a6t,  which  decides  the  whole 
matter.  How  i;hen,  without  having  recourfe 
to  the  cauie,  canj.we  judge  of  i\\'t  naiute  of  fin  ? 
lN;D,fiED  had  Mr.  ,  Edwards  {x^ccttcci  in  his 
atten-'pf  to  (hew,  that  the  ''tfTnce  of  virtue  and 
vice  is  -not  in.  thtircauie,  but  in  their  nature*', 
he  would  not  have  obviated  the  objtflion  fo  of- 
ten made  to  the  do<^lrine  of  necctTity,  but  nevtr 
anfwcred,  that  it  is  charging  GOD  with  fin. 
.  >Foi^  ad?nitiing,GOD  to  be  the  original  caufe 
of  volition,  but  that  being  the  caufe  of  a  fir.ful 
yolit'ion  in  the  creature  is  a  diftindl  wicked* 
ntfs  kom  that  which  the  caufe  produceth 
in  the  t^V^l  •,  ifill  the  Ibpreme  caufe  is  fuppofed 
In  fault  i  is  charged  ^nih  prc-duci?ig^\n.  Tntre  i^ 
no  evading  the  eonfequencejndeed,  rh.at  the  who'e 
guilt  of  men's  evil  difpofiiionsis  chargeable  on- 
GOD,  not  themfclvcs,  or  on  blind  neceffity  and 
fatality,  if  the  things  Mr.  Edwards  advanceth  be 
true.  For  who  will  charge  another  with  vvdiat 
Ive  is  acknowledged  not  to  be  the  author 
or  caufe  of  ?  If  therefore  men's  volitions  are 
virtuous  or  vicious,  and  they  not  the  defign-- 
ing  caules  of  them  ihemfclves  •,  {  which  Mr. 
Edwards  throughout  his  book  faith  they  are 
not  )  it  follows,  that  the  virtue  or  vice  of 
their  volitions  is  to  be  afcribed  to  the  caufe, 
whoever  or  whatever  this  caufe  is.  This  cor-^ 
fequtnce  may  appear  more  plainly  to  follow 
from  the  icheme  oi  necefnty  we  are  exami-^- 
ning,  in  the  fiieceeding  fedions. 

-       •" ""  gECT, 


SECT.     Ill 


Upon    Mr*    Edwards';  own  Scheme^   there   cannot 
be  natural  Libtrty  without  moral. 

WE  acknowledge  the  title  of  this  fciflion 
contains  a  poHfion  direcSlIy  repugnant  to 
Mr.  Edwards^  whole  fcheme,  and  yec  trud  we 
fnall  make  it  appear  that  the  thing  alkrted  plain- 
ly follows   frbm    things  he  hath  advanccvd. 

Liberty  with   re^pe(5t  to  natural  aflions  can 
be  neither  more   nor  lefs  than  according  to  the 
freedom  of  the  ^///,  cr  mind.     For   natural  ani- 
ons, by  luppofition, are  dependent  andconfequenc 
on,  the  fruits  and  effefls   of,   the  will's   determi- 
nation, which  is  the  caufeof  them.     Now  'there 
cannot    be  more  in  the  effed  than  in  the    caiife. 
Thofe    things    which  are  indifTolubl/   cOnneded 
with  other  things  that  are  Leceiiary,  are   them- 
felves   neceffary.'     Therefore  if  the   acfls  of  the 
will  are  necefTary,  thofe  outward  acls,  which  arc 
the   etfefts  of  necefiiiy  in   the  will,  mud  be  ne- 
cefTary '  by  a  necelUcy  of  confequence.'     Now  eve- 
ry a6t  of  the  will  is  faid  to  be  ntceifary.     '  The 
foul  itfelf  is  the  obje(5tof  fomething  adlingupon, 
and   influencing  it.     The  firfl  and  determining 
zCi  of  choice,  which  decides  the  whole  affair,  is 
out   of  our  power.'     So  that    in  natural  adions 
we  are   ^cati/dd  to  a6l  by  fome   other  agent.'  Mr. 
Edwards   faith, '  it  is  no  more  a  contradiction,  to 
fuppofe  that   a6lion    may  be  the  efled  of  fomc 
Itbcr  caufe,  befides  the   ageni  or  king  that  a6ls., 

K  than 


t6  Upon  Mr,  Edwards'j  Scheme,  there 

than  to  fuppofe  that  life  may  be  the  cffefl  of  fomc 
other  caufe  befides  the  liver,  or  being  that  lives, 
in  whom  life  is  caufed  to  be.'  *  (  286.  )The  afti 
of  the  foul  or  will  being,  therefore,  neceflary 
cfFc6ls  of  fome  other  caufe  than  the  agent,  let  it 
be  fhewn  how  there  can  be  fo  much  as  natural 
liberty — meaning  hereby  a  freedom  from  out- 
ward conftralnt  or  reftraint. 

Mr.  Edwards  aflerts,  *The  liberty  of  the  will 
is  not  cxcrcifed  in  any  thing  but  what  the  will 
doei^,  (99.)  *  The  will  in  no  inftance  whatever  is 
it's  6wn  determiner'.  Therefore  the  liberty  of 
ihe  will  is  not  exercifed  in  any  of  the  determinations 
of  the  will.  Therefore  not  in  determining  to  move 
the  body.  Therefore  corporeal  aftion  is  not  vo- 
luntary. Therefore  the  will  does  nothing  There- 
fore It  is  exercifed  in  nothing.  Mr.  Edwards 
promifeth  to  'demonftrate',.  that  '  if  the  fir/l  a6l 
in  the  train,  determining  and  fixing  the  reft,  be 
not  free,  none  of  them  all  are  free.'  And  afTcrrs, 
that  '  GCD's  own  immediate  condudt  is  original 
in  the  lerics.' 

In  one  word,cxtcrnal  a^lion  is  no  more  in  our 
power  than  internal.  To  fay  that  the  will  deter- 
mines the  former  is  not  true  :  For  this  would  be 
to  fuppofe  it  is  its  own  determiner  at  lead  in  this 
particular  determination  to  move  the  body  ;  con- 
trary to  alTertion,  that  it  is  in  no  inftance  whatever 
it's  own  determiner.  But  fuppofe  material  adlions 
to  be  determined  by  the  will,  that  herein  men  arc 
the  voluntary  caufes  of  their  own  adlions — this  is 
really  attributing  no  power  to  thewillor  agent-^ 
fincc  all  the  adtsof  the  will  fuppofe  an  anfwcrabic 

caufe 

*  Ii  a  man  active  in  that  adl  by  which  he  is    brought 
into  being  ? 


cannot  he  natural  Liberty  without  moral.     6i 

caufe  without,  as  much  as  creation  fuppofetha 
xrcator.  (62.) 

If  material  a6lions  are  fubjedl  to,  andcommaed- 
ed  by,  the  will,  ftill  this  is  fubjcd  to  and  deter^ 
mined  by  preceeding  neccfTity.  So  that  natural 
liberty  is  given  up.  For  that  is  a  ftrange  kind  of 
liberty,  which  is  founded  in,  and  refulu  out  of, 

•  RecelTity.  Whether  this  ncceffity  be  natural  or 
moral — whether  it  proceeds  from  an  extrinfic  or 
intrinQc  caufe,  it  equally  militates  againft  the  fup- 
poficion  of  freedom.  The  intelligent  fy Item  is 
a  curious  piece    of  mechanilm. 

•Page  2^2  (and  clfcwhere)  Mr,  Edwards  hath 
an  evafion,  which  Icarce  deferves  a  ferious  an- 
fwer.  It  is  this,  *  that  a  man  may  be  faid  to  have 
a  thing  in  his  power,  if  he  has  it  at  his  tle5lioni 
i.  e.  if  he  now  pleafeth,  and  has  a  dire^  and  imme^ 
diate  defirc  for  it,  he  is  not  unable  to  do  \lJ^ 
This^  in  tnoft  writers,  would  be  efteemed  mecr 
quibbling.  For  if  a  man  is  morally  incapable  of 
a  '  dired  and  immediate  defire'  to  a  thing,  how 
can  he  be  faid  to  .have  it  in  his  power  ?  Would 
Mr.  A"^te;rtr<yj  fay,  that  things  are  in  or  out  of 
men^s  pGvver,farther  than  chufing  sr  %efujing  is  fo„ 
as  well  as  the  conftquent  ads  depending  hereon  ? 
It  is  not  improper  to  fay,  '  that   a  perfon'  cannpt 

*  perform  thofe   adions,  which  depend  on  an  3.3: 
of  will,  when  the  ail  of  will  itfelf  cannot  be  pre- 

,fenr,  but  is  forever  impofllblc' — when  the  dif- 
poficion  to  the  contrary  is  Vas  flrong  and  im- 
moveable as  the  bars  of  a  x^ftle,'  by  nature---- 
when  want  of  iisclination  proceeds  from  m- 
,dure  •,  or  original  bias.  For  '  the  event^is  de- 
pendent on  it's  caufe;'  And  the  caufe  not 
being  put,  the  event  cannot  take  place.  Ad- 
miumg   th;£t   luch  a^  ftate  pf  the  .will  may  he 

,reiiuircd 


62  *  upon  Mr.  Ed^SLvdb  s  fc hem f  there^  &c. 

required  as  is  forever  impolTible  -,  this  can  be 
onJy  on  a  fuppofition  of  an  ability  once  gi- 
ven  and  pofll'lTcd,  but  loft.  "Who  will  fay, 
that  a  man  has  in  his  power  what  is  and  mud 
be   irnpofTible   ?    So  that  when  we    are    told, 

*  that  the  common  people,  in  their  notion  of 
a  faulty  or  praife-worthy  deed,  fuppofe  the 
man  does  it  in  the  exercife  of  liberty  ♦,  but 
that  their  norion  of  liberty  is  only  a  perfon's 
having  opportunity  of  doing  as  he  pleal'cs' — • 
i.  e.  of  executing  a  choice  already  made,  we 
m.uft  efteem  this  trifling.  Fo-r  what  liberty  is 
there  \Mh^w  choice  itleU  is  out  of  a  man's  power — 
is  the  efftd  of  an  antecedent  neceflary  caufe  ? 
*]n  the  firjl  zOi  of  choire,  which  decides  the 
whole  miaxicr,/  he  is  nccefTarily  determined. 
]n  this  Pv^r,  Eciuards  conftanrly  aiTerts  a  man  has 
rot  power,  or  liberty  of  choice,  while  he  grants 
him  a  power  or  capacity  of  cGn/eque7tt  choice.  Than 
j-S  in  other  words,,  a  capacity  of  bei.n^  a^ed  up- 
on by  feme  other  caufe  or  agent.       -•   " 

Ux'^ON  the  whole  :  Mr.  Kdwards  allows,  that 
liberty  is  efiential  to  praife  or  blame,  .-reward  or 
punifnment ;  but  teacheth,  that  the  internal  ftate 
of  the  mind  or  will  proceeds  not  from,  is  not 
determined  by,  ourfelves.  "^  rxternal  adion  on- 
ly is  deicrmimed  by  us.  With  what  truth  and 
propriety  even  this  can  be  faid  on  Mr.  Edwards*^ 
fcheme,  we  trull  is  fufficicntly  manifcft. 

SECT. 

*  Quaere,  V/hether  Mr.  £iw^r^/s  rrotto  at  all  favors 
this  opin'on  ?  it  is  taken  from  Rom.  ix.  xvi.  //  is 
mt  of  him  that  willeih.  1  hat  is,  (  if  we  attend  to  the 
words  taken  by  therrfelves,  or  in  their  connexion) 
€uii^ard  G^ion  is  not  bfh'mthat  willcth.  It  is  Tup- 
;pofed  he  hafh  willed,  and  that  the  will  hfrcm  him- 
felfi—UiKi  that  liiiieth.  But  he  hath  not  power  or 
(Opportunity  to  pxeciite  his  will.  IJaac  did  really  will 
to  give  the  blcilmg  to  ii/^z<' — Efau  did  run  for  venifoa 

^,to  obtain  ic.     But  the  will  of  the  one,  and  the   i un- 
fair g  of  the  Other,  were  ovcr-iuled* 


SECT.     IV. 


Of  GOUs  hein^  the  Author  of  Sin,  upon  Mr. 
EdwardsV  Scheme  ef  neceffuy  \  and  in  what 
Senfe  he  admits  this  to  be  the  Confequence  of 
his  DoBrine. 

MR  Edwards  teacheth,  '  That  GOD,  when 
he  had  made  man,  fo  ordered  his  circum- 
Itances,  that  ftom  tbefe  circumftances^  together 
with  the  withholding  divine  influence  and  afTift- 
ance,  his  fin  infallibly  followed'  And  when  ic 
is  aflct^d  hereupon,  *  why  might  not  GOD  as 
well  have  firft  made  .man  with  a  fixed,  prevail- 
ing principle  of  fin  in  his  heart  ?'  Mr.  Edwards 
intimates  in  his  anfwer,  that  GOD  might  indeed 
have  done  .fo  ;  but  adds,  that  if  man  had  been 
thus  made  at  firft, '  it  would  not  have  been  fo 
'vifible,  that  fin  did  not  arifc  from  GOD,  as  the 
pofiiive  caufe,  and  real  fource  of  it — that  there- 
fore it  wos  mtet  man  fhould  not  be  made  with 
fin  in  his  heart,  that  fin  might  appear  to  arife 
from  the  imperfedion  of  the  creature,  and  not 
from  GOD  as  the  efficient  or  fountain.'  He  al- 
lows GOD  to  be  the  author  of  fin  in  any  fenfe 
but  being  '  the  agent ^  or  a8or  of  fin,  or  doer  of 
the  wicked  thing.'  He 'difpofeth  the  (late  of 
events  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  fin  moft  certainly 
follows  therefrom.  In  fuch  a  {t'^{^i  I  do  not 
deny,  that  GOD  is  the  author  ol-  fin.  It  is  no 
reproach  for  the  mod  high  to  be  thus  the  au- 
thor of  fin.  In  fuch  a  manner  GOD  is  the  orde- 
rer  and  difpofer  of  fin,  though  not  the  a^or  of  it, 
^or  doer  of  the  wicked  thing.'  (  Part  iv.  fe(^.  9> 
io.~  and  p.  402,   408. 

Now 


^4  ^02)  the  Author  of  Sin; 

Now  how  doth  it  appear,  on  thcfe  principles; 
that  God   is    not   the  pofitivc  caufe,  and   real 
fource  of  moral  evil  ?  Every  one   perceives    a 
difference  between  doing  (or  being  xh^JuhjeB  of) 
a  wicked  thing,   and  being  the  efficient  cauje  and 
fountain  of  it — Mr.  Edwards  allows,   thaj  the 
moral  turpitude  lies   wholly  in  the   inward  pro- 
penfity,  and  can  no  farther  be  applied  to  the  cor- 
poreal aflion,  than  as  a  vicious^principle  is  fup- 
pofed  to   be   the  fource  of  it.     If  then  we  have 
no  power  of  felWeterminationin   relation  to  the 
internfil  a6ls  and  exercifes  of  the  in;nd — if  the 
only  thing  wherein  human  liberty  confifts,  is,  a 
power   of  executing  what    is   already  willed — if 
volition   fprings   not   from  man    as   the  fource, 
caufe,   or  efficient  of  it^ — if  he  is  only  ihtfubjeff^ 
the  doer^  the  aSfor  of  fin— Who  then  is   the  po- 
fitive  caufe  and  fountain  of  it  ?  if  not  the  crea- 
ture,   who  but    the  creator  ?  Every    thing   but 
the  a5iion  or  doing  of  wickednefs,  Mr.  Edwards 
cxprelly   affirms  GOD  to  be  the  author  of,  and 
faith  It  is   no  reproach  to    him.     So  that   unlefs 
he  would  confound  caufe  and  effi?^ — unlels   he 
would  allow  men  to  be  '  the  dcfigmng  volun- 
tary caufe   of  their   own  volitions  •,*  (which    I;ic 
conftandy  denies)  there  is  no  evading  the  confe- 
quence,    that    GOD  is  the  fource  and  fountain, 
the  pofitive  caufe  and  efficient,    of  moral  evil — 
yea,    Mr.    Edwards  faith,  that  he  '  decifively  or- 
ders all  the  volitions  of  moral  agents  by  a  pofi- 
tive influence'— (4.03)  which  is  nothing  Icfs  than 
faying  in  exprels  terms,  that  he  is  the  pofitivc 
caufe  and  efficient   of  them. 

Mr.  Edwards's  notion  of  human  liberty,  ,a$ 
beincr  exercifed  and  concerned  in  outward  a'fli- 
ons  only,  in  contradiftindtion  from  an  inward 
power  of  felf-dctcrmination  (or  aiflivity  in  voliti- 


Mpon  Mr,  EdwardsV  Scheme  of  Neceffjt'y,      65 

•« — or  liberty  in  the  mind  or  will)  if  viewed  in 
it's  diredt  and  immediate  conrequences,  we  think 
muft  appear  to  fubvert  the   very  foundation  of 
religion  and   morality.     This  appears  to  be  the 
plain  confcquence  by  his   own   principles.     For 
he  very  juftly  obferves,  that   'the  eflence  of  all 
moral  good  or  evil  lies  in  the    internal  inclinaci- 
ons,  dilpofuions,   volitions* — that   as    thefe  'are 
the  caufe  of  outward  adlions,  fo    the  moral  good 
or  evil  of  fuch  aftions  doth  not  lie  at  all    in  the 
aflions  them/elves,  which  taken  by  themfelves  are 
nothing  of  a   moral  nature  •,    but  in   the  internal 
inclinations  and  volitions  which  arc  the  caufe  of 
them' — (27b)  that  'vice    and  virtue   lie   in   the 
ftate  or  frame  of  the  foul^  and  in  this  only* — that 
'  the  very  willing  is  the  doing  ;  v/hen  once  a  man 
has  willed,  the  thing  is  performed,  and  nothing 
clfe    remains  to    be  done — that  the  will   itfelf  is 
the  proper  object  of  commands,  as  well  as  thofc 
anions  which   are  the  effects  of  the  will.     It  is 
manifeft  the  Joul  only  is   properly   and    diredly 
the  fubjed  of  precepts  or  commands,    that  only 
being  capable  of  receiving  or  perceiving   them. 
The    motions  or  (late  of  the  body  are  matter  of 
command   only  as  they  are  fuhjeii   to    the  foul, 
and  conneded  with  it's  afts.  '  ^   Now    \i inward 
freedom   enters  not  into  the  notion  of  human 
liberty  (33,  38,    39,40,    131,    132,   189,    194, 
113,-215,   234,    236,256,-289,  andfajfim.) 
then  we    are  not  free    in  that  wherein  lies  the 
ejfence   of  virtue   and  vice  :    And  if  we  are  not 
free  in  this  refpeft  efpecially,  how    are  we  free 
in  any  fenfe  that  is  of  the  lead  importance  ?  how 
can  we  be  virtuous  or  vicious,  if  liberty  (as  Mr. 
Edwards  grants)   is  neccflary  to  moral  good  or 
«vil  ?   Yea,  if  wc  are  not  free  with  refped  to  the 

thoughts, 
;  Part  3.  Scft.  f  &  5^ 


66  COT>  tfie  Author  of  Sin, 

thoughts,  affe(5lions  and  purpofes  of  our  heart.v 
our  inward    inclinations  aad  volitions,  hath  not 
Mr.  Edwards  fllewn  undeniably  that  we  cannot 
be  free  in  regard   to  outward  adions  ?   'If  there 
be  a  feries  of  ads,    the  deter fnimng  ad   is  more 
efpecially   the  fubjed  of  comn^and— becaufe  ic 
is  this  ad    that  determines  the  whole  afniir.'  So 
that  we  are  not  at    liberty    in   that  which  deter- 
mines the  whole  chamber.  Nothing  can  be  more 
futile  than  the  evafion,  that  '  the  eflenee  of  vir- 
tue and  vice  lies  in  the  vature  of  volition,  not  ia 
the  cauje" — as  if  meer  effcds  might  be  virtuous 
or  vicious,    and  the  caute   that  produceth  them 
not  fo — Or  fuppofing  the  caufe  (of  a  finful  vo- 
lition, for  inftance  )  to  be  vicious,  as  if  ihcpaffrce 
cffed   would  be  another  and  diftmd  wkkednefs. 
Befides,  if  the  fubjed  of  fuch  a  volirion,   who  is 
altogether  paiTive  herein,  is  vicious  notwithftand- 
ing,  then  how  is  liberty  neceffary    to   praifc  or 
blame  ?  If  he  is  vicious  at  all,  he  is  fo  on  account 
of  the  volition  itfelf,  and  on  this  account  only — 
Whether  he  has  power  or  opportunity    to  exe- 
cute the  volition,  does  not   come   into  confide- 
ration. 

Moreover,  outward  adions  being  determi^ 
ned  by  the  will,  and  partaking  of  the  nature  of 
moral  good  or  evil  only  with  reference  to  their 
caufe,  viz.  rnternaF  volition — how  is  this  (inter- 
nal voruiony  virtuous  cr  vicious  in  it's  cwn  nature^ 
w'hen  the  ads  of  the  body  ate  not  ?  Volition  hath 
a  caufe,  a  prior  determiner,  no  Icfs  than  external 
condud.  Why  then  are  outward  ads  declared 
virtuous  or  vicious  only  with  reference  to  their 
caqfc,  while  this  is  denied  of  volition  ?  Hath 
every   ad  cf  •  volition  m  antccedentj  nccertary 

cauf*^ 


upon  Mr.  Ed^vards';  Scheme  cfT^ectJfity.      67 

caufe,  which  d<?terminech  not  only  volition, 
bur,  of  confecjiience,  outward  actions  ?  And  is 
not  the  virtue  or  vice  of  volition  to  be  attribu- 
ted to  its  caufe,  as  much  as  the  evil  of  external 
a'Sls  to  the  inward  difpofition  and  determinati- 
on ?  '  Thus*  Mr.  Edwards's  '  notion  of  liberty, 
confiding'  m  external  freedom,  '  is  repugnant  to 
itfelf,  and  fhuts  icfeif  wholly  out  of  the  world.* 

Were  it  indeed  true,  as  Mr.  Edwards  inci- 
dentally oblerves,  (contrary  to  the  general  doc- 
trine of  his  book,  and  his  whole  fcnene)  that 
we  '  have  command  over  our  thoiiyhts' — (p^ 
^94)  that  '  the  a(5ls  of  the  will  are  free' — thac 
'  ihQ  Juul  has  freedom' — (p.  ti6,  224)  this 
might  folve  the  difficulty,  as  it  would  be  to 
make  men  the  voluntary  deQgning  caufe  of 
ihofe  inward  ads  wherein  the  nature  of  ^virtue 
and  vice  c^n fills.  But,  as  before  obferved,  Mr. 
Edwards  conllantly  denies  an  inward  principle, 
fource,  or  pov/er  of  activity — and  blames  thole 
divines  who  contend  for  the  freedom  of  the  foul 
in  willing.  He  allows,  that  a  man  hath  '  pow- 
er to  move  his  body  agreably  to  an  antecedent 
a61:  of  choice,  but  not  to  ufe  or  exert  the  facul- 
ties of  hisfouL'  (p.  i^i)  How  then  '  hath  the 
foul  a  power  of  volition  or  choice  V  (p.  39)  of 
chilling  for  inllance,  to  move  the  body,  wheu 
it  hath  not  a  power  of  exerting  its  own  facul- 
ties ?  How  much  more  confident  would  it  have 
been  for  Mr.  Edwards  to  have  faid,  thac  the 
will's  deter'mining  is  a  nesejfary  determining — 
for  the  foul  to  adt  necejfarily  is  evermore  to  adt 
necelTarily  ? — (that  is,  the  will  does  not  determine,, 
the  foul  does  not  ad)  than  to  fay,  '  the  will's 
determining  is  2ifrse  determining — for  the  foul 
to  ad  voluntarily  is  evermore  to  ad  fk^ivilf  ^ 

L  The 


€i         GO'D  the  Author  of  Sin,  upon 

The  will,  the  foul,  may  be  a^ed  upcn^  and  have 
fuch  a  volition  or  choice  produced  in  it,  in  con- 
fequencCi  and  as^ihc  effe5l^  of  fonne  caufe  operat- 
ing on  i%  deciding  and  determining  the  volition. 
What  Mr  Edwards  calls  the  foul's  voluntary^ 
thrive  ads,  are  the  efi-eds  of  a  caufe  indepen- 
dent on  man.  The  ads  and  exercifes  of  the 
human  mind  (if  they  may  be  called  its  ads)  are 
owing  not  to  any  adive  power  in  the  mind^  to 
any  thing  within  its  power,  but  entirely  to  the 
energy  of  a  necellary  caufe,  which  is  prior  to 
what  are  called  its  own  ads.  Volition  is  free 
or  voluntary  with  a  freedom  cf  moral  neceffuy — 
a  ncctflity  cs  ahfolute  as  natural.  And  thus  it 
is,  that  a  man's  heart  comes  to  be  wrong  or 
right. 

Mr.  Edwards  teacheth,  that  GOD  '  orders 
the  volitions  of  moral  agents,  among  other 
-events,  with  fuch  a  duifive  difpofal,  that  the 
events  are  infallibly  connedled  v/ith  his  difpo- 
fal— that  an  univerlal,  determining  providence  in- 
fers an  infallible,  previous  fixednefs  of  all  c- 
vents — that  GOD's  own  immediate  condud  is 
firft  in  the  feries,  and  this  alone  unconneded 
with  any  thing  prececding — that  he  caufeth  the 
difpofition  of  the  mind  to  be  more  in  favour  of 
fuch  ads' — (vicious  no  lefs  than  virtuous)  '  or 
bringeth  the  mind  more  into  view  of 
powerful  motives  and  inducements' — that  all 
things  are  invariably  fettled — and  '  necefiity  be- 
longs to  all  moral  agents.'  His  fchcmc,  upon 
th'^  whole,  appears  to  be  nearly  the  fame  with 
that  exhibited  by  the  celebrated  Mr.  Hume,  aa 
epicurean  atbeift,  which  we  fliall  give  the  reader 
in  his  own  wor  is,  'There  is  a  continued  chaia 
Qt  nccelTary  caufes,  forc-ordaincd,  and  pre-de- 
^         ~ '  termined;^ 


Mr,  Edwards*j  Scheme  of  NeceJJiiy:  69 

termined,  reaching  frarn  the  original  caufc  of 
all  to  every  fingle  volition  of  every  human  crea- 
ture. While  we  adl,  we  are,  at  the  fame  timc,^ 
a6ted  upon.  The  ultimate  author  of  all  our 
vohtions  is  the  Creator  of  the  world,  who  firft 
beftowed  motion  on  this  immenfe  machine,  and 
placed  all  beings  in  that  pofition,  whence  eve- 
ry fubfequent  event,  by  an  inevitable  necefficy,' 
mull  reiult.' 

To  this  fcheme,  Mr.  Hume  fuppofeth  it  will 
be  objeaed  in  the  following  form.      '  Human 
actions,   therefore,    either  can   have  no    moral 
turpitude  at  all,  as  proceeding  from  fo   good  a 
caufe  ;  or  if  they  have  any    turpitude,  they  in- 
volve our  Creator  in  the  fame  guilt,  while  he  is 
acknowledged   to  be  their   ukimar.e  caufe  and 
author.      Wherever  a  continued  chain  of  ne- 
cefTiry  caufes  is  fixed,  that  being,  either  finite  or 
infinite,    who  produces  the  firft,  is  likewife  the 
author  of  all  the  refl,  and  muft  boih  bear  the 
blame,  and   acquire  the  praife,  which   belong  to 
them.     Our  clcareft   and  moft  unalterable  ideas 
of  morality  eflabliih  this  rule  upon  unqueftion- 
able  reafons,  when  we  examine  the  confequen- 
ces  of  any  human  adion  ;  and  thtfe  reafons  muft 
M\  have   greater  force,   when   applied  •  to  the 
volitions  and  intentions  of  a  being   mfinitety  wife 
and  powerjul.      Ignorance   or  impotence    may 
be  pleided  for  fo   limited  a  creature  as   man  5 
but  thofe   imperfeaions   have   no  place   in  our 
Creator.     He  forcfaw,  he  ordained,  he  intended 
all   thofe  adions  of   men,   which   we   fo   rafhly 
pronounce  criminal.      And  we   muft  conclude, 
therefore,  either   that  they  are  not  criminal,  or 
that  the  Deity,   not    man,  is    accountable  for 
them.      But  as  either  of  thefe  pofitions  is  ab- 


■Jd  GOD  the  Author  of  Sin,  upon 

furd  and  impious,  it  follows  that  the  do^bine 
from  which  they  are  deduced  cannot  pcfTibly  be 
true,  as  being  liable  to  all  the  lame  objections. 
An  abiurd  ccnfcquence,  if  ncceflary,  proves  the 
original  do61rine  to  be  abfurd,  in  the  fame  man- 
ner that  criminal  anions  render  criminal  the 
original  caufe,  if  the  conne<^!on  between  ihtm 
be  neceiTary  and  inevitable/ ^ 

This  cbje(flion,  which  Mr,  Hume  dates  to 
h'mleif,  may  be  made'^with  the  lame  propriety 
to  the  general  feheme  of  our  autnor.  From 
3Vir  Hume\  answer,  it  is  lufficiently  manifeft 
what  his  prin4::pics  were.  H;:;  tells  us,  '  Ic  is 
not  pofiibie  to  e, plain  diftindly,  how  the  Dd- 
ty  can  be  the  immediate  caufeof  all  the  adicns 
of  miCn,  Without  being  the  author  of  fin  and 
iporai  turpitude.  Theie  are  mylleries,  whtcb 
meer  natwai  and  unojfijhd  reafcnis  'v en  unfit  io 
handle  \  and  whatever-  i'ydem  it  tmbraces  ic 
muft  find  itielf  involved  in  inextricable  difficul- 
ties, and  even  contradidtions,  at  every  ilep  which 
k  takes  with  regard  to  fuch  fubjeds.'  f 

Mr.  Hume  acknowledgeth,  that  upon  his 
fcheme,  the  Deity  is  the  mediate^  original  caufc 
of  all  the  adtions  of  men  ;  and  virtually  admits 
the  confequence  ♦,  (that  he  is  therefore  the  au- 
thor of  fm  and  moral  turpitude)  by  obfcrving, 
that  it  is  not  nrfiible  diftin^'ly  to  explsin,  how 
he  can  be  the  one,  and  not  the  o'her.  Now  let 
it  be  ihewn,  that  Mr.  Edwards's  icheme  is  not 
'         \  *  liable 

^EfTays  fey  David  Hume ^  Efqj  vol.  iil  p^  15  r,  152, 
^  Ibid  p.  156. 


Mr.  Edwards'^  Scheme  of  Necefftty:  ji 

liable  to  the  foregoing  objedion,  or  admitting 
the  objedion,  let  the  confcquence  be  fliewn  not 
to  follow,  and  it  will  afford  no  fmall  fatisfadlion 
to  many,  who  are  geatly  embarraffed  with  Mr, 
Edwards'z  fheme  of  neceflary  conne^lion. 
Whoever  examines  part  ii.  ^td:.  3d,"  4th,  9th, 
I2th,  and  13th.  Fart  iii.  fed.  ^d,  4th,  and 
6th,  Part  iv.  feci.  9th  and  lOrh,  and  the  con- 
clufion  of  his  difcourfc,  muft,  we  arc  perluaded, 
fee  the  objedion,  as  above  dated,  to  be  juft— . 
And  if  the  confequence  alfo  be  fairly  drawn, 
doth  it  not  prove  the  dodrine  againft  which  the 
objedltion  lies  to  be  falfe  and  abiurd  ?  abfolute- 
ly  irreconcilable  with  the  moral  character  of 
GOD  ? 


SECT, 


^2  "^he  fuppcfed   Ad-i/antage  of 


SECT.     V, 


On  the  fuppofed  Advantage  of  moral  Evil  to  the 
Umverfe. 


HAVING  taken  notice  of  Mr.  Edwards's 
doitrine,  in  afil  rting  GOD  to  be  the  au- 
tr.or  of  (in,  except  that  he  is  not  '  the  a^or  of 
n^  or  doer  of  the  wicked  thing  ;  and  the  eva- 
fion  which  luch  a  dodrine  ^leededy  that  '  the 
cfTence  of  a  finfol  volition  is  in  its  nature,  not 
mii^  caii/c^  ',  the  next  advance  he  makes,  in 
order  to  reconcile  the  exiilence  of  fin  with  the 
divine  choice  and  determination,  in  the  invaria- 
ble ncccfTity  of  it,  is,  that  moral  evil  is  htjl  for 
the  world— that  therefore  *  an  infinitely  wife 
being,  who  always  chufes  what  is  btft,  mufl 
chi!lfc  there  fhould  be  fuch  a  thing' — that  this 
is  not  chufing  what  is  properly  evil  upon  the 
whole,  bccaufe  '  of  the  great  good  which  is  the 
confequencc  of  fin,  for  the  fake'  of  which  GOD 
is  fuppofed  to  '  will  fin.'  He  therefore  affcrts, 
that  '  moral  evil  is  not  of^  bad^  hut  '^ood  ten- 
dency^— that  '  the  coming  to  pals  of  every  indi-' 
vidual  ad  of  fin  is  truly,  all  things  confidered, 
agrcablc  to  infinite  v/ildom  ai'id  *^oodnefs.* 
(Fart  iv.  fed.  9th.) 

For  all.  this  he  quotes  with  approbation  Dr. 
Tw-nb/il/f  againd  wnom  he  had  before  wrote 
and   publifh-d   pare   of  an   elaborate    volun-e. 

Whea 


moral  Evil  to  the  Univerfe.  f^ 

When  it  is  ailced,  W^hence  conies  evil  ?  this  Gen- 
tleman denies  the  hypothcfis,  and  anlwers, 
'  There  is  no  evil  in  the  untverje  What !  is  there 
no  mifcry,  no  vice  in  the  world  ?  or  are  noc 
thefe  evils  ?  Evils  indeed  thty  are  *,  that  is, 
thofe  of  one  fort  are  hurtful,  and  thofe  of  the 
other  fort  are  equally  hurtful  and  abominable  : 
But  they  are  not  evil  cr  mTchicvous  with  rc- 
fpe6l  to  the  whole.  The  ev^d  which  happens  is 
rcquifue  to  the  greater  good* 

That  GOD  may,  and  does  many  times, 
overrule  things  fo,  as  to  bring  good  out  of  mo- 
ral evil,  we  deny  not.  From  the  apoftacy  of 
mankind,  he  hath  taken  occafion  to  manifeft 
the  exceeding  riches  of  his  grace.  He  alio  fre- 
quently improves  vicious  and  profligate  finners 
(befidejand  contrary  to,  their  own  intention)  as 
inilruijopnts  of  great  and  general  good.  Bun 
doth  i^hcrefore  follow,  that  profligate  wicked- 
nefs  is  not  of  bad,  but  good  tendency  ?  That 
every  individual  ad  of  it  is  agreable  to  perfedt 
wifdom  and  goodnefs,  and  beft  for  the  world  ? 

*  Though  the  conftitution  of  our  nature; 
from  whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  mife- 
ry,  may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to 
the  pericdion  and  happinefs  of  the  world  ;  and 
though  the  adual  permiflion  of  evil  may  be  be- 
neficial to  it  :  (chat  is,  it  would  have  been  more 
mifchi^^vous,  Bot  that  a  wicked  pcrfon  had  him* 
fcif  2.b^?i\x\tdi  from  his  own  wickcdnefs,  hut  that 
any  om  had  forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that  it  was 
permitted  :)  Yet  notwithfl:anding,it  might  have 
been  much  better  for  the  world,  if  this  very 
evil  had  never  been  done.  Nay,  it  is  mod 
jlcarly  conceivable,  that    the  very  commifllon 

of 


74  Tbefu^pcjei  Advantage  of 

of  wlckednefs  may  be  beneBcial  to  the  world,and 
yet,  that  it  would  be  infinitely  more  beneficial 
for  men  to  refrain  from  it.  For  thus,  in  the 
wife  and  good  conftitution  of  the  natural  worlds 
there  are  diforders  which  bring  their  own 
cures  ;  difeafes,  which  are  themklves  remedies. 
Many  a  man  would  have  died,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  gout  or  a  fever  ;  yet  it  would  be 
thought  madnefs  to  afl!ert,  that  ficknefs  is  a  bet- 
ter or  a  more  perfedt  (late  than  heaUh  •,  though 
the  like,  with  regard  to  the  moral  world,  has 
been  alTcrced.  "^ 

GOD's  law.  originally  given  to  man,  was 
doubtlefs  good  and  per  feci.  It  was  doubtlcfs 
agreable  to  pcrfedl  wifdom  and  goodnefs,  that 
he  (hould  yield  a  fteady  and  uniform  obedience 
to  it.  Thus  he  would  have  glorified  his  Crea- 
tor, anfwered  the  end  of  his  being,  and  provid- 
ed for  his  own  highetl  happineis.  BiK  fuppo- 
fing  moral  evil  to  be  no  evil  upon  the  whole, 
but  a  great  good,  fuch  conieqaences  as  thefe 
will  follow,  rhat  the  law  given  to  man  at  firfl: 
was  imperfect — that  it  was  better,  all  things 
confidered,   that    the    divine  law    (the    law   of 

man's   nature)  Ihould   be    broke  than    kept 

that  GOD  threatned  diibbedience  with  the  pe- 
nalty of  death,  and  ycr  chofe  man  fhould  rebel, 
*  for  the  fake  of  the  great  good  confequent  on 
fin' — that  the  ends  of  infinite  wifdom  and  good- 
nefs could  be  anfwered,  no  pofilbie  way  dcviri-d 
to  advance  the  highejl  haj^pinejs  of  the  intelligent 
creation,  but  by  the  entrance  of  mfinite  evil  into 
the  world — that  the  revolt  of  men  and  angels 
was  in  compliance   with  the  end  of  their  being, 

and 

*  Butkr^  Analogy,  edit.  4,  p.  J$8>  189; 


moral  Evil  to  the  Univerfi,  75 

aird  the  wtfe  and  gracious  intention  of  the  Crea- 
tor— (and  if  fo,  '  why  did  not  GOD  make  them 
at  firftwith  a  fixed  prevailing  principle  of  fin  V) 
Yea,  it  follows,  that  intemperance,  debauchery, 
opprtfllon,  murther,  malice,  envy,  all  the  lufts 
of  the  ficdi  and  fpirit,  greatly  conduce  to  the 
good  of  the  world,  and  are  perfe^ly  agreable  to 
the  wife  and  good  governor  of  it.  What  obli- 
gations do  mankind  ove  to  drunkards  and 
gluttons,  to  fornieators  and  adulterers,  to  the 
fraudulent  and  oppreifors,  to  thieves  and  liars, 
and  falfe  fvvearers,  to  robbers  and  murtherers, 
and  all  that  great  mukuude,  whom  the  faithful 
and  rrue  witnels  hath  exprefsly  excluded  from 
the  heavenly  Jcrulalcm,  and  configned  to  one 
common  lake  of  fire  and  brimftone  !  *  Which 
judgment  according  to  truth  the  world  have 
been  wont  to  teftify  their  approbation  of  in 
their  treatment  of  fach  perfons — -that  is,  their 
greatelt  bcnefa6iors  1  Bafe  ingratitude  I 

Flow  fin  came  to  be  permitted  is  more  than 
we  can  comprehend.  To  fay  it  Could  not  have 
been  prevented  is  faying  more  than  any  one 
knows.  To  fay  that  GOD  chofe  it,  and  deter- 
mined the  will  of  the  creature  to  it,  is  impious, 
"*ieven  fuppofmg  it  is  in  fad  followed  with  grea- 
ter good,  than  otherwile  would  have  been — « 
which  fuppofition  is,  however,  but  meer  conjec- 
ture at  brft,  and  without  any  folid  foundation. 
For  unlei's  we  can  tell  what  would  have  been 
had  fin  never  entered  the  world,  it  is  impolTiblo 
we  fhould  be  able  to  judge,  by  way  of  compari- 
fon,  of  the  greater  good  confequent  upon  k  ; 
©r  be  able  to  fay,  that  ic  was  bcft  upon  the 
M  whole, 

*  Rev,  xxl,  8.  and  xxii.  15. 


'j6  ^hefuppofed  Advantage  of 

whole.  From  the  miferies  of  ir,  which  we  fee 
and  feel,  we  have  no  fpecial  reafon  to  infer  its 
fuperior  advantages,  and  good  tendency.  And 
notwithdandine  ihe  infinite  reafon  we  have  to 
receive  it  as  a  faithful  faying^  and  worthy  of  all 
acceptation^  that  yESUS  CHRIST  came  into  ihe 
vjcrld  to  fave /inner s  ;  yet  that  he  came  to  reflore 
mankind  to  a  better  ftatc  than  they  would  have 
been  raifed  to,  had  they  never  finned,  is  more 
than  we  have  yet  learned  from  the  holy  fcrip- 
lures. 

Be   this  as    it  will  :    Sappofe  It  to  be  indeed 
true,   that  the  conftquence  of  fin  is  the  greater 
good  of  the  univerfe,  it   will  not  therefore  fol- 
low, that  GOD  mud  chufe  and  dcterniine    ir. 
If  an  apoflle  fuppofed  their  damnation  to  be  jufl, 
who  do  evil  with  a  vicvv  to  greater  good  ;  ihall 
we    venture  to    impute   any   thing   like    this    to 
GOD  ?  Suppofc  (in  the  inflanccs  Mr.  Edwards 
brings)  JofepFs    brethren  had   foreseen  the  con- 
fequences    of  their  treatment  of  him,  would   this 
have  judified  their  condudl,  and  rendered  it  me- 
ritorious ? — what  as  w*ife  and  good  men    they 
muH:  have  chofe  ?  (p.  374,    ^j ^)      The   fame 
quellion,  on  the  fame  fuppofltion,  ofi^crs  itfelf  in 
relation  to  the  murderers  of   our  Savior.      To 
fay  that  GOD  wills  evil  for  the  fake  of  its    good 
tendency,  is  a  reproach  to  an  holy  and  good  be- 
ing,  who  cannet  chufe  moral   evil  at  all — any 
mure  than  a  man  of  reafon  and   confcience  can 
chufe   what  he   knows  ro   be   finful,   from   the 
cleared    profpeft  of  great  publick    advantage. 
The  moral  Governor  of  the   world    will  puriue 
the  happinefs   of  it,   in  fuch  ways,   and  by   fucli 
means    only,  as  are  juft   and   holy.      And   we 
might  with  more  propriety  fuppofc,  he  will  not 

take 


moral  Evil  to  the  Ufiivcrfei  77 

tike  care  of  the  happinefs  of  his  creatures  at  all, 
than  that  he  doth  this  by  chufing  fin  as  the  on-^ 
ly  jure  means  of  the  greatcll  good.  ^ 

Tke  late  Rev.  Mr.  Clap,  Prefidcnt  of  Yale- 
Colicge,  in   Connedicut,    in  his  '  hiftory   and 

vindication 

*  To  admit  that  any  created  being  can  z€t  in  a  manner 
contrary  to  what  it  does,  or  fulfil  any  other  end,  is 
tantamount,  faith  Mr.  Collins,  to  allowing  it  to  be 
.  independent  of  the  Deity  ;  and  confequently,  to 
have  it  in  its  ele(5tion  and  power  to  thwart  the 
fchemes  of  the  great  author  and  fupcrintendent  of 
all  things,  l^c.  His  anfwerer  very  juftly  replies, 
*  All  this  is  nothing  but  fuppofing  it  a  contradiction 
that  GOD  fhould  endue  the  human  mind,  or  any 
creature,  with  liberty  of  a£tion.  For  if  liberty  is 
a  perfection  poiTible  to  be  communicated  to  any 
creature,  it  follows  from  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
that  it  muit  be  in  t\\t  pswcr  and  ek^ion  of  the  agent^ 
to  a6l  in  a  manner  contrary  to  -what  it  does,  and  to  fuU 
.fit  another  end.  But  this  liberty  does  not  at  ail  infer 
that  man  is  independent  of  the  Deity  ;  any  more  than 
the  power  of  breaking  human  laws  infers  that  fub- 
jecls  are  independent  of  their  governors.  Man  is 
ever  fubjedit  to  the  providential  government  cf  GOD, 
and  accountable  to  him  for  his  a£lions  ;  and,  as  he 
does  good  or  evil  to  himfelf  or  others,  is  liable  to 
receive  rewards  or  punifhments.  This  fufiiciently 
faews  the  dependency  of  man  upon  GOD  ;  and  as 
much  Co,  as  if  his  actions  were  neceffary.  For  as  in 
the  latter  cafe,  he  would  depend  upon  GOD  as  an  in- 
J}ru7ncnt  only  in  the  hands  of  an  agent  ;  or,  as  the 
inaiiimate  creation  depends  upon  him,  meerly  as  a 
machine  upon  the  framer  and  dire6lor  of  it  ;  fo  in 
the  former  cafe  he  depends  upon  GOD  as  a  moral 
governor,  who  fuperintends  his  adllons,  and  from 
v/hom  he  has  reafon  to  expe£t  to  be  recompenfed 
2ccor  Jing  to  his  worlc— And  no  power  whatfoever 
can  deliver   him  out  of  GOD's    hands.       Is  fuch   a 

.  .creature  then  irJepsndmt  of  GQDP  On  the  contrary. 


7S  ^hsfuppofed  Advantage  of 

vir.dication  of  the  dodlines  of  the  Nrw-Eng- 
!and  churches,'  (p.  19J  has  exhibited  *  a  new 
jcheme  of  reHgion,*  which  he  apprehended  was 
prevailing,  in  oppofition  to  thofe  dodrines— 
^Mentioning  '  this  fundamental  principle'  of  the 
new  fcheme,  ^Yhat  the  happinefs  of  the  creatuye 
h  the  fole  end  cf  the  creation^  the  worthy  Prtfi- 
dent  remarks,  '  Tbis  naturally  leads  to  moft^  ij 
not  alitor  the  reft'  (meaning  all  the  other  errors 
of  the  new  fcheme  of  divinity.)  '  For  this 
.rnuft  be  i\iQ  Jole  rule  of  all  GOD's  condud  to- 
wards us,  and  of  ours  towards  him  ;  and  it  is 
certain,  that  GOD'sJoie  end  and  ultimate  defign 
can  never  be  fruftrated.'  Whether  the  Pre- 
■fidenc  had  Mr.  Edwards's  book  in  view,  is  un- 
certain. W^  can  only  lay,  that  befides  the  au- 
"        '    ,  ■     ^  ''  '  ihors 

as  his  fubjeiTtion  to  GOD's  providential  government 
and  final  judgment  is  the  gteatcft,  fo  it  is  the  only 
dependency  which  a  rational  creature  as  fuch  can  be 
under  unto  GOD. 

Nor  again,  is  it  any  confequence  of  liberty,  that 
man  will  have  it  in  his  eU6iu7i  and  power  to  thwart 
ihe  fchejTies^  and  reji/}  the  will  of  the  great  author  of 
his  being — For,  la^.!  ofmg  human  liberty^  it  miift  be 
fuppoled  from  the  nature  of  it,  that  the  will  ofGOD, 
and  the  fcheme  of  his  government  formed  by  it,  is  a 
moral  providence  and  fuperintendency,  like  that  of  a 
rational  movi2irc\\  over  his  fubje(Sl:s,  who  gives  them 
laws,  er  joining  obedience  to  them,  and  eftab'ifhing 
them  v.ith  the  fandtion  of  rewards  and  punifhmentsi. 
It  is  the  wili  of  GOD,  that  we  (hould  aSt freely ^ 
and  have  it  in  our  power  cither  to  do  or  not  do  his 
commardments,  that  he  may  appear  to  be  a  moral 
snd  righteous  governor,  by  rewarding  thofe  who 
£huje  to  do  that  which  is  right  and  good^  and  by  pu- 
nifhin^  thofe  who  wilfully  commit  evil'  Jack/on  s 
vindication  of  human  liberty  againft  J,  Collins^  Ei^i 
p.  56,— 39. 


moral  Evil  to  the  Vniverfe.  yg 

thors  particularly  fet  down,  he  mentions  '  other 
books'  from  which  he  made  his  colledion  of 
errors,  without  infor2iiing  us  who  the  authors 
were.  But  though  we  apprehend  Mr.  Ed- 
wards*s  book  as  exceptionable  as  any  mentioned 
by  rhe  Prefident  ;  yec  we  rather  think  this  book 
was  not  in  his  view.  For  we  were  fome  years 
ago  informed,  (and  upon  enquiry  found  it  to  be 
true)  that  this  book  was  introduced  by  the  Pre- 
fident to  be  recited  by  the  ftudents  of  the  col- 
lege— and  Tuppofe  it  is  flill  continued. 


SECT; 


^o    Obfervations  mid  Refledllons  on  the  Scheme 


SECT.    VI. 


Containing  general  Obfervations  ^;/i  Reflexions 
on  the  Scheme  cf  Necejfity  exhibited  in  Mr*  Ed- 
.,  wards'j  Book. 


^TOTWITHSTANDING  all  Mr.  Edwards 
%  hath  laid  upon  the  diftindlion  between  na- 
tural and  moral  neceffity^  we  cannot  but  think  this 
*  diilin6tion  altogether  inipertinenc  in  the  prelent 
controverry.'  For  '  that  which  is  neceflary,  is 
necelTary,  mud  be,  and  cannot  be  prevented.' 
If  there  be  a  real  necefiity  on  the  mind  in  all  its 
adts,  it  is  quite  immaterial  whether  this.  necefTity, 
by  which  the  mind  is  in  every  inftance  determi- 
ned, be  called  natural  or  moral.  Whether  will 
and  endeavour  is  overcome  by  external  con- 
ftraint  ;  or  v/hether  fuch  a  ftate  of  the  will  or 
foul  is  produced  by  fome  neceffary  caule,  extrin* 
fie  or  incrinfic,  amounts  to  much  the  fame  thing 
in  the  end.  There  is  exa£dy  the  fame  propriety 
in  faying,  that  fuch  a  thing  cannot  be  done,  is 
im-pojjible^  unavoidable^  necejfary,  &c,  where  there 
is  a  moral  inability  to  it,  as  in  applying  thele  epi- 
thets to  2.phyfical  inability  :  For  if  the  a<ft  of  the 
mind,  on  which  the  natural  ad  depends,  be  for 
ever  impoffible,  the  natural  ail  mull  be  alike  im- 
poffible — unlefs  it  be  faid,  that  it  is  poffible  an 
effect  may  be  produced  without  a  caufe.  What 
Mr.  Edwards  haih  faid  to  lliew,  that  natural  a£li^ 


of  Necejfity  exhihlted  m  Mr.  Ed  ward s'i  Book,    8  r 

ons,  which  are  determined  by  the  mind,  are  pofH- 
ble,  when  the  determination  of  the, mind  itfelf 
refpedling  them  is  forever  in-ipofTible,  is  unfatifi 
fadory,  and  unintelligible  to  us.  If  no  being 
can  chufe  or  aft  oiherwifc  than  he  doth,  we  can- 
not conceive  of  a  neceffiiy  more  ai)foIute  ;  and 
fuch  is  the  neceffity  maintained  by  Mr.  Edwa^ds—^ 
only  he  approves  not  the  terms  natural  necejfity ^ 
and  thinks  the  word  certainly  more  proper— 
While  he  afierts  all  events  to  6e  rMrally  necelTa- 
ry — and  that  in  things  thus  necelTary  there  is  a 
'  connexion  prior  and  [uperior  to  will  and  endea- 
vour.' (  294.  ) 

After  all  that  hath  been  faid,  moral  neceffity 
is,  properly  fpcaking,  natural  7teceffity  \  moral 
power  is  natural  power.  The  one  is  as  original 
to  us  as  the  other.  The  latter  is  interwoven  in 
our  frame  no  othcrwife  than  the  former.  The 
moral  faculty,  or  power,  which  Mr.  Edwards 
faith  belongs  to  moral  agency,  is  a  natural  facul- 
ty or  power.  So  that  whatever  moral  capacity 
or  incapacity  is  attributed  to  mankind,  the  fame 
is  natural.  If  man  is  a  law  to  himfelf  it  is  hy  na- 
ture  that  he  is  fo,  having  the  work  of  the  law 
wricten  on  his  heart.  And  as  to  the  inability  of 
man,  Mr.  Edwards,  we  prefume,  believed  this  to 
be  derived  from  nature — to  have  it's  fourcc  in 
'the  want  of  original  righteoufnefs,  and  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  whole  nature.'  Now  an  inability 
which  has  it's  fource  in  the  very  nature  of  man 
may  furely  be  called  a  natural  inability. 

Much  hath  been  faid  to  fhew,  that  every  mo- 
ral event  muft  have  an  anfwerable  caufe.  Be  it 
fo.  Every  fuch  event  mull  then  have  a  moral 
caufe.     And  whether  any  other  than  an  intelU- 

geni 


$2    Obfervatlons  andRt^c&ion^  en  fbe  Schema 

gent  mind  can  be  fach  a  caufe,  let  thofe  who  have 
common  undcrftanding  judge.  If  it  be  admit- 
ted, that  a  moral  caufc  muft  be  a  moral  agent, 
then  it  will  follow,  that  we  are  the  caufes  of  our 
own  volitions,  or  that  our  maker  is  the  caufe  of" 
them.  Mr.  Edwards  denies  the  firft — iherefore 
our  volitions  are  to  be  attributed  to  GOD  as  their 
proper  caufe.  But  however  this  might  be  ad- 
mitted of  holy  volitions,  v/e  cannot  think  it  will 
be  admitted  of  Jinfu I  ones.  And  if  nor,  what 
regard  fhould  be  had  to  a  dodrine  of  which  thii 
is  the  direct  confequence  ?  Wc  are  felf-decer- 
mined,  or  determined  by  the  deitv.  If  there  be 
any  difference  between  a  cau/e^  and  a  meer  in- 
Jtrument^  the  former  denotes  a  n>ind  that  hath 
wifdom,  power  &c,  in  a  greater  or  lefs  degree, 
according  to  the  effeds  afcribed  to  it.  And  if 
moral  events,  through  a  chain  of  fecond  caufes, 
centre  in  the  deity,  as  natural  effedls  do,  what  is 
this  but  running  up  morals  to  inechanifm  ?  any 
pains  Mr.  Edwards  hath  taken  to  avoid  fuch 
an  imputation   on    his  fcheme   notwithRanding. 

In  our  author's  fcheme,  necelTity  is  univerfal. 
The  divine  will  is  always  determined  by  it,  and 
the  will  of  every  creature.  Now  GOD  Is  either 
the  author  of  this  necefliiy,  to  which  he  himfelf 
is  fubje6l,  or  he  is  not.  If  he  is,  then  all  the 
effe^ls  cf  it  are  to  be  afcribed  to  him  as  their 
proper  caufe.  If  he  is  not,  then  there  is  foine 
caufe  prior  to  the  frjl  caufe,  binding  and  deter- 
mining hitr. —  he  is  caufed  to  determine  as 
he  doth  by  fomething  extrinfic  (  For  to  fay  he  is 
determined  by  fomething  intrin/ic,  is  to  fay  he  is 
felf-dtter mined — contrary  to  fuppofition  )  His 
being  and  volitions  are  effeots  as  much  as  thofe 
of  linitc  creatures.      That  necefliiy,  which  is 

faid 


cfNeceJfity  exhibited  in  MnEdw^rds'sBook,  Sj" 

faid  to  be  the  caufe  of  every  determination  of 
the  divine  will,  the  caufe  and  ground  of  his  ex- 
igence and  perfedtions,  is  prior,  by  fuppofition, 
to  his  exillence  and  volitions.  And  this  necef- 
fity  mufl;  be  determined  by  fomething  preceed- 
ing,and  fo  on.  Yea,  Mr.  Edwards-  makes  exprefs 
mention  of  the  caufe  of  moral  neceffity — and 
fays,  that  the  caufe  of  this  neceffity  is  equally  ne- 
cefTary  as  of  natural.  That  is,  there  is  a  necef- 
fary  caufe  of  this  caufe,  and  fo  on  in  infinitum: 
Thus  we  are  run  back  far  into  noa-enticy,  and 
have  to  enquire,  By  what  caufe  the  firft  caufe 
exitls — which  caufe  is  an  effe6t  in  relation  to 
fomething  preceeding,  and  this  an  effrd:  with 
relation  to  fomething  flill  preceeding,  ^c.  i^c* 
And  if  fomething  exterior  and  prior  to  the  Dei- 
ty determines  him,  what  is  this  but  affirming 
him  to  be  the  almighty  minifter  of/^/^  ?  How- 
ever IMr.  Edivards  hath  exprefled  his  difinclina- 
tion  to  fatalifm,  (in  which  we  doubt  not  his  iin- 
cerity)  we  think  his  reafoning  is  plainly  on  the 
(iJe  of  abfolute  fatality  -,  and  fuppofe  he  was 
caught  in  his  own  fubtilty.  Upon  his  fchsmc 
it  follows,  that  the  actions  of  all  finite  beings 
are  the  agency  of  the  Deity  ;  and  his  is  not 
properly  fpeaking  agency,  but  in(lrumentality — ' 
a  fubjedion  to  blind  neceffiiy  and  fate.  There 
is  no  felf- mover,  fclf- direction,  felf-detcrmina-^ 
tion,  or  fource  of  adivity,  in  the  univerfe.  '  Li- 
berty is  banifhed  out  of  the  world — and  ths 
world  mult  have  been  eternal. 

Whether  GOD  could  have  a6led  otherwife 
than  he  hath  }  is  a  curious  rather  than  profita- 
ble enquiry.  And  as  to  the  notion  of  fitneis 
of  things,  independent  of  the  things  themfelves, 
and  wiihoac  reference  to  the  fovcrci^n  mind,* 
^'  ^  N  ■  It 


$4    Obfervations  and  Refleftions  on  the  Scheme 

it  is  difficult  even  to  imagine  it  ;  to  fay  nothing 
of  tlie  impiety  implied  in  Ibch  a  thought. 

We  have  reprefented  what  we  apprehend  is 
the  plain  tendency,  and  indeed  only  ccnfiftenc 
fenlcjof  the  fcheme  of  neceffity  before  us.  Whe- 
ther it  was  copied  from  Mr.  Hume,  Hohhs^  ^pi- 
noza,  or  any  of  the  old  heathen  Philofophers  we 
do  not  r?.y.  We  hint  the  thing  becaufe  of  a 
remarkable  coincidence  we  have  exhibited  ac 
the  cbfc  of  thefc  remarks,  in  fome  extrads  from 
ihem,  fee  over  againft  fimilar  paflagcs  of  Mr. 
Edwardsh  book.  Though  we  have  a  right  to 
renew  valid  objcdions,  how  oft  foever  they  have 
been  m>ade  belore,  until  fome  tolerable  anfwcr  is 
given  to  them  (efpecially  when  the  old  doc- 
trines, to  which  the  Ike  objcdions  were  former- 
ly made,  but  not  anfvirered,  are  received.;  Yet 
we  would  not  repeat  the  charge,  without  giving 
a  fpecimen  in  fupport  of  it.  We  really  are  per- 
fuaded,  that  there  can  be  no  pofTible  confutation 
of  fatalifm  on  the  principles  of  Mr.  Edzz^ards^s 
book.  Hefpeaks  with  fatisfadtion  of  the  progrefs 
o{ metaphyfic  fcience  \  (325  j  of  which  and  its'  ter- 
rible doings,'  his  own  book,  among  others  on 
fatality,  is  an  alarming  proof.  [Epicurus,  Mr. 
Edwards  reminds  us,  was  '  the  father  of  at heifm 
and  licentioufnefs.'*  David  Hume,  Efq^  is  the  fa- 
ther of  modern  epicurifrn  :  And  whoever  hath 
read  his  effays  and  Mr.  Edwards* 9>  enquiry  is 
better  able  to  judge  than  one  can  from  the  ftw 
fcle(^l  pafTages  we  have  extracted,  of  the  agrcer 
ment  between  them.] 

Not  that  we  fuppofe  Mr.  Edwards  faw,  or 
allowed,  the  tendency  and  confcquences  of  his 
fcheme  to  be  fuch  as  we  have  here  reprefented  ; 

he 


wfNeceJfity  exbihited  in  Mr,  Edwards'^  Booh    t$ 

he  hath  repeatedly  declared  the  contrary.     Still 

if  the  confequences  are  fairly  deduced — if  in 

'  ofc   pafTages  wherein   he   profefTcs   himfelf  a 

id  to  liberty  he  is  cither  repugnant  to  him- 

or  allows  no  liberty  that  is  of  any  moment, 

'  connedled  with  moral  agency — let  any 

reafon  fay,  whether   his  fcheme   can  be 

^is  dodlrine  of  neceflary  connexion,  if 

dacible  to  the  confequences   we  have 

1,  if  confiftenL  with  itfelf  ooly  in  that 

\ave  taken  if,  will  be  rejeded   by  all 

due  regard  to  the  moral  perfedlions 

)r  which  w«  doubt  not   in  the  leall 

(wards   had   a   fupreme  veneration, 

d  good  men. are  not  always  wife. 

'\niuch  Mr.  Edwards*$  method  to 

ons   by  endeavouring  to  reduce 

his  ?dverfaries  to  the  fame  abfur^ 

chough  it  be  a  good  argument  ad 

10  means  rttisfadory.    We  mighc 

fome  other  anfwer  in  particular 

ns   of  the  fate  of  the   heathen^ 

',  making  men  machineSy   making 

of fin^%%  well  as  other  objedions, , 

/en.     But  as  we  may  prefume 

ve  what  appeared   to  him  the 

-jfe  and  fuch  like   objedions  to 

effity  \  fo  we  conclude  from 

the  fubjed,  no  folid  anfwer 

•fe  objedions   ;   otherwife  he 

ed  the   world  with   fuch  an 

'vafivc  ones.      Though  we 

think  thofe  anfwers  to  ob- 

we  muft  take   the  liberty 


g6  Obfervations  ^;^JRefie6lions  on  tbeScheme.Szc: 

TiicuGH  we  think  no  book  hath  been  pub- 
lifhed  in   this  country   of  more  dangerous  ten 
dency,   yet  did  we  not  at  the  fame    time   f 
pofe   the  author  to  have   been   a   ferious 
believer  of  religion,  natural    and  revealed' 
zealoufly  concerned  for  the  intcreft  of  p; 
godlinefs,  we  fhould  not  have  taken  the 
to  enter  on  this  puzzling    fubjed  of  hi 
recefnty — which,  as  Mr.  Hume  remark 
jncft  contentious  queftion  of  meraph' 
inoft  contentious   fcience.'      If  what 
remarked  is  fufficient  to  fnew   the 
dangerous   confequences  of  admitti 
fary  connexion  of  moral  caufes  and 
the  beginning  of  the  world,  or  a  fr 
tion  of  moral  ads  with  afuppofed  i 
preceeding,  as  of  natural  events  ^ 
i€s  ;  the  inconfiftence   of  our  ai 
-with  itfclf  y  and  the   perfed  futi' 
into   nice  dilquifitions   on   fuch^ 
jnain  end  ofthefe   remarks  hith' 
anfv/ered.     But  as  it  may  be  t ho 
Eo  have  done  this  in  fome  meaft 
ceeding  to  exhibit  a  fcheme  m 
truth  and  reafon,  this  is  what 
in  the  following  part  of  our  fu' 


to    moral    Agents^  S9 

their  probation,  poflcfs  it  in  fome  mcafure  and 
degree. 

Mr.  Edwards^  as  hath  been  Ihtwn,  denies  all 
felf-detcrmining  power,  and  inward  liberty — af- 
ferting,  that  '  tvery  determination  of  the  will  in 
chufing  and  refufing  is  neceffary.' (p    in,  113) 
But  that  an  inward   principle  of  adlivity,  and 
power  of  volition  or  choice,  belongs  to  mankind, 
we  think  is  in  a  manner  fclf-evident.     For  it  is 
granted  on   all  hands,  that  moral  good  and  evil 
lie  in  the  ftate  of  the  mind,  or  prevailing  internal 
difpofition  of  the  agent.      Liberty  therefore,  if 
at  all  necelTary  to  virtue  and  vice,  muft  be  ex- 
ercifed  in  that  wherein  the  nature  of  morality 
and    religion   confifts — that  is,    in    the  inward 
man.      A  freedom  from  external  conftraint  is  a 
liberty  belonging  to  fools  and  madmen,  and  to 
the  brute  creatures.      Thefe,   therefore,  are  as 
capable  of  virtue  and  vice,  praifc  and  blame,  as 
beings  endowed  with,  and  in  the   exercife  of 
reafon,   if  this  external  (hypothetical)  liberty  is 
the  only  thing  neceffary  to  moral  agency.  Fools, 
madmen,   and  brutes,  if  they  are  not  bound  or 
imprif&ned,  have  natural  liberty.     They  have  a 
power,  faculty,  or  property  called*  wilh     Their 
adlions  are  as  voluntary   (in  many  refpedls)  as 
thofe  of  mankind,  who  are  of  a  found  under- 
ftanding.     The  adtions  of  brutes  proceed  from 
inclination  and  defign — an  inclination    and  de- 
fign   proceeding  from  nature,  or  internal,  ori- 
ginal bias. 

If  then  an  a6lion's  being  voluntary  (in  the 
fenfe  of  Mr.  Edwards's  book)  makes  it  virtuous 
or  vicious,  the  lower  animals  are  fo  as  really  as 
intelligent  creatures.    As  we  arc  not  accuftom- 

^  -  ed 


'^Cr  Internal"  Libert^  hekvgs 

cd  to  tiilk  of  virtuous'  or  vicious  herds  of  cattle,' 
the  epithets,  as  applied  to  them,  may  found 
fomething  odd  and  harfh  at  firft  ;  but  by  the 
help  of  metaphyfics  we  may  in  time  be  recon- 
ciled to  fuch  language.  We  are  not,  indeed, 
to  fuppofe  our  oxen  and  horfes  are  morally  good 
or  bad  in  thofe  acftions  of  tfieirs  wh.ch  are  againft 
their  m\h — to  which  they  are  externally  impel- 
led— Or  in  regard  to  any  inftances  of  forbear- 
ance, which  are  owmg  to  external  impediment-—' 
to  which  they  have  a  will,  and  endeavour  to 
perform,  but  are  hindered  from  doing  as  they 
would.  But  the  caies  of  cca£lion  and  reftraint 
excepted, Itt  it  be  fliewn,  on  the  prefent  hypothe- 
fis,that  they  are  not  proper  fubjecls  of  commenda- 
tion or  blame,reward  or  punifliment — and  by  the 
fame  arguments  we  prefume  it  may  be  (hewn, 
that  mankind  are  not.  If  power  or  opportuni- 
ty to  execute  a  will  or  choice  already  produced 
by  fome  cxtrinfic  caufe,  be  all  that  is  meant  by 
liberty,  or  that  is  neceflary  to  moral  agency,  li- 
berty is  perfedtly  ideal^  and  the  controveriy  a- 
bout  it  is  about  a  mecr  word.  But  if  liberty  be 
really  eflential  to  moral  agency,  as  Mr.  Edwards 
admits  ;  and  if  there  cannot  be  liberty  of  adting 
or  conduding  farther  than  there  is  liberty  of 
willing,  chufmg,  preferring,  as  hath  been  (hewn 
— the  plain  conlequence  is,  that  liberty  in  the 
mind  is  effential  to  moral  agency.  Upon  Mr. 
Edwards^  fcheme  of  liberty,  it  is  not  for  the 
adts  and  exercifts  of  their  minds  that  men  arc 
accountable,  but  only  for  thtir  outward  actions. 
There  is  no  moral  turpitude  in  fuch  a  ftate  of 
the  foul  or  will  as  our  Saviour  defcribes.  Matt, 
V.  18,  32,  but  only  in  the  execution  of  fuch  a 
difpofition.  We  know,  indeed,  that  Mr.  Ed- 
t^ards  intcnded'ngc  to  afTcrt  any  luc^  thing  as 
' " "         ^  "  this, 


to    moral    Agentsl  4^ii 

this,  that  malice,  envy,  pride,  impure  defires; 
<^c.  are  innocent  until  they  become  effe(5ls  :  BuC 
is  not  this  the  confequence  of  his  allowine;,  that 
liberty  is  nscefTary  to  moral  agency,  while  he 
makes  this  liberty  confift  only  in  a  power  a  maa 
hzth  to  execute  his  will.  If  Mr.  Edwards  in^ 
tended  not  to  aflcrt  the  above  confequence,  (as 
it  is  plain  he  did  not)  then  in  the  enquiry  where- 
in  the  liberty  of  man  confifts,  fom^ithing  farther  is 
to  be  confidered  than  material  adlion — There 
mud  be  internal  liberty,  if  liberty  enters  into 
the  notion  of  a  praife-worthy  deed,  or  the  con- 
trary. The  proper  queftioa,  \%lVhether  we  have 
end  exercife  liberty  in  that  wherein  the  nature  of 
'virtue  and  vice  confijis  ?  And  one  might  think 
this  would  not  be  made  a  queftion. 

To  fay  that  the  mind  is  necefTarily  determin- 
ed in  all  its  adts,  is  making  mankind  necclTary 
agents  in  that  thing  which  diftinguiflieth  them 
from  the  inferior  creatures.  Without  mo- 
ral liberty,  it  is  plain  their  adlions  cannot  be  of 
a  moral  nature,  any  more  than  thofe  can  be  cal- 
led naturally  free  adlions,  which  proceed  from 
natural  neceffity.  Abridge  a  man's  natural  li- 
berty ever  fo  much,  his  moral  freedom  may  re- 
main ;  and  if  it  doth,  the  willing  or  unwilling 
mind  is  rewardable  or  punifhable.  On  the  con- 
trary, fuppofe  moral  liberty  taken  away,  or  ra- 
ther, never  to  have  been  poflfeiTed,  and  there  is 
an  utter  incapacity  of  moral  action.  * 

O  That: 

f  «  Man  cither  has  within  himfelf  a  principle  of  aSlion^ 

properly   (peaking,  that  is,  a  felf-moving  faculty,   a 

principle  or  p9wer  ofbtginning  motion  j  or  he  has  not. 

U  he  has  within  himfelf  fuch  a  principle,  then  he  is  a 

Jree^  and  not  a  mce£ar^  agm*    For  every  majfarf 


^i  Internal  Liberty  belongs 

That  we  have  internal  liberty  is  apparent^ 
from  our  moral  di/cernment,  that  faculty  Mr. 
Edvoards  himfclf  fpeaks  of.  We  fhall  reft  the 
whole  proof  of  our  dodrine  on  this  fingle  point. 

This 

,    cgent  Is  moved    necejj'ar'ily   by    fomething  elfc  ;   and 

then  that  which  mo'^ed  it,  not  the  thing  itfelf  which 

is  moved,  is  the  trut  and  or.h  caufe  of  the  acftion.     If 

man    has   not  within  himfelf  a  principle  or  power  of 

'  Jeif-motion^  then  every  motion  and  aSiion  of  man  is  ftridl- 

.    Jy  and  properly   produced    by  the   ffficiency  of  feme 

.,  extrinfic  caufe  :   Which  caufe  muft  be  either  what  we 

ufually  call  the  77iotive  or  teajon,  upon  which  a  man 

t^s  ;  or  c^i(z  it   muft  be  fome  infenfiblc  fuhtle  rrMtery 

or  (oHiCctker  beirgox  jubjlancevmk.\ng  an  imprcflion 

upon  him. 

It  tlie  reafom  or  mauves  upon  which  a  n:an  a£ts,  be 
the  immediate  or  effdent  caufe  of  the  e^ion  ;  then  ei- 
-  ther  GlfiraSi  notions  (  as  all  reafons  and  motives  are) 
arc  \}[itv[\.\^\\Q%  fiihjiances  ;  orelfe  that  which  has  itfelf 
no  real  fubfiancs  can  put  a  body  into  motion  :  Either  of 
which  is  maRifeftly  abfurd. 

If  infenfiblc y«^//^  matter^  of  any  other  heing  or  fuh-* 
Jiance^  continually  making  impreffion  upon  a  man, 
be  the  immediate  and  efficient  caufe  of  his  a6lin<y  5  then 
the  rrotion  ohhit  fubtle  matter  or  fubflance  muft  be  cau- 
fed  by  fome  other  fubftance,  and  the  motion  ©f  that 
by  fome  oiher^  till  at  laft  we  arrive  at  a  free  agent  ; 
•  and  then  liberty  is  a  poffihh  thing  ;  and  then  inan  pofli- 
bly  may  have  liberty  :  And  if  he  m^y  poffibly  have  it, 
then  experience  will  prove  that  he  probably^  nay,  that 
he  certainly  has  it.  Jfwe  w/i;^r  arrive  at  any  free 
caufe  ;  then  there  is  in  irfnitum  a  progreffion  of  mo- 
tions without  any  mover^  of  effctts  without  any  caufe^ 
t,hings  <2J7/^ without  any  agent* 

Dr.  Samuel  Clark's  remarks  on  the  <  philofophical 
enquiry  concerning  human  liberty,'  wrote  by  J, 
Collins,  Efqj   p.  42,  43,  44. 

The 


tff  moral  Jgents.  9/ 

This  mord  difcernment,  it  is  allowed,  is  the 
principal  power  that  diftinguiflieth  us  from  the 
brute  creacion  :  In  refpedt  of  this  our  ma- 
;icer  having  taught  us   more  than  the  beads  of 

the 

The  author  oi  Caio*^  letters  replies  to  Dr.  Claris 
^  We  fee  and  feel,  that  defires  and  fears,  that  abflra(5l 
rations  or  images  of  the  brain,  alter  the  difpofition 
of  the  whole  fabric,  and  often  dcftroy  the  whole  con- 
texture of  it.'  '  This  is  true,  fays  his  anfwercr  (Mr. 
Jackfon)  but  nothing  to  the  purpofe  to  fhew,  that 
ahlhaB  notions  are  the  immedmte  and  effcient  caufe  of 
a^ion  or  active  motion,  which  is  Dr.  Clarli%  argument, 

I  GRANT  that  ahflraSi  notions,  fach  as  fuddenfur^ 
prifts^  violent  pajjimsy  oi  madnefs  will,  by  a  forcible 
and  irrefif^ible  impu'fe,  compel  the  mind  to  move 
the  body  ;  in  fuch  cafes,  though  the  ahflra£l  notions, 
do  not  immediately  themfelves  move  the  body,  yet 
(which  is  all  one)  they  force  the  mind  to  move  it 
whether  it  will  or  no  j  but  then  this  motion(  though 
called  a5iion)  is  no  more  really  or  properly  ^^/(?«,thaa 
the  Tnoiion  of  a  man,  who  is  driven  by  a  /jorm  or 
whirlwindy  is  an  a^ion.  If  it  fhail  ftill  be  infifled  on^^ 
that  every  event  or  efftii^  howfoever  produced,  is  an 
6i£iion  ;  then  the  motions  oi  fijips  and  clocks  are  ^dlions, 
and  all  motion  is  a^ion,  and  there  will  be  no  fuch 
thing  as  pajjlon  in  nature  :  And  yet  ncverthelefs  there 
will  appear  to  be  as  much  difference  betwixt  thefc 
natural  motions  and  humin  aS]io7is^  as  between  the 
ideas  of  mcsffiiy  z.w\  freedom,*  Jackfor}^  anfwer  to 
C<2/A  letters,  p.  198,  19,9. 

Dr.  C/cjri,(in  his  *  demonftraricn  of  the  being  and 
attributes  of  GOD,'  (tenth  edition  p.  83,  86)  hay 
argued  the  pcjjil/ility  and  reality  of  the  communicatioa 
of  liberty  to  man  in  i\\t  following  clear  and  conclu- 
i^ve  manner.  '  As  a  power  of  beginning  motioia,  is 
not  in  it/elf  in  impoffibie  thing  ;  bccaufe  it  mult  of 
liecefiity  be  in  the  fupreme  caufe  :  So  neither  is  it 
ii^ipoilitsle  to  hz  CQupmnifaUd  to  erpAted  bcir.gs.  Th& 


g^  r  Internal  Liherty  Belongs 

the  field,  and  made  us  wifer  than  the  fowls  of 
heaven  :  In  refpeft  of  this  man  is  by  nature  a 
Taw  to  himjelf^  having  the  work  of  the  taw  written 
mi  his  heart. 

That 

Tcafon  is  plain  :  Becaufe  no  powers  are  impoflible  t® 
be  communicated,  but  only  thofe  which  imply  Jelf- 
ex'iflence^  and  abfo^ute  independency — 1  know,  the 
maintainers  ©f  fate  are  very  confident,  that  a  power 
of  beginning  motion,  is  nothing  lefs  than  being 
really  independent,  or  being  able  to  ail  inde- 
pendently from  any  fuperior  caufe.  Bat  this  is 
only  a  childifh  trifling  with  words  :  For  a  pow- 
er of  idling  independently  in  thii  fenje^  commu- 
nicated at  thepleafure  of  the  fupreme  caule,  and  con- 
tinued only  during  the  fame  good  pleafure,  is  no  more 
real  and  abfolute  independency,  than  the  power  pf 
exifting — or  than  the  power  of  being  confcicus,  or  any 
€iker  power  whatfoever,  can  be  faid  to  imply  indepen- 
dency. In  reality,  it  is  altogether  as  hard  to  conceive* 
how  conjctoufnejs^  or  the  power  of  perception^  fhould 
he  communicated  to  a  created  bein^,  as  how  the  pow- 
er of  fe If- motion  {hoM]d  be  fo- Yet  no  man  doubts* 

but  that  he  himfclf,  and  all  ethers,  have  truly  a  pow- 
er oi  perception.  And  therefore  in  like  manner  (how- 
ever hard  it  m?y  be  to  conceive,  as  to  the  manner  of 
it;  yet  fi nee,  as  has  been  now  proved,  it  can  never 
be  fhown  to  be  impciTible  and  exprefly  contradictory, 
that  a  power  o{  j elf' motion  ftiould  be  communicated.) 
1  fuppofc  no  confidcring  man  can  doubt,  but  that  he 
actually  has  alfo  a  power  oi  felf- motion.  For  the  ar- 
guments, drawn  from  continual  experience  and  obferva- 
tion,  to  prove  that  we  have  fuch  a  power,  are  fo  ftrong, 
that  nothing  lefs  than  a  ftricl  demonftration  that  the 
thing  is  abfolutely  impofTible,  and  implies  an  cxprefs 
contradic'^ion,  can  make  us  in  the  Icaft  doubt  that  we 
have  it  not.  We  have  ail  the  fame  experience,  the 
fame  marks  and  evidence  exadlly  of  our  having  real- 
ly a  power  of  y^//-TOfl//W  ;  as  the  moft  rigid  fataiift 
could  po^joly  contrive  to  require,  if  he  was  to  make 
'&cf<r^ofui(in.Qi^imris  bsing  endued  with  that  pow- 


t9    moral    Agent  si  95 

That  wc  have  a  power  of  deliberating,  judg- 
ing, preferring,  will  not  be  difputed,  being  mat- 
ter of  experience.  The  perception  of  right  and 
wrong,  good  and  ill-defert,  Mr.  Edwards  juftly 
obferves,  '  is  one  of  the  firft  ideas  children  have.' 

This 

cr.  There  is  no  one  thing  that  fuch  a  man  can  ima- 
gine ought  to  follow  from  the  fuppofition  of  /elf-mo^ 
tioHy  which  every  man  does  not  now  as  much  feel 
and  aSlually  experience  in  himfelf,  as  it  can  poflibly 
be  imagined  any  man  would  do,  fuppofing  the  thin|; 
were  true.  Wherefore  to  affirm,  notwithstanding  all 
this,  that  the  fpirits,  by  which  a  man  moves  the  mem- 
bers of  his  body,  and  ranges  the  thoughts  of  his 
mind,  arc  themfelves  moved  wholly  by  air  or  fub- 
tler  matter  infpired  into  the  body  j  and  that  again 
by  other  external  matter,and  To  on  ;  as  the  wheels  of 
a  clock  are  moved  by  the  weights,  and  thofe  weights 
by  gravitation,  and  To  on  ;  without  a  man's  having 
the  leaft  power,  by  any  principle  within  himfelf^  to 
think  any  one  thought,  or  impel  his  own  fpirits  in 
order  to  move  any  member  of  his  body  :  All  this  is 
fo  contrary  to  experience  and  the  reafon  of  things, 
that  unlefs  the  idea  of  felf- motion  were  in  itfejf  as 
evidently  and  clearly  a  coniradiSiian^  as  that  two  and 
two  fiiould  make  five,  a  man  ought  to  ^  be  afhamcd 
to  talk  at  that  rate.  Nay,  a  man  of  any  confidera- 
ble  degree  of  modefty,  would  even  in  that  cafe  be  al- 
moft  tempted  rather  to  doubt  the  truth  of  his  facul- 
ties, than  take  upon  him  to  alTert  one  fuch  intolera- 
ble abfurdity,  merely  for  the  avoiding  of  another. 
There  are  fome  indeed,  who  denying  men  the  pow- 
er of  beginning  motion^  would  yet  feem  in  fome  man- 
ner to  accouni^.  for  their  anions,  by  allowing  them  a 
power  of  determining  motion.  But  this  alfo  is  a  mere 
ludicrous  trifling  with  wbrds.  For  if  that  power  of 
determining  motion,  be  no  other  in  a  man,  than  that 
which  is  in  a  ftone  to  reflccSl  a  ball  one  certain  wayy 
this.is  juft  nothing  at  all.  But  if  he  has  a  power  of 
determining  the  motion  of  his  fpirits  anyway'^  as  he 
himfelf  pleafes ;  this  is  in  all  refpedls  the  very  fam^ 
^^  tb^pQWsr  of  beginning  motiGn,[ 


g6  Internal  Liberty  hekng^' 

This  faculty  approves  fome  actions,  and  c^^^ 
demns  others,  detached  from  the  confideratioQ 
of  their  eficdls  and  confequences.  The  exer- 
cifes  of  our  minds,  our  thoughts,  affections,  de- 
figns,  are  the  objed  of  this  faculty,  no  lefs  thaa 
the  condudl  they  lead  to.  Yea,  for  thefe  efpe- 
cially  (if  not  only)  it  approves  or  condemns  us, 
as  thefe  arc  the  foundation  of  life  and  condudl. 
In  cenfuring  or  comn'^ending  trie  eondudt  of 
others,  we  go  upon  a  fuppofuion  of  intelligence 
anddefign  :  For  wejudge  very  differently  of  the 
fai^ne  adtions  as  performed  by  an  ide©t,  or  mad- 
man, and  by  one  in  polfeffion  of  reafon.  And 
■when  it  appears  that  an  adlion  proceeded  not 
from  defign,  or  that  a  different  and  contrary 
purpofe  was  intended  from  what  is  a^ually  ef^ 
fefted,  our  opinion  of  it  is  changed.  We  ap- 
prove good  intentions,  and  condemn  evil  ones, 
in  ourftlves,  (and  in  others  fo  far  as  fuch  in- 
tentions can  be  known)  though  evil  comes  of 
what  was  m^eant  for  good,  and  vice  verfa. 

Now  our  ef^.imating  the  moral  charafter  frorn 
internal  difpofitions  is  on  a  fuppcficion  that 
/^f/^  are  within«the  power  of  the  agent.  Whe- 
ther he  fhall  execute  his  will  or  not,  depends 
not  on  himfclf.  He  may  be  hindered  herefrom, 
or  compelled  to  do  contrary  to  his  will — which 
alters  not  the  internal  character.  If  we  are 
made  the  means  or  inilruments  of  what  we  do 
not  intend,  or  are  externally  hindered  from  what 
we  do  intend,  we  are  judged  according  to  what 
we  would  have  dons.  The  realbn  is,  that  we 
have  internal  liberty  in  many  initances,  when 
we  have  not  external.  It  is  therefore  much 
more  proper  to  fay,  that  natural  nt^ceffity,  in  any 
fupppfed  cale,   though  it  c/*cukth  an  external 


io   'Moral    /Rents'!  ^ 

aft,  or  the  omifTun  of  fuch  an  a6t,  yet   hinders 
not  but  the  ftate  of  the   will  oiay   be  right  or 
wrong  in   fuch  cafe  ;    than  to  fay,   that  moral 
necefTity  is  confiftent  with  praife  or  blame,  be- 
caufe  not  attended  with  natural  necejfity.     We  are 
condemned   or  approved  of  ourfelves  for  a  wil- 
ling or  unwilling  mind,  and  have  a  natural  ap- 
prehenfion,  that  the  judgment  of  GOD  will  fe- 
condour  own.   But  did  ever  any  man  commend  or 
accui'e  himfelf  for  what  he  knew  to  be  necelTary 
and  unavoidable — not   within  his  power,  or  not 
determined  by  himfelf  ?    The  inward  perturba- 
tion vicious  men  feel  proceeds  from  a  convidi- 
on   that  they    might  have   cultivated    another 
frame  of  heart.     If  external  condraint,  or   natu- 
ral necefficy,   renders  a  pcrfon  incapable  of  fuch 
commands   as  rcfpedt  material  action,  moral  ne- 
cefiity,  or  internal  conftraint,   mud  render  him 
equally  incapable  of  fuch  commands  as  refpc6t 
the  exercifcs  of  the  mind^  or   ads  of  volition — • 
(admitting  this  to  be  original^  and  not  the  con- 
fequence  of  internal  liberty   abufsd.)       We  are 
faid   to  be  the  '  voluntary,   defigning  caufes  of 
corporeal  attion.'     Be  it  fo,  *  the  effence  of  vir- 
tue and  vice  lies  not  in  their  caufe.'    And  more- 
over, in  a   feries  of  ads,  conne£led  and  depen- 
dent,  the  praife  or  blame  is   to  be  attributed  to 
the  original  ad.     But  of  this  (which  determines 
all  the  reft)  we  are  not  the  voluntary  caules.  (p. 
48,  224^  156)      To  return  from  this  fhort  di- 
greffion. 

The  moral  capacity  we  have  been  fpcaking 
of,  including  moral  obligation, undeniably  proves 
the  internal  liberty  of  mankind.  As  it  implies 
a  rule  or  guide  of  life,  with  authority  and  fanc- 
lions,  as  wc  have  an  inward  perception  of  good 

or 


5 8  Internal  Liherty  Mongs " 

or  ill-defert,  according  as  we  have  followed,  or 
departed  from,  the  direftion  of  this  leading 
principle  •,  fo  we  could  not  perceive  ourfelves 
to  be  under  it  as  a  law^  and  reproach  ourfelves 
fordifobediencejWcrewc  fully  pcrfuadedfuch  dif- 
obedience  was  a  matter  of  real  necefTiiy,  Wc 
experieixe,  that  '  our  happinefs  or  milery  is 
not  our  fate* — Meaning  here  by  thefe  terms, 
not  fo  much  that  kind  of  happinefs  or  milery 
which  depends  on  a  man's  outward  condition 
and  circumftances,  as  that  which  we  fignify  by 
the  words,  peace,  ferenity^  and  joy  of  heart,  on 
the  one  hand  •,  and  difquietude  of  mind,  vexation 
or  angiiifh  of  fpirit  on  the  other.  ^{ he  good  man 
is  fathfied  from  him  [elf,  The  wicked  is  like  the 
troubled  Jea,  when  it  cannot  rejt.  Thefe  differ- 
ent and  oppofite  fenfations,  which  conftitute  our 
chief  happinefs  or  mifery  in  this  world,  and  are 
accompanied  more  or  lefs  with  hope  or  fear  for 
fiiturity,  it  is  impofTible  we  fliould  have,  were 
we  not  internally  free.  We  may  fuppofe  them 
to  be  as  ftrong  in  thofe  who  are  wholly  depriv- 
ed of  external  freedom,  as  in  thofe  who  are  ful- 
ly poffeired  of  it.  So  that  however  external  ne- 
c'elluy  may  wholly  prevent  our  being  rewarda- 
ble  or  punilhable  for  the  outward  adion,  it  by 
no  means  doth  for  the  inward  dilpofition,  pro- 
vided this  depends  on  ourfelves.  Hence  the 
injunftion.  Keep  thy  heart  with  all  diligence  ;  for 
out  of  it  are  the  ijfues  of  life.  It  is  in  the  power 
of  7nan  to  lay  any  external  neceflity  upon  us, 
but  no  infernal  one.  No  chains  can  bind  the 
foul  but  thofe  of  our  own  impofing.  The  cap- 
tive, prifoner,  i^c,  may  be  as  free,  in  the  religi- 
ous fenfc,  as  any  man.  A  pcrfon  wholly  de- 
prived of  his  bodily  powers  of  ailion  may  yet 
be  free  in  the  nobkft  fenfc. 

-       -  JST^ 


to  moral  jiger.ts',  99 

Wfi  fhafl  now  proceed  to  fnew,  that  Internal 
liberty,  in  finite  beings  placed  upon  trial,  im- 
plies an  opportunity  and  capacity  of  chufin^  and 
a5ling  otherwije  than  they  in  fa5l  do.  Finite  be- 
ings^ we  fay  •,  becaufe  we  pretend  not  to  know 
what  the  perfcfl  liberty  of  the  /«/«/;f  Being  is. 
'  So  far  as  we  are  free^  v/e  arc  not  necejfarily  de- 
terminedy  fo  that  we  could  not  hue  make  the 
choice  we   do/ 

Whether  the  holy  angels  ever  had  a  moral 
ability  of  falling,  we  need  not  enquire  ;  though 
we  have  no  ground  to  determine  the  contrary. 
Beings  made  upright,  we  know,  have  revolced. 
^ow  if  the  malignity  of  apoRate  fpirits'againit 
GOD,  their  unalcerable  oppofiiion  to  him,  be 
the  confcquence  of  perverting  a  moral  power  they 
once  had,^  it  (hews  that  finite  beings  may  polTels 
a  liberty  of  chafing  and  afting  otherwife  thaa 
they  do  ;  andconlequently,  that  liberty  may  be 
diftinguifiied  from,  and  oppofed  to,  moral  ne- 
cefiity.  So  with  refpeft  to  apoftate  man,  if  he 
had  originally  a  moral  power  of  retairving  his  in- 
nocence, the  inference  is,  that  he  poflTefTed  liber- 
ty,not  only  as  oppofed  to  conftraint  from  without, 
but  as  oppofed  to  moral  necefiity.  From  the 
fall  of  angels  and  man,  the  inference  therefore  is 
not,  that  they  were  morally  unable  to  keep  their 
firflweftate  •,  but  that  they  had  a  moral  power, 
and  abufed  it.  Indeed,  in  the  cafe  of  their  firft 
fin,  moral  ncccfllty  muft  have  been  ftridlly  natu- 
rtf/— Not,  as  we  are  won't  to  call  habits,  2.  fecond 
nature,  but  a /iry?  nature.  So  i\\2X  moral ov  cri- 
mind  inability  fuppofcth  a  moral  power  once 
^ojfejfed  b\M  forfeited. 

If,  on  ths  coatrary,  it  be  fupngfed,  that  nei- 
'  -■   ■  P  thcr 


ioO  Internal  Liter fy  ielongs 

ther  man,  nor  the  angels  that  fell,  had  a  moral 
ability  at  firft  to  continue  in  a  (late  of  redlitudc, 
to  whom  but  their  Creator  muft  their  fall  be  at- 
tributed ?  Their  original  powers  were  fuch  as  he 
endowed  them  with.  They  could  be  required 
to  exert  no  other.  Their  abilities,  relations,  and 
deftination  being  fuch  as  their  great  Former  gave 
and  intended,  they  could  be  anfwerable  only  for 
■what  was  given.  If,  therefore,  the  firft  a6t  of 
fin  *  neceflarily  followed  from  GOD's  withhold- 
ing afliftance,  or  if  that  afliftance  was  not  afford- 
ed, which  was  aUfolutely  neceflary  to  the  avoid- 
ing' the  firft  tranfgreffion,  what  is  this  but  mak- 
ing GOD  the  proper  author  of  it  ?  How  con- 
fiftent  this  is  with  his  moral  charadcr,  or  tbe 
pojfibility  of  fin^  we  need  not  fay.  But  if  GOD 
be  the  immediate  author  of  the  firft  a6l  of  difo- 
bedience  in  the  creature,  he  is  conltquentially 
the  author  of  all  the  moral  defilement  and  inabi- 
lity proceeding  therefrom  •,  fince  '  the  firft  ad  in 
the  train  determines  and  fixes  the  reft/  So  that 
if  'there  is  not,  and  never  can  be,  either  in  ex- 
iftence  or  idea,  a  freedom  from  moral  necefTity, 
or  a  power  of  felf-determination — if  every  moral 
event  is  immediately  or  uUimatdy  ordered  and  de- 
termined by  GOD' — (403,  404.)theconrcqucnce 
is,  either  that  there  is  not,  and  never  can  be,  fin 
in  the  world  ;  or  if  there  is,  it  is  wholly  chaigea- 
ble  on  the  firft  caufe.  The  only  way  to  e^pde 
this  confequence  is  to  admit,  that  the  duty  of  an- 
gels and  man,  before  their  fall,  was  no  other  than 
ihey  had  a  moral  as  well  as  natural  power  to 
do.  To  fuppofc  their  duty  exceeded  their  abi- 
lities would  be  the  injuftice,  which  the  flothful 
fcrvant  charged  his  Lord  with. 

f  ROM  what  hath  been  iivi^  ic  appears,  that 


(9   mor^l  Agents:  f©? 

there  is  no  need  of  our  examining  into  any  moral 
impotency  dtnvtd  irom  the  fall,  or  the  moral 
inability  of /j//^»  man.  For  Mr.  Edwards  fup- 
pofeth  this  kind  of  impotenCy  to  have  taken  place 
in  innocence,  as  really  as  fince  the  apoftacy.  ThaC 
h,  there  was  a  moral  necefTity  of  the  firft  fin-^ 
therefore  a  moral  incapacity  ©f  refraining  from 
it.  *  And  if  the  moral  ntfcefTicy  of  the  firft  fin, 
(though  as  real,  (p.  230)  was  not  in  the  fame 
,4egree  with  ihatof  fubfcqucnt  fins  ;  yet  the  /;/- 

.  crea/ed 

*♦  Mr.   Edwards^  do£lrinemanIfeftly  implies  a  moral 
inability  in   man  and  angels  before  their  fall.      He 
faith  he     'has   dcmonftrate<J,   that  the  futurity  of 
all  events  is  eftablifhed  by  previous  neceflity,  either 
.natural  or  moral  5    and  that  it  is  manifeft  that  the 
fovereign  Creator  and  Difpofer  of  the  world  has  or- 
dered this  neceflity,  by  ordering  his  own  cx>ndu<^, 
either  in  <lefignedly  acting,   or   forbearing  to  aft. 
That  the  whole  feries  of  events  is  coone£led  with 
!  fomcthing  in  the-ftate  of  things,eitber  pofitivc  or  nega- 
,tive,  which,  is  original  in  ^he  feries ;  i.  e.    fomething 
which  is  con nc^ed   with   nothing  preceeding  that> 
;but  GOD's  own  -IMMIDiate  condud'— and  in  re- 
gard '  to  the  ftate  and  a<Sts  of  the  will,  every  event 
of  this  kind  is  neceflary  by  a  moral  neceflity.* — (p. 
402,  403,  405,  406)     '  The  will  always  has  an  in- 
ability to  a<Sl  otherwifc  than  it  does'  ;  (p.  35)  that  is, 
the     man,    or   agent,     or   foul-r-'for  .the    faculty 
of  will    doth   not  a<El,    but  the    agent  that  hath 
it.'    GOD  does  decifively  in  his  providence  deter- 
mine all  the  volitions  and  ai^ions  of  moral  agents, 
either  by  pofitivc  influence  or  permiflion-^-meaning 
;by  permiflion,  not  only.'  the  not'hindering  fin,   but 
.difpcTing  the  ftate  and   circumftances  of  things  in 
tfuch  a  manner,  thatfm  certainly  and  infallibly  fol- 
lows  from  his    difpolal — that  GOD,   when  he  had 
made  man^fo  ordered  his  c'lrcumfiancei,   that  from  thefi 
circum/iiincei,  together  with   the  withholding  divine  in^ 
fumce  and  ojfijiajice^  hi i fin  infallibly  follouiidt''  (p.  37 6 J 


jt 02  Internal  Liherty  heUngs 

creafed  imbecility  being  a  necefTary  effeSl  of 
\yhac  was  original,  that  is  finally  to  be  refolved 
into  thfls  ;  and  this  to  be  attributed  to  the  firft 
caufe — who  made  man  upright  indeed,  in  his 
own  moral  image,  but  really  incapable  of  re- 
taining his  primitive  reditude. 

Whatever   hath  been  fuppofed  to  be  the 
prefenc  moral  inability  of  mankind,  Calv  nii\ic 

divints 

The  firft  fin  ofangfls  and  man  was  then  morally 
necedary,  and  pfoceec^ed  from  their  origmalftate  and 
circumftanccs— -from  GOD's  withholding  neccffafy 
pfTiftance.  And  this  proves  their  original  moral 
inability  ;  which  inability  beine; '  connedled  with  no- 
thing preceeding,  but  GOD's  own  immfdiatE 
CONDUCT,  which  is  ORIGINAL  in  the  feries^i*  he  muft 
be  the  author  of  it.  For  if  he  himfelf  necf^itatcd 
them  to  fm,  by  doing  or  forbearing  what  rendered 
the  lirft  fin  un  avoid  able  ■*~-if  fm  foliowed  from  his 
ordering  and  difpofal,  that  n^axim  in  philofophy  is 
ftri£lly  applicable^  '  Caufa  dejiciem^  in  rebus  nutjfa^ 
riis,  ad  caufam  perfg  ejficientem  reducenda  eji.  In 
things  neceiFary,  the  dehcirnt  caufc  muit  be  reduced 
to  the  efficient.  And  in  this  eale  the  reafon  is  evi- 
dent ;  becaufe  the  not  doing  what  is  required,  cr 
not  avoiding  what  is  forbidden,  rnuft  follow  from 
the  pcfition  of  the  nectffary  caufe  of  the  deficiency.* 
The  moral  ncceffitv  Mr.  ^^tt;<2r*:/j  contends  for,  as 
it  runs  up  to  the  firft  entrance  of  fin  into  the 
world,  fuppofctlr  an  inability  in  the  time  of  inno- 
cence— and  that  GOD's  own  immediate  conduct  is 
firfl  in  the  feries  of  caufes  ^-and  .cfFeefls  ;  fo  to  fay 
,  the  fifft  fin,  or  any  other,  was  not  necefil'.ry  by  a 
natural  nercfTity,  no  way  relieves  the  difHculty.  For 
natural  liberty  depends  on  moral  liberty,  by  his  own 
principles.  Ar-d  to  fay  that  ihe  fiift  caufe  and  fu- 
.  p.eme  orderer  of  all  things  made  angels  and  men  fo 
at  firft,  as  that  iht'ir  original  fin  became  nectfiary  in 
confequence  of  a  moral  inability  they  were  created 
with,  is  making  the  fupreme  caufe  *  the  proper  au- 


to  moral   A^enl^l  Ipj 

divines  have  ever  maintained,  not  that  it  was 
eriginal^  but  confequent  ts  the  /<8//— the  judicial 
animadverfion  of  the  Deity  upon  the  firft  of- 
fence. We  are  inclined  to  think  Mr.  Edwards 
was  in  the  fame  opinion  upon  the  whole,  though 
he  haih  exprefled  himfelt  fo  as  to  give  full  rea- 
fon  for  our  attributing  the  contrary  to  him-— 
that  is,  bringing  a  charge  of  felf-repugnancy. 
For  Mr.  Edwards  afferts,  that  man  was  '  en- 
dowed at  firft  with  the  moral  or  fpiritual 
'    '    ''  .-     .      ^  ^     '     image 

thor,  the  ciEcicnt  caufe,*  of  all  the.  fins  of  men  and 
devils.  To  which  objection  it  is  really  furprizing 
to  find  Mr.  Edwards  returning  this  anfwer,  that  the 
do6trine  of  hrs  oppofers  is  involved  in  the  fame  dif- 
ficulty. For  admit  it  to  be  fo,  is  this  a  proper  an- 
fwer  ?  If  either  his  do6trine  or  theirs  is  juftly  char- 
geable with  fuch  a  confequence,  by  all  the  regard 
we  owe  t®  a  Deity  and  moral  Governor  we  arc  bound 
to  reje^  a  fcheme  which  contains  fuch  an  imputa- 
\tion  upon  him,  ^    "     -     ....  -    .....       .. 

It  hence  appears,  that  the  cafe  Mr.  Edwards  xn'- 
■ftanceth  in,  *  of  a  man  for  his  rebellion  caft  into 
prifon,  and  loaded  with  chains,  on  whom  his  Prince 

i  hath  compafTion,  orders  his  chains  to  be  knocked  off, 

'  and  the  prifon  doors  to  be  fet  open— but  who  is  full 
{  ©f  fuch  malignity,that  he  cannot  be  willing  to  accept 
the  offer  of  forgivencfs' — (p.  305,  306)  that  this,  cafe 
is  quite  aliene  from  the  purpofc,  and  no  way  ap- 
plicable to  Mr.  Edwards's  do(ftrine.      For  by  his 

'  principles,  there  is  a  neceffity  on  the  minds  of  men, 
ftrong  as  grates  of  brafs,  and  bars  of  iron — which 
neceffity  extends  to  the  firft  entrance  of  fin  into  the 
world.  Hence  the  angels  that  fell,  and  our  commoa 
progenitors,  could  not  be  willing  to  abide  in  their  pri- 

?  mitive  ftate.  Hence  finncrs  continue  impenitent. 
Internal  chains,  ftrong  as  the  bars  of  a  caftle  bound 
the   morning  ftars  to   revolt  from  Heaven — bound 

'-  Adam  and  Eve  to  fin — and  bind  all  who  ft  and  out 

'  againft  the  gofpel  invitation. 


%04.  Internal  Liherty  lekngf 

image  of  GOD/  in  diftin6lion  from  his  natural 
image — By  the  laaer  alio  he  explains  himfelf  to 
mean,  *  an  underftanding  to  perceive  the  difFe* 
rence  between  moral  good  and  evil  -,  a  capacity 
of  difcerningthat  moral  v^rorchineis  and  demerit, 
by  v^rhich  fome  things  are  praifc-worthy,  others 
deferving  of  blame  and  punifhment  ;  and  alfo  a 
iapactty  of  choice^  and  choicr  guided  by  under- 
ftanding,  and  a  power  of  a£iing  according  to 
choice.*  (p.  41,  43^)  Consequently,  he  had  a 
xapaciiy  pf  making  ibis  choice,  to  continue  ia 
the  ftate  of  mor^l  rcclicudc  wherein  he  was  ere- 
.ated.  <Gonftrq.]ently,  a  (moral)  power  of  abid- 
ing in  rthat  ftcice.  Confeqaently,  his  fall  from 
it  was  not  an  event  morally  neceffary.  Confe- 
.quently,.not  .infallibly  cmneded  with  the  divine 
difpofal  and  determination.  Confequently,  the 
fuppofed  fixed  connexion  o^  every  moral  event 
with  a  previous  moral  caufe,  could  not  antecede 
the  apoftacy,  but  muft  (if  real)  be  fubfequent  to 
it.  Confequently,  in  every  fuch  event  ^  GOD's 
own  immediate,  con  dud'  cannot  be  fuppofed  to 
be  '  original  in  the  feries.'  The  difficulty  ari- 
fmg  from  divine  prefcicnce  we  pretend  not  to 
be  able  to  clear.  It  is  fufficient  that  it  equals 
iy  lies  againft  Mr.  Edwards's  dodtrine. 

Upon  admitting,  with  the  generality  of  ,C^1- 
viniftic  divines, /7r/^^'«^/,/»/^''«^/ freedom  in  man; 
fhat  his  moral  imbecility  was  confequent  to,  and 
the  punifhment  of,  the  firft  offence  ;  that  the  mo- 
ral  impotency  of  apoftace  fpirits  alio  is  the  fruit 
and  effeSl  of  their  revolt  •,  the  moral  perfed.ons 
of  GOD  are  vindicated,  and  he  is  freed  from 
^he  impious  charge  of  being  the  author  of  >their 
fin  :  But  how  this  charge  can  be  removed  on  the 
foundationMr.  ^Yit'^r^J  proceeds  upon  is  difficult 


to    moral   Jgentsl  105 

to  conceive;  nor  indeed  has  he  taken  much  pain^to 
remove  it,  though  he  allows  it  '  is  infinitely  to 
be  abhorred,  and  denies  it  to  be  the  eonfcquencc 
of  what  he  has  laid  down.'  In  what  fenfe  he 
thought  It  was  to  be  *  abhorred,'  and  will  not 
allow  it  to  be  the  '  confequencc'  of  what  he  hath 
faid,  has  been  already  remarked.  *  However 
great  that  impotency  is  which  mankind  derive 
from  y^<^^w,thereis  a  man ifeft  difference  beiweea 
a  moral  inability  or  neceflity  derived  from  the 
fall  of  man,  and  a  like  kind  of  inability  or  ne- 
ceflity original  to  the  human  race.  Mr.  Ed- 
wardsh  dodlrine  of  neceflity  is  inconfiftent  witfi 
the  opinion  of  our  having  loft  our  power  in  A-^ 
dam  J  fincc  he  could  not  hfe  a  power  he  never 
had. 

We  have  but  one  thing  farther  to  add.  While 
we  acknowledge  the  fallen  ftate  of  our  nature, 
and  the  impotency  derived  from  the  fall,  the 
proper  queftion  on  the  gofpel  plan  is,  Whether 
falvation  is  offered  to  finners  on  pr amicable 
terms  ?  The  offer  prefuppoleth  our  lofl:  and  pe- 
rching ftate.  Is  it  then  adapted  to  this 
ftate  of  mankind  ?  Is  there  a  poffibility  of 
accepting  it  ?  Rather,  is  there  no  impropriety, 
is  there  not  a  palpable  contradidion,  in  fpeak- 
ing  of  an  offt.r  on  terms  known  to  be  morally  im- 
poflible  ?  The  prefent  queltion  is  not,  Whether 
fallen  man  hath  power,  independently  cf  the  aids 
€f  grace y  to  accept  the  gofpel  propofals  ?  but. 
Whether  fuch  afliftances  are  tendered  with  the 
call  of  the  gofpel  as  that  an  acceptance  of  it  is 
morally  poffible  I 

f  S^,  m  Fart  iii  of  theft  r^marltt; 


io6  Internal  Liheriy  lehngi 

Or  fuppofe  it  morally  impoflible,  that  great 
numbers,  who  are  externally  called  by  the  gof- 
pcl,  (hould  accept  the  invitation  of  it — fuppofe 
their  final  condemnation  to  be  juft  notwith- 
ftanding,  in  conlequence  of  their  relation  to 
Adam^  and  the  moral  inability  derived  from 
him  ;  yet  who  will  fay  that  they  merit  a  forer 
punilhment,  x greater  damnation,  when  their  re- 
je6ling  the  gofpel  is  fuppofed  to  be  the  necelTa- 
ry  confequence  of  GOD*s  withholding  that  af- 
Jifiance^  without  which  they  can  no:  embrace  it  ? 
A  propofal  of  pa'rdon  and  life  to  rebels  againft 
heaven,  on  impraiticable  terms,  sc.ompanied 
with'  a  threatening  of  aggravated  condemna- 
tion, feems  hardly  reconcileable  with  the  difco-^ 
vcries  GOD  hath  mauc  of  himfelf  as  having 
Hiewn  the  exceeding  riches  of  his  grace  inCHRL'i^r 
JESUS — Not  zvitting  any  Jhculd  perifl:^  but  that 
f.li  PiOuld  come  to  repentance — Cofnmanding  all  men 
every  where  to  ?  epent — tVhotvcr  will,  let  him  come^ 
and  take  the  waters  of  life  freely, 

-ir  may  be  faid,  '  True  indeed,  whofoever 
will  \ci  him  come.  We  grant,  if  they  have  a 
will,  they  may  come.  But  we  afTcrr,  that  none 
but  fuch  as  a61ually  come  can  will  to  come.* 
Now  what  faith  the  fcripture  ?  When  our  Savi- 
our upbraids  the  Jews,  '  Ye  will  not  come  to' 
me  that  ft  might  have  life/  doth  this  imply  that 
it  was  forever  morally  impoflible  for  chcm  to 
haVeiome  ?  or  doth  it  fuppofe,  on  the  contrary, 
thal'they  might  have  willed  to  come  ?  Why 
clf<;  are  they  upbraided  for  not  coming  ?  Hovr 
oft  would  he  have  gathered  them,  but  they 
would  not  ^  Was  there  not  a  time,  therefore, 
when  they  might  have  known  the  things  belong- 
ing to  ihcir  peace  ?  1  la  before  you  life  and 

deaths 


to  moral  Agents,  107 

death,  bleffing  and  curfing  ;  therefore  chusb 
life — implying  a  moral  capacity  oi  cbufing  as 
well  as  CDYidutling  according  to  choice  :  And 
indeed,  without  fuppofing  the  former,  how  caa 
the  latter  be  faid  to  be  in  any  one's  power  ?  It 
is  fo  only  in  confequence  of  volition  or  choice.  If 
the  caufe  be  out  of  our.  power,  the  effect  mud  be 
ofcourfe.  Befides,  *  the  very  willing  or  chu* 
fing  is  the  doing  :  When  once  a  man  hath  wil- 
led or  chofen,  the  thing  is  done,'  Had  not  thac 
fervant,  who  received  the  fingie  talent,  a  moral 
power  to  have  improved  that  talent  well  ?  In 
confequence  of  fuch  improvement,  would  he 
not  have  received  more  ?  According  to  thar> 
'  To  him  that  hath,  fhall  be  given,'  ^c.  Was 
he  not  condemned  out  of  his  own  mouth  ? 

Let  us  add  here,  that  the  fuppofition  of  (in- 
ners  being  abandoned  and  given  up  of  GO  D,  im- 
plies, that  they  once  had  a  moral  power  to  turn  and 
live — Always  remembering  to  include  the  means 
and  influences  of  grace  when  we  fpeak  of  fuch  a 
power.  For  it  is  GOD  that  worketh  in  us  to  will 
and  to  DO  ^  which  is  the  argument  to  ou'c  work- 
ing out  our  own  f ah  at  ion.  Doth  not  the  demand 
of  the  Prophet,  What  could  have  been  done  more, 
to  my  vineyard  ?  imply  that  means  and  influen- 
ces on  GOD*s  part  are  afforded,  or  tendered,  in 
fuch  meafure  to  finners,  as  renders  their  compli- 
ance with  the  terms  of  falvation  poffible  at  lead  ? 
We  have,  indeed,  no  warrant  to  fay  abfolutely, 
that  he  could  not  have  done  more  for  the  con- 
vcrfion  of  the  Jews — that  he  could  not  have 
converted  them  by  an  immediate,  irrefiftible  in- 
fluence. He  that  '  is  able  to  raife  up  children 
to  Abraham  out  of  the  ftones,*  could,  no  doubt, 
have  done  this,  had  he  k^i^i  fit.     it  is  enough 


loS  Internal  Liherty  belongs  &c, 

that  the  means  ufed  with   them  were  ftffficient, 
though  not  unconquerable. 

But  we  may  difmifs  this  matter.  Mr.  Ed' 
wards'^  do6lrine  is,  that  the  Jirji  fin  of  angels 
and  man  as  was  r^^/Zy  neccfTary,  as  the  wickednefs 
of  abandoned  (inners  and  apoftate  fpirits — So 
that  what  hath  been  laft  obferved,  relating  to 
the  neceffity  of  the  fins  of  fallen  creatures,  while 
on  probation,  and  in  the  time  of  GOD's  grace 
and  vifitation,  no  way  affedls  our  main  argu- 
ment. Mr.  Edwards  hath  offered  a  chain  of 
feafoning  in  proof  that  man  hath  in  no  cafe,  and 
never  had,  a  power  of  fc If- determination  ;  but 
is,  and  always  was,  determined  by  a  moral  necef- 
fiiy^  which  neceffity  is  as  real  as  any  other.  This 
riecedity,  he  affirms,  belongs  to  all  finite  beings, 
and  to  the  Creator  himfelf— At  the  fame  time 
he  hath  taken  great  pains  to  (hew,  that  it  is  con* 
lilknc  with  the  moft  perfedl  liberty. 


SECT, 


S  E  C  T.  IL 


.  Internal  moral  liberty^  as  dijlin^  from  e^iernaly 
confiftent  with  the  influence  of  motives,  and  ufe  of 
commands^  exhortations^  promifes^  warnings^ 
threateningSy  &c. 

WE  readily  grant,  there  can  be  no  a6l  of 
choice  without  feme  motive  or  induce- 
.ment.  But  if  what  hath  been  obferved,  with 
relpe6t  to  the  power  of  creatures  made  uprighc 
to  retain  or  forfeit  their  innocence.  Be  admitted, 
it  clearly  follows,  that  the  application  of  com- 
mands, invitations,  monitions,  &c.  is  confiftent 
with  a  freedom  to  either  fide.  For  who  quefti- 
ons  but  rebel  angels  had  the  higheft  induce- 
niems,  before  their  fall,  to  abide  in  their  firft 
eftate  ?  We  need  not  fcruple  to  fay,  the  ftrong- 
eft  pofTible  motives  could  not  be  wanting  in 
the  prefence  of  GOD — that  it  was  the  higheil 
apparent  good,  as  well  as  their  higheft  duty,  and 
what  they  had  a  moral  ability  for,  to  continue 
fubjedl  to  the  great  Creator.  And  it  is  really 
one  of  themofl  inexplicable  events,  that  beings 
in  their  fituation  fhould  fall.  This  event  fhews, 
beyond  queftion,  that  a  liberty  to  either  fide  is 
-confiftent  with  the  moft  powerful  motives  to  bi- 
as and  incline  the  will  to  one  fide. 

So  in  the  cafe  of  innocent  Adam,  no  one  mil 
/ay,  that  the  motives  in  paradife,  to  hold  faft  his 
jnteority,  were  infufficient— or  that  their  noc 
proving  effeaual  necefiarily  proceeded  from  the 

..original 


ijfy  Infer  ml  moral  Liherty^ 

original,  moral  (tate  of  his  will,  pOiTeiTed  of  the 
moral  image  of  GOI?.  That  he  had  a  moral 
capacity  to  fuftain  the  federal  trial  is  here  taken 
for  granted.  Among  other  commands,  writ- 
ten on  -his  heart,  or  communicated  by  fpecial 
intercourfe  with  Deity,  he  had  one  prohibition 
properly  pofitive,  which  was  made  the  teft  of 
hiS  fidelity,  acccmpanied  with  an  exprefs  threat, 
that  he  fhould  die  in  cafe  ot  npn -forbearance  in 
that  in  (la  nee  -,  and  implying  a  promife  of  life, 
if  he  refrained  in  this  article.  Whatever  be  un- 
dcrftood  by  the  death  threatened,  the  threaten- 
ing was  lufficiently  awful.  Yet  againfl:  the 
cleared  warning,  againft  the  higheil  motives  to 
the  contrary,he  veLtnred  to  take  and  eat.  Com- 
mands, invitations,  prom/ifes,  admonitions,  &:c. 
are  therefore  confiitent  with  a  moral  ability  tp 
hearken  or  not  hearken  to  them. 

For  the  fame  reafon  that  yF;^  couM  not  be  mp- 
rally  necefiaryat  firft^  it  will  be  difficult  to  prove, 
that  the  CQ.n{\Ti\:itd  holinefs  of  good  angels  vyas 
morally  neceflary  from  the  beginning.  Mr.  Ed- 
.ivards  Teems  to  fuppofe  a  difference  as  to  the 
degree  of  m.oral  neceffity  i  but  exprefsly  main- 
tarns,  that  the  reality  of  it  is  the  fame  in  all  in- 
fiances.  *  That  is  to  fay,  though  every  act  of 
every  creature  is  certain  and  fixed  decifively  be- 
forehand, yet  there  are  different  degrees  of  ab- 
iolute  certainty. 

Farther,  with  regard  to  fallen  man,  Mr. 
Edwards  allows,  that  commands,  &c.  are  given 
to,  and  means  ufed  with  finners,  in  unregene- 
racy.     From  hence  he  partly  argues  his  dodrine 

»  Part  III.  Sea.  iHcu 


'cdtififtenf  with  the  influence  of  Motive.      1 1  i 

of  neceflity.  f  They  have  a  moral  underfland- 
ing,  and  the  fame  natural  powers  of  adtion,  with 
lioiy  and  good  men — To  which  end  moral  ior 
duGcmcnts  of  various  kinds  are  laid  before  them. 

The  doflrine  of  necefraryconne6i:ion  of  means 
and  ends,  as  ftated  by  Mr.  Edwards^  implies  one 
or  other  of  the  following  things  :  Either  that  no 
means  are  employed  with  the  unrcgenerate  in 
order  to  their  converfion — or  none  that  have  a 
tendency  to  the  end — or  that  they  have  not  a 
.moral  power  of  ufing  them — or  their  ufe  of  thenti 
is  certainly  and  infallibly  fuccefsful. 

That   means  are  ufed  with  unregenerate  fin- 
fiers^  Mr.  Edwards  grants.      But  fince  the  doc- 
trine he  defends  may  feem  to  imply,  that  means 
are  never  ufed  with  the  .finally   impenitent,  (at 
lead  not  to  bring  them  to  repentance,  but  only 
to  confirm  them  in  wickednefs,  and  lead   them 
todcftrudion)  we  fhall  juft  hint,  that  the  whole 
ceconomy   of  providence   and  grace  is  a    means 
ufed  with  the  righteous, and  wicked  in  common, 
for  the  canfirmation,  improvement  and  comforc 
of    the  former^   and  convidion   and  reformation 
of  the  latter.     Extraordmary  and  ordinary  means 
are  ufed    tbvthls   end.     Of  the  former  kind  are 
miracles,  prophecy,  tongues,  vouchHifed  at  fpe- 
cial    feafons,    and  in  divers  manners  -,   together 
.with  fingular  and  alarming  interpofitions  of  pro- 
vidence.    To  the   latter  kind  belong  a  written, 
{landing   revelation,  a  public  miniilry  and  infti- 
tutions  of  worfhip,    the  drivings  of  the   divine 
fpirit,  various  providential  allotments  &c.    The 
.word  of  truth   in  particular  is  an  external  ap- 
pointed 

t  Ibid,  and  Se£t.  7.  and  p.  384.. 


ij  12  Unterml  moral  Lihertyp 

pointed  means  of  regeneration,  repentance  from 
■dead  works,  converfion,  or  that  faith  by  whicK 
thofe  live  who  are  pafied  from  death  to  life.  If 
any  reject  the  tender  of  (alvation,  the  meffen- 
gers  of  it  are  diredled  to  wipe  off  the  duli  of 
their  feet  as  a  teftimony  againfl  the  defpifers  of 
their  mcffage^  leaving  with  them  this  foleinn 
proteftation,  '  Be  ye  fure  of  this,  that  the  king- 
dom of  GOD  is  come  unto  you.'  We  might 
mention  the  patience  of  GOD  towards  fmners, 
g^c. — v;hence  it  is  apparent  that  means,  power- 
ful means,  are  ufed  for  the  converfion  even  of 
thofe,  who  are  at  length  rcfigned  up  to  their  own 
hearts  luft.  But  as  this  maaer  appears  not  to 
be  contefted  .by  Mv.Edwardh  WQ  fhail  pafs  to 
.the  next,  thing  above  mentioned. 

'  '"Whether  the  means  ufed  witli  the  isnregcn- 
crare  have  any  tendency  to  the  end  ?  The  very 
propofing  of  this  queftion  is  enough,  For  when- 
ever we  ule  the  means,  it  is  in  relation  to  lome 
end.  Wtf  intend  by  it  the  7nedia  through  which 
any  end  is  attained.  So^that  tofpeakofmeans^and 
deny  their  conducivenefs  to  the  end,  is  an  affront 
to  common  fenfe,  as  nothing  can  properly  be 
called  a  means  farther  than  it  hath,  oris  fuppofed 
to  have,  a  tendency  to  accomphfh  an  end.  And 
as  all  who  maintain  there  are  any  inftituted  n:\eans 
of  converfion,  allow  them  to  have  been  ordained 
by  infinue  wifdpm,  it  would  be  impeaching  lu- 
preme  wifdom  and  goodnefs  ro  fay,  they  are  not 
calculated  in  the  beji  manmr  to  lead  finners  to  re- 
pentance. 

Not  that  any  external  means  are  efficacious  in 
themielves,  ba:  only  tnrough  the  divine  concur- 
itcncc  v/ith  them.     So  ic  is  in  temporal  and  world- 


conftftent  with  the  influence  of  Motive.     1 13. 

ly  matters  ;  and  fo  it  is  in  the  concerns  of  re- 
ligion. Means  and  endeavors  do  not  enlure 
worldly  fuccefs.  They  are  in  vain  except  GOD 
worketh  with  them.  Yet  whohcfitates  one  mo- 
ment, whether  the  divine  concurrence  is  to  ht 
cxpe£led  in  the  ufe,  and  through  the  inftrumen- 
tality,  of  the  means  he  hat^  prefcribed,  or  the 
contrary  ?  Exempt  cafes  there  are  wherem  means 
are  fuperfeded  in  mens  temporal  affairs  :  I'here 
may  be  like  mftanccs  in  the  affairs  of  falvation. 
But  thefe  being  exempt  cafes  is  a  reafon  why 
fpiritual  blelTings  are  much  rather  to  be  expedcd 
in  the  ufe,  than  in  the  negledt  of  means. 

It  is  the  united  voiceof  all  Calviniftic  divines, 
that  there  is  the  greateft  poffible  encouragement 
to  the   endeavours  of  unconverted    men  in  the 
ufe  of  the  means  of  falvation.     Mr.  Edwards  al- 
lows,  that   moral   inducements    are   ufed    with 
them  ;    and  fays,  *  it  is  of  the  nature  of  fuch  in- 
ducements, that  they  have  fomething  inviting^ 
fome  tendency  to  induce  and  dijpofe  to  virtuous 
volition  ;  to  give  the  mind  an  inclination  or  bias 
to  virtue — that  they  can  operate  only  by  biaffing 
the  will,  and  giving  it  a  certain    inclination  one 
way — (p.  119,  125.)  that  motives  have  in  them- 
felves  this  nature  and   tendency  in  different  de- 
grees, fome  greater,   others  lefs.'     Now  by  Mr. 
Edwards\  principles  every  inclination,  however 
weak,  is  of  the  nature  of  a  difpofuion  ta  virtue, 
and  leading  to  it.     (For  there  can  be  no  induce- 
ments to   virtue  but  fuch  as  operate  by  giving 
the  mind  an  inclination  to  it.)  If  then  ihe  motives 
vifed  with  the  unregenerate  may   excite  a  virtu- 
ous inclination,  though  in  the  kwejt  degree,  we 
may,  for  the  fame  reafon,  Rjppofe  this  ir  clination 

increafcd  to  that  degree  as  to  become />^^^<^^^^^^ 

through 


114  Internal  moral  Liherijt 

through  the  influence  of  moral  means  and  m- 
ducements,  in  fubordination  to  him  who  wor- 
keth  all  in  all.  And  in  proportion  to  the  pre- 
ponderation  of  the  mind  in  favor  of  virtue,  js 
the  degree  of  virtue.  How  confident  thefe  things 
are  with  Mr.  Edwardi%  4th  and  5th  Sedt  pare 
3d.  and  other  things  faid  in  his  book,  thofe  may 
judge,  who  will  be  at  the  pains  to  exanfiine  and 
compare  them. 

If  it  be  faid,  in  the  next  place,  that  the  un- 
regenerate  have  not  a  moral  power  to  ufe  the 
7neans  of  grace  :  This  is  the  lame  abfurdity  as  to 
fay,  the  means  have  no  tendency  to  the  end. 
For  how  can  means  be  faid  to  be  afforded,which 
cannot  be  ufed  ?  At  bed,  they  are  as  if  not  af- 
forded. How  then  can  the  gofpel  be  preached 
for  a  witnefs  to  fuch  as  finally  rejed  it  i*  Why  is 
it  taken  from  fome,  becaufe  they  bring  not  forth 
the  fruit  of  the  kingdom,  when  they  never  had 
it  in  their  power  to  receive  its  teftimony  ?  Can 
they  be  liable  to  an  aggravated  puniflim.ent  for 
not  ufing  means,  which  they  could  not  improve 
toany  purpofe  ?  We  repeat  it  to  prevent  miflakes 
that  when  we  fpeak  of  the  ability  of  unregenerate 
men  to  ufe  the  means  of  grace,  we  mean  not  an  in- 
dependent power  in  themfelves  :  (This  the 
regenerate  have  not)  But  that  fuch  influences  of 
grace  are  vouchfafed,  together  with  external 
means,  as  that  thofe  might  embrace  the  gofpel 
i-all,  who,  in  event,  rejedl  it  againft  ihemlelves. 

Moreover,  there  is  a  wide  difl^erence  in  the 
characters  of  unregenerate  men.  Some  fuch  are 
nearer  the  kingdom  of  GOD  than  others.  There 
is  more  hope  of  fome  than  others  of  this  cha- 

rader-::! 


csnfifient  with  the  infiuaice  of  Moihes*       Xie^ 

fabler — Which  things  cannot  be  faid  confident- 
}y  v/ith  the  fuppofition  of  unregenerate  men's 
being  utterly  incapable  of  any  good  cffedl  from 
the  means  of  grace,,  through  their  own  endea- 
vours in  the  ufe  of  them,  and  the  conimon  ftri- 
vings  of  GOD's  fpirit.  And  yet,  what  lefs  is 
implied  in  the  aflertion,  that  they  cannot  ufe 
the  means  that  are  employed!  with  them,  cannot 
improve  a  fappofed  price  in  their  hands  ?  For 
how  then  is  the  gofprl,  a  difpenfation  qI grace  to 
them  ?  Is  it  not  father  a  difpenfation  of  wrath  ? 
To  fay  that  their  incapacity  is  not  natural^  but 
moraly  is  faying  nothing  to  the  purpofcy  as  ws 
truft  hath  been  fhcvvu.  If  the  incapacity  be 
teal^  \i  is  no  matter  under  v/hat  name  it  goes. 
Is  it  determined  beforehand,  that  any  of  the  un- 
regenerate fhaU  not  ufe  the  means  of  grace,  or 
fliall  not  fucceed  ?  If  it  is,  let  any  man  mewp 
how  the  gofpel  can  be  a  privilege  to  them, 
or  they  liable  to  a  greater  damnation  for  abufmg 
it. 

To  fay  laftly,  that  the  ei^deavours  of  the  unre- 
generate in  the  ufe  of  the  means  of  grace  are  infa!-' 
libly  conneded  ^xihfuccefs^  is  to  fay,  that  no  means 
ire  employed  with  thofe  who  die  in'  their  (ins  ; 
contrary  to  what  Mr.  Edwards  exprefsly  al-* 
lows.  And  ye:  he  malt  either  f^^y  this,  or  elfc 
that  none  but  the  regenerate  can  ufe  the  means 
of  grace.  We  may  juft  as  well  affirm,  that  all 
converted  men  muft  ^xo^i  equally  under  the  meanss 
offalvation,  as  that  none  can  improve  them  at 
all  but  they  who  fucceed.  One  may  venture  to 
afTert,  that  fuch  as  hear  the  word,  and  anon  with 
joy  receive  it,  ufe  the  means  of  grace,  thought 
they  fhould  endure  but  a  while. 

The  means  of  religion,  as  thofe  of  this  life,' 

arc  ufed  with  different  degrees  of  application  by 

'        R        ^  ~ '"  different 


^i  1 6  Internal  moral  Llhcrtyy 

different  perfons  -,    which  is  the  true  grouncf 
(ordinarily;  cf  their  different  fuccefs.      But  we' 
deny  that  any  are  commanded,  invited,  exhort- 
ed, &c.  to  exert  powers  and  faculties  they  are 
not  pofTclTed   of — to  ad  from  principles    they 
arc  not  endowed  with — to  ufe  means  out  of  their 
power.     Such  faculties,   principles,  powers,  and 
aiTedions  as  they  arc  pofTcffed  of,  fuch  means  as 
are  within   their  power  are  the  only  ones   they 
are   porTcfTcd  cf,  fuch  means  as  arc  within   their 
power  are  the  only  ones    ihey   can  be   required 
to  ad:  from  and  improve.     Arguments    la-d  be- 
fore wicked  men  are  adapted  to  operate  on  their 
reafon  and  moral    difccrnment — on  the  principle 
of  ingenuity  and  gratitude — on  their  hope,  fear, 
joy,  forrow,    and  the  various  movements  of  the 
mind.     Nor  cnn  it  be  propofcd  they  fhould  aft 
from  the  highefl  fp'ritual  principles  while  unre- 
generate,  but  from  fuch  as  they  are   capable  of 
being    influenced   by  a?    rcafcnable  beings,  pof- 
feflcd  of  a   moral  faculty,   and   fubjeds  of  moral 
government — who  have  an  advocate  for  GOD 
\vithin  rhem,  to  whom  he  hath  deputed  his]^  au- 
thority— a  principle  which  is  by    v.^nu^  Jupreme^ 
and  implanted  to  give  law  to  the  animal  affedi- 
ons  and  appetites. 

*The  end  of  laws,  we  acknowledge,  is  to  hind 
to.  one  fide  ♦,  and  the  end  of  commands  is  to  turn 
the  will  one  way.'  But  we  cannot  agree  with 
Mr.  Edwards,  'that  laws  and  commands  are 
therefore  of-  no  ufe,  unlefs  thty  aSiiially  turn  the 
imi\  that  wai*  which  they  require,  "^  Mr  Edwards 
would  not  fay,  that  any  of  GOD's  laws  or  com- 
mands are  ufelefs — that  he  might  not  juftly  re- 
quire fubjedion  to  his  snointed  from  thofe 
who   faid.  Let  us   break  their  bands  afundsr^  and 

.♦  Part  III.  Sea.  4th  p.  216. 


**         mfident  with  the  influence  of  MuHves.    1 1 J 

Jtaji  away  their  cords  from  us.     The  title  of  the 
iedion,  from  which  we  have  extra6ted  the  above 
■words,  iSyCommands  confijlent  with  moral  inability.. 
Now  is  the  will  of  thofc,  who  are  under  moral 
:neceiruy  of  difobeying,   turned  and  biafT^d  that 
way  the  command  is  ?  Mr.  Edwards  has  oiiered 
many  reafons  why   their  will  ought  to  be  turned 
t-o  this  fide— to  evince  the  propriety  of  ihe  com- 
mands given  them  not withtlanding  their  ^nj^/w^/ 
inability  to  turn  this  way.     But  he  hath  not  (licwn 
.clearly,  that  'commands  and  laws  are  therefore  of 
.no   ufe^   becaufe   the  fubjedb  will  not  be  bound 
thereby.     Or  admitting  he  had  fhewn  this,   we 
need  not  fay  how  much  or   how  Vutle  it  makes 
>for  his    purpofe.     One  thing   is  hence  obvious, 
-,that  by  his    own  confclfion  and  argument,  com- 
mands, invitations  &c,  are  of  no  ule  where  there 
■is  a  moral  neceffity   of  being  biafled,  or  going, 
the  CDncrary  way. 

Moreover,  as   wicked  men   may  have  in- 
ducements to  virtue,  confident   wich  the  fuppo- 
fition  of  their  perfiding  in  vice  ;  in  like  manner 
good  men  have  allurements  to  vice.     Such  al- 
lurements   they  meet    wi'h  from  the    flefli,  the 
world,  and  the  devil.     Hence  they  are  called  to 
watch  and  pray, that  they  enter  not  into  tempta- 
tion— to  fightT-to    drive   for   the    tnaftery^ — :o 
.deny  themfelves,  and  take  up  the  crofs — to  tak« 
heed  left  they  fall — and  in  general  to  work  out 
their  own  falvation  with  fear  and  trembling.  Now 
temptations  and  allurements  to  fin  '  operate  by 
giving  the  mind  an  inclination  to  it — bialUng  the 
will  this  way.'     So  that  as  inducements  to  holi- 
rjcfs  may  be  confiftcntly  ufcd  with  ihofe  who  at 
prcfent  are  under  the  dominion  of  fin,  with  % 
.prjlpeit  of  changing  their  prefent  prevaihng  bi- 
^s  and  inclination  j  allurements  to  fin  may  aUo 

bs 


J 1 5  hlsrnal  moral  Liberty^ 

be  laid  befort  thofe  v/hofe  prevailing  bias  is  i(5 
holincfs,  not  without  a  pofTibility  and  profped 
of  their  being  overcome— with  which  view  they 
are  always  propofed  hy  the  tempter.  Adam,  en* 
dowed  with  the  moral  image  of  GOD,  was  over- 
come :  And  are  his  fallen  fons  exempt  from 
danger  ?'  The  regenerate  fall  from  virtue  fre- 
quently ihrough  inadvertence,  and  the  ftrength 
of  a  prcfent  temptation.  They  are,*  therefore, 
lender  no  moral  neceffity  of  being  perferJ^  nor  in- 
^ttd  can  be  free  from  (m  m  this  life.  Or  will 
any  undertake  to  file w,  that  the  fins  they  fall  in- 
to are  morally  neceffary  ?  According  to  Mr. 
Edwards^  doCtrine  they  are  fo  indeed.  To  fup- 
pofe  farther,  as  his  doctrine  doth,  that  the  im- 
ferfe^  holincis  of  the  faiocs  in  this  life  is  necef- 
iary  by  amoral  nec:flicy,  is  a  palpable  contra.- 
<iiLtion  :  For  fuch  a  neceiTiiy  being  fuppofed 
-would  prove  them  incapable  of  any  lapfe  what- 
ever, ^tcciiiiy  \s  fixed  z.n'l  uniform^  admitting 
.of  no  variety  or  dijjonancy  of  charafler  :  Where- 
as the  moral  charaders  of  good  chrillianj  are 
mixed,  and  in  many  inftances  contradidory. 
Dalit's  murther  and  aduhery  v/ere  very  incoa** 
fillent  v;ith  his  general  character,  and  canriot  be 
iuppofed  to  have  been  morally  neceffary,  con- 
fiitent  v/ith  the  opinion,  that  by  the  fame  necef^ 
iity  he  was  a  man  after  GOD's  own  heart. 

Upon  the  whole,  .powerful  motives  to  holl- 
nefs,  joined  with  a  prevailing  propendty  this  way 
are  yet  to  be  found  where  there  are  in  many  in- 
ftances  contrary  volitions  j  and  in  fome  inftan- 
iCcs,  on  fome  occafions,  to  an  high  degree.  Nor 
have  the  maintainers  of  the  dodfrine  of  the 
iaints  perfeverance  been  wont  to  ground  it  on 
;?he  fuppofed  indefiBihility  of  tr\<^  fpiritual  princi^ 
pie  in  them,  m  itfelf  confidered,  but  on  the  co^ 
p.cmnt  and pzvcr  of  GOD  engaged  to  theni* 


mftfiettt  with  tU  influence  of  Motives.     \\^ 

Mr.  Edwards  very  jiiflly  obfcrves,  that  fome 
^crimes  are  more  heinous  than  orhers  in  their  own 
nature  :  Nor  would  he  deny,  but  that  of  fome 
more  is  required  than  of  others.     We  may  afk. 
On  what  ground  ?  if  all  volition  and  adion  is 
necelTaiy,  in   the  fenfe  of  his  book.     How  is  a 
*  perfon  under  previous  obligation   to  confider 
beforehand    in  fijme   cafes  more  than  others  ?' 
(p.  262)     Can   he  confider  without  motives  t© 
confidcration  prefented  to  his  mind?  Can  he  be  the 
caufe  ofnew  motives  to himfeif?  Doth  he  neceffari- 
ly  follov/thofeexhibited^^^^AT/r^?  Could  he,  among 
many  motives  to  choice,   have  viewed  any  one 
otherwifc  than  he  in  fafldoth?  The  whole  con- 
troverfy,  in  a  manner,  terms  on  the  refoiutioa 
of  thefe  que  (lions.     Every    reader  perceives  on 
which  fide  Mr,  Edwards  vj2i%  in  regard  to  them  : 
And    every  reader,    from  the  bare   propofal  of 
them,  may  fee  ac  once,  whether  or  no,  or  how 
far  Mr.  Edwards's  doctrine  is  reconcileable  with 
the  fuppofition  of  different  degrees  of  guilt,  and 
.obligations  to  confider  previous  to  making  choice. 
It  feems  hardly  proper  to  fpeak  of  tendency  and 
influence  in  motives    to  choice,   when  all   things 
SiTit  fettled  and  determined  beforehand  by  eflablifljed 
Jaws  in  nature^  fo  that  every  intelligent  creature 
is   ncceffitated  to  chufe  and  improve,  or  refufe 
and  negled  fuch  and  fuch  things,  called  means.  So 
fure  and  perfect  a   connexion  of  caufes  and  ef- 
itdi%^  antecedents  and  confequents,  as  he  hath 
endeavoured  to  make  appear,  leaves  no  room  to 
fpeak  of  a  meer  tendency  in  motives,  which  have 
a  certain  fovereignty  in  determining  every  ad  of 
^very  being  in  the  univerfe. 

SECT. 


f2d        Mr  Edwzrds's  fcheme  cfNeceJJtty, 


SECT.     111. 


^/iUowing   Mr,  JLdvt sirds* s  Jcbeme  cf  necefftty  to  hjt 
true  in  theory,  it   is  not  applicable  to  pradlicc. 

AS  we  have  fuppofed  the  d®drlne  of  necefli- 
ty  maintained  in  Mr.  Edwards^  enquiry- 
runs  up  to  ah folute  fatality^  vft  Ihall  in  this  ledli; 
on  confider  it  in  this  view.      We  fliall   luppole 
,fuch  a  necefiity  to  be  indeed  agreable  to  philo- 
ffophic   truth.     Taking  for  granted  the  coinci- 
;,dencc  tbetween  Mr.  Edwardj  and  a  ftridt  fatalift, 
pr.  ^tt//^r*s, region ing  with  the  latter  is  in  a  good 
meafure  applicable  .to  the  formsr.     \We  lliail  ac- 
cordingly take   the  liberty  to  extract   from  the 
chapter  of  his  analogy,  entitled,  'Qf  the. opinion 
of  nccefiity,  confidered  as  influencing /)r^67/Vd'.'' 
He  introduces  what  he  there  obferves   with  this 
apology  to  his  readers  :  '  As  the  puzzle  and  ob- 
icurity,   which    muft  unavoidably  arife  from  ar- 
guing upon  io  abfurd  a  Tuppofition  as  that  of  uni- 
yerlal  neceility,    will,  I  fear,    eafily  be  fe.en  3  U 
will,  I  hope,  as  eafily  be  excufcd.' 

When  it  is  faid  by  a  faialift,  that  the  whole 
conftitution  of  nature,  and  the  adions  of  men, 
that  every  thing,  and  every  modeand  circum- 
ftance  of  every  thing,  is  neccllary  and  could  not 
pofTibly  have  been  other  wile  •,  it  is  to  be  obfcr- 
ved,  that  this  nccvflity  docs  not  exclude  delibe^ 
ration,  choice,  preference,  and  a61ing  from  cer- 
tain principles,  and  to  certain  ends  :.Becaufe  all 
this  is  matter  ot  undoubced  experience,  acknow- 
ledged by  all,  and  what  every  man  may,  every 
iRiomcnt,  be  confcious  of.     And  hence  it  follows, 

that 


not  appJicahk  to  Praclicri  ¥21 

that  ncccflity,  alone  andof  itlelf,  is  in  no  fort  an 
account  of  the  conftitution  of  nature,  and  hov/ 
things  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  they  are,  but 
only  an  account  of  this  circumftance,  relating  ta 
their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could  not 
have  been  otherwifc  than  they  arc  and  have  been. 

Necessity  as  much  requires  and  fuppofes  a 
neceflary  agent,  as  freedom  requires  and  fuppo- 
fes a  free  agent,  to  be  the  former  of  the  world. 
And  the  appearances  of  dejign  and  oifinal  caufes 
in  the  conftitution  of  nature,  as  really  prove 
this  ading  agent,  to  be  2lx\ intelligent  defigner,  or 
to  ad  from  choice,  upon  the  fchemc  of  neccfli- 
ty,  fuppofed  pcfTible,  as  upon  that  of  freedom. 

Suppose  then  a  fatalift  to  educate  any  one, 
from  his  youth  up,  in  his  own  principles,  thac 
the  child  (hould  reafon  upon  them,  and  conclude 
that  fince  he  cannot  poflibly  behave  otherwife 
than  he  does,  he  is  not  a  fubjedl  of  blame  or 
commendation,  nor  can  defervc  to  be  rewarded 
or  punilhed  :  Imagine  him  to  eradicate  the 
very  perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation 
out  of  his  mmd,  by  means  of  this  fyftem  -,  to 
form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  behaviour 
to  it ;  and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he 
was  to  exped,  fay,  from  reafonable  men,  upon 
his  coming  abroad  into  the  world — I  cannot  for- 
bear ftopping  here  to afk,  Whetheranyone  of  com- 
mon fcnle  would  think  fit,  that  a  child  fhould  be 
put  upon  thefe  fpeculations,  and  be  left  to  apply 
them  to  practice?  Andaman  has  little  pretence  to 
reafon, whois not  fenfible,  thatweareallchildrenin 
fpeculations  of  this  kind.  However,  the  child 
would  doubtlefs  be  highly  delighted  to  find 
himfelf  freed  from  the  reftraints  of  fear  and 
ihamc,  with  which  his  play-fellows  w«re  fettered 

and 


Hi        M-.  Edwards'j  fdeme  of  Neceffi'ty^. 

^nd  embarralTed  ;  and  highly  conceited  in  his  fa- 
perior  knowledge  fo  far  beyond  his  years.  But 
conceit  and  vanity  would  be  the  lead  bad  part 
of  the  influence,  which  thefe  principles  niuft 
have,  when  thus  rcafoned  and  adcd  upon, during 
the  courfe  of  his  education.  He  mnft  'either 
be  allowed  lo  go  on,  and  be  the  plague  of  all 
about  him,  and  himfelf  too,  even  to  his  own  de- 
llrudion  :  Gr  elfe  correction  muft  be  continual- 
ly made  ufe  of,  to  fupply  the  want  of  thole  na- 
tural perceptions  of  blame  ant3  commendation^- 
which  we  have  fuppofed  to  be  removed  ;  arvd 
to  give  him  a  pradical  imprefTion,  of  what  he 
had  reafoned  himfelf  oat  of  the  belief  of,  that 
he  was  in  fa<St  an  accountable  child,  and  to  be 
punifbed  for  doing  what  he  was  forbrd.  It  is 
therefore  in  rearuy  impoffible,  but  that  the  cor- 
re£lion  which  he  mud  meet  with,  in  the  courfe  of 
his  education, mufl  convince  him, thai  if  the  fcheme 
he  v/as  intruded  in  were  not  falfe  ;  yet  that  he 
reafoned  inconclufively  upon  it,  and  fome  how 
or  other  mifapplied  it  to  prs6lice  and  common 
life.  But  fuppofing  the  child's  temper  could 
remain  dill  formed  to  the  fydem,  and  his  expec- 
tation of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the 
world  be  regulated  by  it  ♦,  fo  as  to  cxpefl  that 
no  reafonable  man  would  blame  or  punifh  him, 
for  any  thing  which  he  fhould  do,  becaufe  he  could 
not  help  doing  it  :  Upon  this  fuppofition,  it  is 
mainifed  he  would,  upon  his  coming  abroad  in- 
to the  world,  be  infupportable  to  fociety,  and  the 
treatment  he  would  receive  from  it,  would  ren- 
der it  fo  to  him  ;  and  he  could  not  fail  of  doing 
fomev^har,  very  fo0n,for  which  he  would  be  deli- 
vered over  into  the  hands  of  civil  juftice.  And 
thusj  in  thecnd,  hewould  be  convinced  of  theobli- 
gations  he  was  under  to  his  wife  indrudor.     Or 

fuppofc 


fiot  qppUcahJe  to  Praftjcc.  I2| 

fnppofe  this  fcheme  of  fatality,  in  any  other  way, 
applied  to  pradice,  fuch  pradical  application 
of  it  will  be  found  equally  abfurd  ;  equally  fal- 
lacious in  a  pradical  fenfe  :  For  inftancc,  that 
if  a  man  be  deftined  to  live  fuch  a  time,  he  fhall 
live  to  it,  though  he  take  no  care  of  his  own 
prefervation  •,  or  if  he  be  deftined  to  die  before 
that  time,  no  care  can  prev.eni;  it.  Therefore 
all  care  to  preferve  one's  own  life  is  to  be  n«- 
glefted,  which  is  the  fallacy  inftanced  in  by  the 
sintients. 

But  now  on  the  contrary,  none  of  thefe  prac- 
tical abiurdities  can   be  drawn,  from  reafbning 
upon  the  fuppofition,  that  we  are  free,  but  all 
fuch  reaibning  v/;th  regard  to  the  common  af- 
fairs of   life,    isjuftified   by  experience.    ^  And 
therefore,  though  it  were  admitted  that  this  opi- 
nion of  neceffity   were  fpeculaiively   true  ;    yet, 
with  regard  to  pradlce,   it  is  as  if  it  were  falfe, 
fo  far  as  our  experience  reacheth  •,    that  is,   to 
the  whole  of  our  prefent  life.     For,  the  conftitu- 
tionof  the  world,  and  the  condition  in  which  we 
are  actually  placed,  is,  as  if  we  were  free.     And 
it  may    perhaps  jullly  be  concluded,  that   fincc 
the  whole  proceis  of  adion,  through  every  ftep 
of  it,  fufpenfe,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way, 
determining,  and  at  lall  doing  as  we  determine  ; 
is  as  if  we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  fo.     Buc 
the  thing  here   infilled  on  is,  that  under  the 
prefent  natural  government  of  the  world,  we  find 
we  ar?  treated  and  dealt  with,  as  if  we  were 
free,  prior  to  all  confideration   whether  we  are 
or  not.     Were  this  opinion  therefore  of  neceffity 
admitted  to  be  ever  fo  true  ;  yet  fuch  is  in  fact 
our  condition  and  the  natural  courfe  of  things* 
that  whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and  pra(5lice» 


Ii4         Mr,  EdwardsV  fchsme  of  Necejfity, 

this  application  of  it  always  mifleads  us,  and  can- 
not but  miflcad  us,  in  a  mod  dreadful  manner, 
■with  regard  to  our  prefent  intereft.  And  how 
can  people  think  themfelves  fo  very  fecure  then, 
that  the  lame  application  of  the  fame  opinion  may 
not  midcad  them  alfo,  in  Tome  analogous  man- 
ner, with  refpedl  to  a  future,  a  more  general  and 
more  important  intereil  ?  For  religion  being  a 
pradlical  fubje(fl  ;  and  the  analogy  of  nature 
fhewing  us,  that  we  have  net  faculties  to  apply 
this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  pra6lical  fub- 
je6ls  ;  whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  fubjeft  of 
religion,  and  thence  conclude  that  we  are  free  from 
its  obligations,  it  is  plain  this  conclufion  cannot 
be  depended  upon. 

The  notion  of  neceflify,  with  refpe6l  to  prac- 
tical fubjc61:s,  therefore  is  as  it  were  not  true. 
Nor  doth  this  contain  any  refie61ion  upon  rea- 
fon  ;  but  only  upon  what  is  unreafonable.  For 
to  pretend  to  adt  upon  reafon,  in  oppofition  to 
pradical  principles,  which  the  author  of  our  na- 
ture gave  us  to  a^ft  upon  -,  and  to  pretend  to  ap- 
ply our  reafon  to  fubje^s,  wiih  regard  to  which, 
our  own  (hort  views,  and  even  our  experience, 
will  ihev/  us,  it  cannot  be  depended  upon  ;  and 
luch,  at  bed,  the  fubjed  of  necefficy  mud  be  -, 
this  is  vanity,  conceit  and  unre'afonablenefs. 

But  this  is  not  all.  For  we  find  within  our- 
felves  a  will,  and  are  confcious  of  a  chara^ler. 
Now  if  this,  in  us,  be  reconcilcable  with  fate,  it 
is  reconcileable  with  it,  in  the  author  of  nature. 
And  befidcs,natural  government  and  final  caufes 
imply  a  charadler  and  a  v;ill  in  the  governor  and 
defigner;  a  will  concerning  the  creatures  whom 
he  governs.    The  author  of  nature  then  being 

certainly^ 


not   applicable  to   Pranice,  125 

certainly  of  fome  charader  or  other,  notwith- 
flanding  necefllty  ;  it  is  evident  this  neceffity  is 
as  reconcileable  with  the  particular  ch.»ra6ler  of 
bencv'olencc,  veracity,  and  jullice  in  him,  which 
attributes  are  the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with 
any  other  chara6ler  :  Sure  we  find  this  neceflity 
no  more  hinders  men  from  being  benevolent 
than  cruel  ;  true,  than  faultlefs  j  juO;  than  un- 
juft. 

We  find  GOD  exercifes  the  fame  kind  of  go- 
vernment over  us,  with  that  a  father  exercifes 
over  his  children,  and  a  civil  magidrate  over 
his  fubjects.  Now, whatever  becomes  of  abftradt 
queftions  concerning  liberty  and  neceflity,  it  evi- 
dently appears  to  us,that  veracity  and  juflice  mud 
be  the  natural  rule  and  meafure  of  exercifing  thrs 
government  or  authoriiy,  to  a  b::ing,  who  can 
have  no  competitions,  or  interfering  of  interefls, 
with  his  creatures  and  his  fubjeds. 

We  have  endeavoured  to  keep  in  view  the  de- 
fign  we  mentioned  in  the  in  trodudion, to  examine 
o:i\y x\\Q ground'W or ko^yit. Edwards^ s  book  with- 
out entermg  into  confideration  of  the  particular 
dodtfines  built  thereupon.  Whether  they  ftandor 
fall  with  the  foundation,  is  befide  our  purpofe 
to  fay — Or  whether  what  has  been  offered  at  a H 
weakens  this  foundation  is  not  for  us  to  deter- 
mine. One  thing,  perhaps,  appears,  that  nun 
of  ftrong  powers  and  great  abilities  are  wont  to 
wade  beyond  their  depth,  and  bewilder  them- 
felves  and  others  with  fpcculations  abftrufe  and 
lUiprofitaole — to  fay  no  worfe.  Great  geniufes 
are  fri-itful,  many  times,  of  great  errors.  There 
is  a  ihcvv  of  fcience,  faliely  fo  called,  which  is 

efpecially 


126         Mr,  "Ed-Vid^tds^s  Jcheme  of  Necejfiiy^ 

cfpccially  incongruous  in  handling  moral  and  re- 
li:,bas  Jubjedtsi  wherein  che  fimple  (who  make 
much  the  greater  pare  of  mankind)  are  alike 
concerned  as  the  wile  and  learned — and  which, 
therefore,  ought  to  be  treated  with  the  utmoi 
plainnefs. 

We  do  not  deny  but  Mr.  Edivards  wsls  *•  wor- 
thy-of  the  name  of  a  Philojopher  :'  (p.  401)  But 
\^e  appeal  to  the  publick,  whether  lome  of  the 
mod  famed  Philolophers  in  the  Englifh  nation, 
.for  many  years  back,  and  at  this  day,  have  noc 
philofophired  themfelves  into  fcepticifm  ?  One 
'of  firft  diftindlion  in  particular  (whofe  eiTays  on 
fome  m«ral  lubjeds  are  fo  nearly  akin  to  Mr. 
Hdwards  on  ncccffity,  that  a  reader  might  think 
the  latter  copied  from  the  former)  appears  plain- 
ly to  be  a  difbeliever  in  nat;ural  religion,  not 
lets  than  revealed.  ^  However,  we  have  not  the 
leafL  fufpicion  of  Mr.  E^^ie^.^jr^j's  inclination  ei- 
ther to  atheifm  or  deifm.  We  doubt  not  he 
had  a  ftrong  practical  fenfe  of  religion,  which 
overbalanced  his  theory.  But  when  great  dif- 
putants  are  pofTefTed  of  a  particular  hypodiefis, 
they  are  apt  to  defend  it  many  times  by  a  me- 
thod of  reafoning,  which  leads  to  mod  danger- 
.ous  confequences — without  feeing  or  allowing 
thofe  conlcquences,  which,  if  fairly  deduced, 
demonftrate  the  hypothecs  itfelf  to  be  wrong, 
,Qr,chat  they  have  argued  wrong  from  it. 

If  we  have  mifreprefented  Mr.  Edwards^  it 
has  not  been  through  defign  ;    nor  have  we 
knowingly  '  infixed  on  difficulties  not  belong- 
;Srig  to  the  controvcrfy.*      Whether  our  '  indig- 
nation 

^  Umii  €%,ycl.  III.  Sea.  7,8, 10,  u.  ^c. 


not  applicahlc  to  Praftlcc.  "12^ 

nation  or  difdain'  hath  been  '  raifed  at  the  (ighc 
of  his  dircourfe/  others  muft  be  left  to  judge. 
No  one,  we  may  prefume,  will  fay,  that  much 
pains  have  been  ufed  to  '  fet  forth'  the  dodlrines 
of  his  book  *  in  colours  fhocking  to  the  imagi- 
nations, and  moving  to  the  pafTions  of  thofe,who 
have  either  too  little  capacity,  or  too  much  con- 
fidence of  the  opinions  they  have  imbibed,  and 
contempt  of  the  contrary,  to  try  the  matter  by 
any  ferious  and  circumfpedb  examination.* 
yiv.Edwardsy  it  feems,  was  aware  of  being 
charged  with  maintaining  *  horrid  and  blaf- 
phemous  do6lrines,  the  fate  of  the  heathen, 
Hobbs's  neceffity,  making  men  meer  machines,* 
&€.  Whether  he  had  any  reafon  to  apprehend 
fuch  an  indidment  is  a  matter  we  refer  to  the 
reader  :  To  whofe  judgment  we  alfo  fubmit  the 
following  propofcd  fpecimen  of  the  coincidence 
between  Mr.  Edwards^s  doftrines,  and  thofe  of 
ibme  celebrated  infidel^. 


APPENDIX, 


k»8  THE 

APPENDIX. 

Exhiliting  a  fpecmen  of  coincidence  between  the 
principles  of  Mr,  Edwards'j  book,  and  thoje 
of  ant  lent  and  modern    Fataiifts. 

A  LEARNED  Writer,  *  who  hath  dillinftly  examined 
the  opinion  of  the  antients  concerning  fate,  in  a 
defence  of  human  liberty  in  anjwer  to  Cato'j  letters,  hath 
cleariy  mewn,  That  the  freedom  of  human  acSlions  was 
the  ahnoft  unanimous  do6tfine  of  the  phiJofophers— 
that  it  was  taught  by  the  five  great  feds  among  the 
heathen,  which  comprehended  all  the  philofophy  of 
Greece  and  Rome  j  v.z.  The  Stcics,  Platonics^  Epicure- 
G7tSy  Arijiotiliam  and  Academics —  That  the  moft  reafona^ 
hie  of  the  antients,  ot  all  fc6ls,  were  agreed,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  necessity  was  to  be  excluded  from  human 
anions^  that  fo  the  diftiiKftion  of  virtue  andvice^  and  the 
rewards  and  punijhments  both  of  divine  and  human  Isws 
founded  upon  them,  might  b^  preferved  iaviolatcd  :  On 
the  other  hand,  that/^/^,  even  wrthrefpe^t  to  human  ac- 
tions(as  well  as  to  external  events  confequentupon  them, 
in  which  it  was  abfoluteand  uncontroIayte)was  fo  far  to 
be  retained,  as  that  it  was  to  be  allowed  that  antecedent 
caufes  were  motives  of  acting,  though  the  principle  'and 
tj^cieni  caufe  of  action  was  a  natural  ^o^n&i  and  free  e^urti- 
on  cf  the  mind  itlelf.  borne  things  they  held  to  be  dejTined^ 
others  not ;  and  difi:inguiihed  the  caufes  of  things  into  an-  ' 
tcccdent  and  efficient,  that  they  might  excmp:fome  from 
receffity,  and  fubjedl  others  to  it  j  placing  the  human 
uUl  among  thofe  which  they  allowed  not  to  be  under 
neccflity — always  meaning  by  the  efficient  caufe  of  hu- 
man a(Slions  a  principle  oife  If -motion  and  exertion  in  the 
mind  or  agent — by  the  antecedent  caufe,  the  motive  of 
action  to  the  general  efficient  caufe.  Aljolute  fatality 
or  neceility,  v/ith  rcfpe6l  to  man,  was  underllood  only 
of  external  providential  events,  conftquential  to  the  nature 
of  their  adioas,  prcfuppofed  to  be  tree,  and  in  their  own 
powtr. 

Their 
f  Jackfon. 


APPENDIX.         129 

Their  notion  of  liberty,  upon  the  whole,  was, 
Firft,  a  principle  or  power  cf  a£iion^  felf-moiion^  exertion^ 
or  caufation  in  the  mind,  \n  other  words,  that  the  caufe 
of  voluntary  motion  is  in  the  nature  of  the  mind  itfelf, 
whatever  external  motive  may  preceed,  or  concur  to  the 
exertion  of  it.  Hence,  Secondly,  That  motives  are 
only  alflPanty  not  efficient  caufes.  1  hirdly.  They  main- 
tained a  freeciom  from  necejjity^  as  well  as  from  external 
conjlraint  and  coaSiion  ;  allowing  necefiity  only  in  regard 
to  providential  events.  Fourthly,  A  power  of /z^?;.'?^  or 
not  a^ing,  of  chufing  and  adting  varioujly,  or  differently 
from  what  we  do. 

These  propofitions  exprefs  the  fenfe  in  which  liber- 
ty was  afiferted  by  all  the  antient  philofophers  of  emi^ 
NENCE.  The  oppofers  of  this  do8:rine  were  chiefly 
Leuctppus^  Empedocles^  and  Democritus^  the  firft  found- 
ers of  the  Epicurean  fed  ;  Heraciitus^  Diodorus^  and  fbme 
aftrologers  and  fortune-tellers  among  the  Stoics  ;  who 
maintained  univerjal^  abfolute  fate —  To  whom  Plutarch 
joins  ThaieSs  ParmenideSy  Pythagoras^  and  others,  who 
aflerted,  that  «  neceffity  is  omnipotent^  and  exercifeth  an 
empire  over  every  thing' — '  that  the  world  is  infefted  by 
neccility.'  * 

The  aflerters  of  univerfal  fate  had  difFercnt  notions 
about  it.  Diodcrus  and  Democriius  were  of  the  atcmical 
fe£l,  who  made  every  thing  the  neceflary  eft"e£l  of  the 
eternal  motion  and  concourfe  of  atoms,  fuppofing  an  e- 
ternal  chain  of  effeSis^  without  any  original  caufe  or 
agent  at  all.  Heraclitus  derived  every  thing  from  the 
firji  caufe  of  the  univerfe  as  the  efficient^  ftiling  it/<2^^  ; 
and  fuppofing  not  only  all  other  things  which  exift, 
but  the  purpojes  of  our  minds  alfo,  proceed  from  the  effici- 
ent power  of  it — Which  was  making  no  agent  in  the 
world  but  the  fupreme  caui'e,  and  human  actions  no- 
thing but  the  operations  of  GOD  in  men,  aduating 
them,  and  every  thing  elfe,    as  the  foul  doth  the  body. 

The  a/lrological  notion  of  fate  was,  that  every  thing 
was  efFefted  by  the  circumvolution  of  the  univerfe,and  the 
pofitions  and  appearances  of  the  planets  and  fixed  flars. 

Another 

*  Plutarch's  morals,  vol.  3.  c.  25.  p.    170.  tranflated 
ffgna  the  Greek,  zd,  edition,  London. 


5f3d  APPENDIX. 

Another  notion  of  fatality  was  founded  In  the  fup- 
pofition  of  a  mutual^  eternal  concatenation  and  chain  ofcau* 
fes  whereby  things  poftcrior  always  follow  thofe  which 
are  antecedent,  and  arc  refelved  into  them,  as  exifting 
by  them,  and  necejfarily  confequcnt  to  thofe  which  pre- 
cede them.  This  was  the  moft  plaufiblc,  and  moft  in- 
fifted  on  by  the  maintaincrs  of  necejjity — grounded  on 
the  fuppofition  ;  that  there  was  no  internal  principle  or 
caufe  of  motion  or  adion  in  the  mind  at  all  :  Concern- 
in^  which  Cicero  fays,  that  <  as  it  deprives  the  mind  of 
it's  free  willy  and  fubjeds  it  to  a  nece^ary  fatality ^  it  is 
not  tolerable.'  Whether  or  how  far  this  was  Mr,  Ed- 
wardi's  opinion,  thofe  who  have  read  his  book  may  ea- 
fily  judge  :  Alio  what  prefumption  of  it's  truth  arifeth 
from  it's  being  rejected  by  the  moft  reafonable  and  learn- 
ed philofophcrs  of  all  fe£ts,  who  were  full  in  the  four 
propofitions  above-mentioned — all  which  are  very  ex- 
prefly  contradicted  by  Mr.  Edwards,  who  allows  not  of 
a  principle  of  fe  If- mot  ion  in  the  mind — a  freedom  from 
neceffity — a  power  of  acting  otherwije  than  wc  do — and 
afcribes  efficiency  to  motives. 

Not  tnat  we  fuppofc  the  oppugnation  of  Mr.  £//- 
ward's  fchcme  to  the  doctrine  of  the  moil  eminent  phi- 
lofopbers,  and  the  agreement  of  it  with  their  opinion 
"whodiffcnted  from  the  common  belief,  proves  it  to  be 
faUe.  The  wifcft  philofophcrs  had  but  rude  notions  of 
religion  and  morality  in  general  ;  (  The  world  by  vuif- 
iom  knew  not  GOD  )  yet,  on  fome  things  many  of  them 
cxprefTed  themfelves  juftly  ;  and  on  a  point  (o  evident 
as  human  liberty,  they  were  capable  judges,  if  on  any. 

The  fame  learned  writer,  to  whom  we  have  been 
chiefly  indebted  for  the  above  account  of  the  opinion  of 
the  philcfophtrs  on  the  fubjedt  before  us,  has  alfo  fliewn, 
that  the  tuedcm  of  human  anions  was  univerfally,  and 
without  any  controvcrfy,  received  and  maintained  by 
the  antient  chri/lians.  He  refers  us  to  Origen  and  Eufe^ 
hius,  two  as  learned  writers,  and  as  well  fkillcd  in  the 
philofophy  cf  their  times,  as  any  the  werld  affords* 
He  gives  us  the  following  paflages,  among  others,  from 
them.  *  If  not  only  external  tvents,  hut  our  internal de^ 
figm  proceeding  from  reafon,  are  fubjefl  to  fate  ;  and  if 
ihe  minds  of  men  are  under  the  impulfe  of  an  inexorable  * 

*  Mr,  Edivards  ufes  the  word  irrefragallu 


APPEND    I    X.  151 

mcejfily^  then  farewell  pbilofopKy  !  farev/eil  religion  ! — 
This  opinion  (  of  necelTity  )  i?  .an.  incentive  and  encou- 
ragement to  iicatUoujnefs^  iiju/Iic'e,  and  a  thpufand  other 
evils,  and  dirc£lly  tends  to  the  fubveiTion  of  every  ccn~ 
c'ition.of  life.'  *  'From  the  notion,-  (of  neceflity)  faith 
Origeriy  it  follows.  That  the  faculty  of  will  is  whol'v 
taken  away  ;  and  with  it /riJ/*/^  and  £li/prai/e^  ^ndtho 
difFerence  between  things  that  .  arc  coinmendahk^  and 
things  that  zre  blaTze-wo?  thy  :  And  this  being  (o^  the  (o 
much  proclaimed  equity  of  the  judgment  of  GOD  va-  " 
nifheth,  and  his  thrcatcnings  to  punijQi  thofe  whorw/- 
mit  /in,  and  the  promifes  of  rewards  and  blefielneis  -to 
thofe  who  do  uucll^  fall  to  the  ground.  For  there  is  1:3 
reafon  for  either  the  one  or  the  ether — If  all  events  aie 
neccjjary^^  it  is  irrational  to  intreat  GOD  for  any  thing — • 
We  cortfefs  that  many  thing?,  which  arc  not  in  our  pew  ^ 
er,  are  caufes  of  many  things  that  are  in  our  poiver  j 
without  which,  namely,  thofe  things  which  are  7^:t 
in  our  power,  other  things,  which  are  in  our  power, 
v^oiild  not  be  done.  LJut  thofe  things  whidh  arc- in 
our  power,  and  are  done  cortfequential  to  antecedent 
things,  v/hich  are  not  in  cur  power,  are  done  fo.as  that' 
notwithftanding  thefe  antecedcnt.thingSvWe  might  havs^ 
done  oiherw'^fe.  But  if  any  one  would  have  it,  that  our 
free-will  is  wholly  independent  of  every  thing    in  th 


Kv 


world,  fo  as  that  we  do  not  chufe  to  do  fome  things 
reafon  of  certain  ^precedent)  accidents,  he  forgets  th«£ 
he  is  a  p^Jt  of  the  world,  and  comprehended  withiii 
human  fociety,  and  the  circumambient  air/  f 

'  If  Cato  (fays  his  anfwerer,  p.  I49-J  had  any  regard 
for,  or  had  ever  read  the  writings  of  the /jWot/V/V^  Chri/H" 
am^  he  muft  have  (een  and  owned,  that  no  doctrine  was 
more  unanimoufly  and  univerfally  infifted  on,  and  in- 
culcated by  them  than  that  of  human  liberty  :  And  the 
contrary  di^clrinc  of  the  necejftty  of  human  actions  was  a 
principal  branch  of  the  error  of  the  Falentinians,  Adar- 
cicnites,  ard  Manicheesy  who,  in  confequence  of  it,  led 
rnofl:  profligate  and  wicked  lives.' 

Some  of  the  moft  diltinguifhed  maintainers  cf  uni- 
vcrfal   neceffity,  in  the  Jaft  and  prcfent  century,  were 

T  Hobbs^ 

*  Praep.    Evang.  lib.  6.  p.  2425  243.   quoted    in  Jack- 

fons   defence  of  liberty,  p.  205,  206- 
f  Orig,  apud    Eufeb.  praep,   cvang.  lib.  6.    p.   28  f, 

28^,  290,  quoted  by  J<?;>^;7,' p,  81,82,112,   liy 


132 


APPENDIX. 


Hohhsy  Spimzdy  Collins^  Leibnitz^  the  authors  ^f  Cato*t 
letters,  Humt^  among  the  Athtijli  and  Dtijii ;  and  Lord 
Kaims  and  Mr.  Edwards  among  the  advocates  for  reve^' 
laiion*  Our  author's  agreement  with  thefe  on  the  ar- 
ticle of  neceilaty  may  more  diftindly  appear  from  the 
following  cxtrafts.  We  fliall  place  the  fimilar  palTages 
over  againil  each  other  in  different  columns,  that  the 
ccadcf  may  have  a  readier  view  of  the  coincidences 


SPINOZA. 

It  was  impoflible  f«r 
OOD  to  have  produced 
things  in  any  refpc£l  dif- 
ferent from  what  they  are. 
(Clark's  demonftration,  p. 
27,  28,  29,  4Q,  50) 

Leibnitz.  The  fame. 
(Vid.  papers  between 
Liibnitz  and  ^r.  Clarky  {)• 
159,  i6r,  219,  133) 

Ho  BBS.  Every  ciFe<^ 
muft  needs  be  owing  to 
fome  caafe,  and  that  caufe 
muft  produce  the  cfFe<^ 
NECESSARILY.  Becaufc 
if  it  be  a  fufficient  caufe, 
the  Q?t^^  cannot  but  fol- 
low ;  and  if  it  be  not  a 
fufScient  caufe,  it  will  not 
be  at  all  a  caufe  of  that 
thing:.  {Clark's  demon- 
ftration, p.  88) 


LsiBNITa* 


EDWARDS. 
•  Neither  the  form,  'or- 
der, nor  minutcfl  circum- 
ftance  or  mode  of  exiftencc 
of  any  thing  could  pofH- 
bly  have  been  in  any  re- 
fpe£t  different.  (En<juiry 
part  iv,  fe^a.  8) 


No  event  whatfoevw, 
and  particularly  volition^ 
can  come  to  pafs  without 
a  caufe.  To  fupppofe  there 
is  any  event  not  neces- 
sarily connected  with 
its  caufe  is  to  fuppofe  it 
hath  a  caufe  ;  which  is 
not  its  caufe.  If  the  ti- 
it&.  be  not  necejfarily  con- 
ned^ed  with  the  caufe,  then 
the  caufe  may  fomctimes 
exert  the  fame  influence, 
and  the  cfFedl  not  follow. 
And  if  this  adually  hap- 
pens in  any  inflance,  the 
influence  of  the  caufe  is 
not  fufficient  to  produce 
the  efFea.  That  which 
fcems  to  be  the  caufe  can 
be  no  caufe  in  the  fuppo- 
fed  ca(e.    (Part  ii.  feft.  3, 

4>  ?.  p.  i©2,— ig^. 


APPENDIX- 


U5 


Leibnitz.      Nothing 
happens  without  a  fuffi- 
eicnt  reafon  why  it  is,  or 
why  it  is  thus  rather  than 
othcrwife.     A  man  never 
has  a  fufficient  reafon  to 
a^y  when  he  has   not  al- 
fo  a  fufficient  reafon  to  a£l 
in  a  certain  particular  man^ 
mr.     As  often  as  a  man 
has  fufficient  reafon  for  a 
ifingle  a£tion  ;  he  has  alfo 
fufficient   reafon  for  all  its 
requifites.The  overthrow- 
ing this  great  principle  of 
a  jufficient  reafon  to  every 
fv^n/, would  be  overthrow- 
ing the  befl  part  of  all  phi- 
lofophy.    (Papers  between 
Mr.     Leibnitz    and     Dr. 
•Clark,    p.  55,    169,    171, 

399)  _ 

Hume.  The  conjunc- 
tion between  motives  and 
voluntary  anions  is  as  re- 
gular and  uniform  as  that 
between  the  caufe  and  ef- 
fect in  any  part  of  nature. 
(Eflays,  vol.  iii.  p.  137) 

P.  146.  It  is  pretend- 
ed fome  caufes  are  neccf- 
fary,  others  not :  Let  any 
body  define  a  caufe  with- 
out a  neceflary  connecti- 
on with  its  cfFecEt. 

Spinoza.  The  will  can- 
not be  called  a  free,  but  a 
nccefTary  caufe.  The  will 
of  any  voluntary  agent 
muft  of  neceffity  be  deter- 
mined by  fome  external 
,ciufe,and  not  by  any  pow- 
er 


Mr.  Edwards  principle 
of  a  caufe,  ground,  or  rca* 
Ton  of  every  event,  he  fays 
extends  to  things,  and 
the  manner  and  circum- 
ftances  of  things.  There 
muft  be  a  fufficient  reafon 
why  an  a6l  of  the  will,  or 
any  other  event, /j  rather 
than  not ;  or  why  it  is  as 
It  is  rather  than  otherwifc. 
If  this  principle  of  com- 
mon fenfe  be  taken  away, 
all  arguing  from  efFefls  to 
caufes  ceafeth.  (Part  ii. 
fefl.  3,  4.  and  p.  83-!-8|^, 
ioz-^xo&) 


The  ads  of  the  will 
and  material  things  have 
a  like  necefTary  depend - 
ance  on  a  caufe  without. 
Moral  neceffity  may  be  as 
abfolute  as  natural.  Vo- 
lition is  as  palTive  with  re- 
fpcift  to  the  antecedent 
caufe,  as  the  motions  of 
the  body  to  the  volitions 
which  determine  them, 
(P.  183,  184— alfo  p.  JO, 
40,  48,  58,  62,  66,  &c.) 
Moral  habits  arc  owing  to 
the  nature  of  things.  (P. 
31.  32  33)  If  the  a£ls  of 
the  will  are  excited  by  ex- 
trinfic  motives,  thofe  mo- 
tives are  the  caufes  of  thofc 
aits  of  the  will  j  which 
makes. 


JJ4 


A    P    P    E    N    D    t    X. 


.     Spinoza. 
er   of  determining   itfelf, 
inkrentinhiclt.     (Clark'i 
dcm.  p.  09,  1 06) 

CATo.l'hefamc.  (Let- 
ters, vol.  iv.  p.  174,  195, 
196)     P.  190,  191,  193. 
Scmething    -muft     deitxr. 
ir.ine  the  ^^iions  of  men, 
or  elfc  they  couid  not  be 
iktermincd  ;  and  it  is  no- 
thing to    the  ptH-pofe  to 
{ay^  that  their  choice  dc- 
teFmines   them,   if  fome- 
thing.  elfe  muft  determine 
that  choice  5  for  let  it  be 
what    it  wiiU   the    tff/d: 
rr.ull:  bs  necclTary,  &c.  &:c. 

Collins.  Man  is  ne- 
ccfTjrily  determined  by 
particular,  moral .  caufes, 
and  cannot  pcilibly  ?ft 
contrary  to  what  it  does. 
{Clark*^-  reoiarks  on  65/- 
lim,  p.  18,  28)  P.  ij. 
To  reprefent  reafons  to 
men — would  be  cf  no  ufc, 
if  men  had.  free  wills,  or 
their  wilU  were  not  mov- 
ed by  them* 


Edwards. 
maizes  them  necefTary,  as 
cfF.cls  neceilirily  follow 
the  efficiency  of  the  caufe. 
(P.  103,  118,  261,  262, 
278) 

The  will  is  necelTarily 
determined  in  every  one 
ot  its  acts,  from  a  man's 
fiiir  exigence,  by  a  cauic 
bcfide  the  will,  and  m  no 
inftanre  whattver  its  own 


K;jr?w!sr.  Vol.  ili.  p,  149, 
.150.  Aiftions  not  prccerd- 
ing  froRva  pcr.iianenr,f:>c- 
ed  caufe  (th:::  is,  from  ne- 
ctili:y)  arc  n-^ithcr  virtu- 
.  ous  nor  vicious^ 


detenniner.  (P. .  113,  et 
paflin)  There ;  is  not, 
,.£nd  never  can  be,  either 
,  in  exiftence  or  idea, a  free- 
dom from  moral  neccilicy, 
o:  a  power  or  fclf-deter-^ 
mination.     (P,  404)- 

Natural  "teiidcncy 
snd  iiii^uence  fuppafes 
caufality,  and  that  fuppo- 
fr;th  neceiiity  of  events, 
(P.  315)  Moral  neceiTiry 
as  mucri  afcertains  and 
fiKcs  the  event,  as  any. 
(c'.4o0 

Laws  and  commands 
areoi  noufe  unlefs  they 
.  turiUhcwiU  thafvvay  which 
they  require.  (P.  226) 
'4  here  is  an  eitablifhed 
conaecflion  between  means 
a::d  end.  I'he  being  of  the 
eii-<5l  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
conncded  with  the  means; 
and  the  want  of  the  efrc(?l:, 
with  the  want  of  the 
means  (?,  309>"~-3i5) 

Sin  and  virtue  come  to 
pafs  by  a  neceffity  confid- 
ing in  a  fure,  eflabiifhed 
Cv'nnv£l'cn  oi  caufes   and 


APPENDIX. 


^3S 


A 


Leibnitz.  The  mind 
a6ls  by  virtue  of  motives, 
which  are  its  difpofuions  to 
acl.  Motives  comprehend 
all  the  dijpofitions,  which 
the  mind  can  have  to  acl 
voluntarily.  They  in- 
clude, not  only  the  rea" 
fons^  but  alfo  the  inclina- 
iicns  arifmg  from  paflions, 
cr  other  preceeding  im- 
prefHons.  (Papers  of  Z.n3- 
nitz  and  Clarke^  p.  i66j 

167) 

Leibnitz.  Motives 
have  the  fame  rel^^tion  to 
the  vyill  of  an  inteiiigent 
agent,  as  weights  have  to 
a  ballance  ;  fo  that  of 
two  things  abfolutely  in- 
different an  intelligent 
sgcnt  can  no  more  chufe 
either  than  a  ballance  can 
move  itfeif  when  the 
weights  on  both  fides  are 
equal.  (P.  121  of  pa- 
pers, &c.) 

KuME.  Liberty  a  pow- 
er of  adding  or  not  ading 
according  to  the  determina^ 
iion  cf  the  will — that  is, 
if  we  chufe  to  remain  at 
reft,  we  may  5  if  we 
chuie  to  move,  ws  may. 
Nqw 


eff.as.  (P.  3G9)  Moraf 
habits  are  owing  to  the 
nature  of  things.  (P.  31) 
The  good  or  bad  ftatc  of 
the  moral  world  depends 
on  the  improvement  they 
make  of  their  natural  a- 
gency.  (P.  i6?J 

Moral  caufes  and  mo- 
ra! motives  and  induce- 
m^'nts,  fuch  as  habits  and 
difpofuions  of  the  heari-^h. 
moral  habit,  or  motive^  (P 
29.  3®)  Every  thing  jhat 
is  properly  calJed  a  motive 
has  a  tendency  or  advan- 
tage to  move  the  will  pre- 
vious  to  the  effc£i:,  or  to 
the  aft  of  the  will  excit- 
ed. (P.  8,  that  is,  a  mo- 
tive, which  is  a  moral  ha- 
bit, is  yet  previous  to  and 
excites  the  moral  habit) 

Mr.  Edwards's  applica- 
tion of  gravitation  and 
the  fcale  of  a  ballance  (p. 
93)  to  his  fubjea,  may 
ferve  to  fhew  the  coinci- 
dence in  this  place  ;  efpe- 
cially  if  hix  general  rcafon-  . 
ing  is  alfo  taken  into  COA- 
fidsration. 


Liberty  is  a  power, 
opportunity,  or  advantage 
that  any  one  has,  to  do  as 
he  pleafes — or  power  and 
opportunity  to  purfue  and 
execute  his  choice — with- 
out taking  into  the  mean« 
ing 


fs^ 


APPENDIX 


Now  this  hypothetical  li- 
berty (as  Mr.  HumejuMy 
ftiles  it)  belongs  (as  he 
adds)  to  every  body  who 
is  not  a  prtforter^  and  in 
chains,  (Vol.  iii.  p.  145) 
Collins.  I  contend 
/or  liberty  as  it  %niiies  a 
power  in  man  to  do  as  he 
xvil/s  or  pUaJes,  {Claris 
remarks  on  Collinsyi^^  14.^ 


HoSBt.  Though  the 
,ivili  be  neccflitated,  yet 
,the  doing  what  we  will  is 
liberty.  He  is  free  to  do 
a  thing,  who  may  do  it  if 
he  have  a  will  to  do  it,and 
may  forbear,  if  he  have 
ihe  will  to  forbear,  though 
the  will  to  do  the  action 
be  neceflary,  or  though 
there  be  a  neceiHty  that 
he  fhall  have  a  will  to  for- 
bear. He  who  takes  a- 
way  the  liberty  of  doing 
cUording  to  our  willsy  takes 
away  the  nature  of  fin  ; 
but  he  that  denies  the  li- 
berty to  will  doth  not  do 
fo.  The  necclHty  of  an 
adlion  doth  not  make  the 
law  that  prohibits  it  un- 
juft  ;  for  it  is  not  the  ne- 
cefTify,  but  the  will  to 
break  the  law,  that  makes 
the  aflion  unjuft  ;  and 
what  nccefliry  caufc  fo- 
cver 


ingof  the  word  any  thing 
of  the  caufe  or  original 
of  that  choice.  Two 
things  are  oppofed  to  li- 
berty, namely,  conftraint 
and re/iraint.  (P.  38,  39, 
40,  300,  et  pajpm)  To 
fay  that  a  man  exercifetk 
liberty,  not  only  in  exier" 
ntf/ actions,  but  Vx  the  ails 
of  the  will  themrelves^  is  to 
lay  liberty  confifts  in  wil- 
ling what  he  wills.  (P. 
74-,  75>  76>  i86,  187; 
He  cannot  be  faid  to  be 
unable  to  do  a  thing,  who 
can  do  it  if  he  will ; 
though  fuch  a  will  may  be 
required  by  command  as  is 
forever   impoilible. 

(Part  iii,  fed. 4)  A  free- 
dom from  coacfion^  but  not 
from  necejjityy  is  eflcntial  to 
virtue  or  vice,praire  or  dif- 
praife,  reward  or  punifh- 
ment.  ('P.  194,  213,  it 
pajjim)  Commands 

and  obli;2;ations  to  obedi- 
ence are  confiftent  with 
moral    inability    to   obey. 

(Partiiijfea.  4) 

The  will  in  every  in* 
ftance  a£ls  by  moral  necef- 

fity,  (p.  130)  and  always 
has  an  inability  to  a£t  o- 
thcrwife  than  it  doth  ;  (p. 
35)  men  are  morally  un- 
able to  will  otherwifc  than 
they  do  will,  as  really, 
truly,  and  properly  in  ont 
inftance  as  another  :  yet 
the  necefTity  of  the  will 
never  readers  any  thing 
improperlj 


APPENDIX; 


^3f 


ever  prececds  an  a£lion, 
yet  if  that  adtion  be  for- 
bidden, he  that  doth  it 
willingly^  may  juftly  be 
puniibcd.  {H^hiiby  on 
five  points,  p.  360,  361) 


CoLiiNs.  GOD  can- 
not communicate  free-will 
to  men,  without  being 
chargeable  with  their  a- 
bufe  of  it.  To  admit  that 
any  being  can  a<^  in  a 
manner  contrary  to  what 
it  does,  ©r  fulfil  any 
other  end,  is  tantamount 
to  allowing  it  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  the  Deity  ; 
and  confcquently,  to  have 
it  in  its  cledion  and  pow- 
er to  thwart  the  fchcmcs 
of  the  great  author  and  fu- 
perintcndent  of  all  things. 
{Jack fan's  vindication,  p. 


improperly  the  fubjcft  of 
command.  The  oppofiti- 
on  or  defc£l  of  the  will  in 
that  which  is  its  original 
and  determining  aii^  implies 
a  moral  inability.  This 
inability  alone  (whick 
confifts  in  difinclination) 
never  can  excufc  any  per- 
foB.  (Part  iii,  fe<Et.  iv) 
In  moral  neccflity,  the 
conne£lion  between  caufe 
and  effe^  is  prior  and  fu- 
perior  to  will  and  endea- 
vour. (P.  194.)  In  a  feries 
of  a<Sts,  if  there  are  five, 
tenjan  hundred,  or  a  thou- 
fand  ads  in  the  train,  and 
the  firft  not  detcrnained  by 
the  will,  none  of  them 
are.  (P.  48,  124,  215, 
2^6,  257)  The  tffence  of 
Virtue  and  vice  is  net  in 
their  caujfy  btit  in  their  na^ 
tun. 

Part  iv,  fed.  ix,  x. 
And  p.  401,  408,  Mr^ 
Edwards  chargeth  the  dc^  • 
niers  of  neceflity  with  vir- 
tually fayingjthat  GOD's 
will  and  defire  is  infinite- 
ly crofs'djn  every  ad  of  fin> 
provided  moral  evil  is  not 
forthe  bcft — that  libc  rty,a« 
oppcfed  to  ncceffity, argues 
an  inferiority  and  fervitudc 
unworthy  of  the  fuprcam 
Being  ;  really  fubjeds  the 
will  of  the  Moft  High  to 
the  will  of  his  creatures, 
and  brings  him  into  a  de- 
pendence on  them.  (353) 


'38, 


APPENDIX. 


Cato.  The  notion  of 
liberty  of  a(5iion  reflects 
upon  GOD's  wifdom  or 
power — U  intrenches  up- 
on his  providence  and  go- 
vernment of  t  h  e  univerfe, 
by  giving  p^rt  of  his  pow- 
er out  ot  his  own  hands 
and  by  leaving  it  to  the 
cJifcrction  of  inferior, weak 
beings  to  contradict  him- 
felf,  and  difappcint  his  in- 
tentions. (Vol.  iv.  p.  179) 

Leibnitz's  '  pre-erta- 
blifhed  harmony/  anfwers 
to  Cato's  refcmbling  the 
creation  fnot  excepting 
the  intelligent  part  of  it) 
to  a  machine  ;  which  if 
not  fo  framed  at  flrft  as  to 
anfwer  its  end  without  the 
continual  interpofai  of  the 
Creator,  is  fuppofed  10 
imply  a  6tk€t  of  wifdoin 
and  power.  (Vol.  iv.  p. 
205, 206) 


Cato.  Ail  caufes  muft 
fi:  ft  or  laft  center  in  the 
fupream  caufe.  (Vol.  iv. 
Pt  i74->  ^l^y  Jt95>  ^9^) 


The  argument  of  the 
fatalifts  from  prefcience, 
is,  either  that  all  events 
are  known  and  foretold  by 
the  gods,  and  therefore  ne- 

^#7  \ 


Unless  his  fcheme  of 
necefTity  be  admitted,  Mr. 
Edwards  fays  it  will  fol- 
low, that  GOD  muft  be 
cxpofed  to  be  conftantly 
changing  his  mind  and  in- 
tentions as  to  his  future 
conduct  J  altering  his  mea- 
fures,  relinquifhing  his  old 
defigns,  and  forming  nev/ 
fchemes  and  projecflicns-- 
continually  putting  his 
fyftem  to  rights,  as  it 
gets  cutoforder,and  liable 
to  be  wholly  frufirated  of 
his  end  in  the  creation  of 
the  world,  (?.  i6c— 166, 
353) 

On  the  fcherae  of  felf- 
detcrmiration,  the  will  of 
man  is  left  to  the  guidance 
of  nothinf^  but  blind  con- 
tingeiice  .-So  tl^.at  ifitmakes 
anyjdifFcrencebetween  men 
and  machines,  it  is  for  the 
worfe  i  for  machines  are 
guided  by  an  underftand- 
ing  caufe,  by  the  fkilful 
hand  of  the  workman  or 
owner.    (P.  318) 

Things,  which  ever 
had  or  will  have  a  begin- 
ning, are  not  ncccfiary  in 
their  own  nature,  but  are 
neccfiary  by  a  connexion 
with  what  is  from  eterni- 
ty.    (P.  25) 

GOD  orders  the  vohti- 
oiis  of  moral  agents,among 
other  events,  in  fuch  a  de- 
ciftvc  manner,  that  the  c- 
vents  arc  infallibly  con- 
nected 


A'  P    PEN    D    I    X.         139 

4fffary  ;  or  fome  things  are  nedled  with  his  difpofal, 
neither  known  nor  taken  His  own  immediate  con- 
care  of  by  the  gods.  {Jitck-  du(H:  is  original,  or  hrft  im 
fon*^  anfwer  to  Cato,  p.  72,  the  ("cries  of  events^ — and 
73.  Compare  Mr.  Ed^  fin  comes  to  pafs  bccaufe 
wardsy  part  ii.  fe£l.  ii.  par-  he  Jees  it  needful  and  ofim- 
ticularly  p.  160 — 166)  portance    that     it     fhould 

come   to   pafs.     (Part   iv, 
fed   9,    10,   and  p.  403, 

405) 

Upon  the  whole  :  One  of  the  famous  obje(5lions  of 
i\it  fat alijis  of  old  to  the  liberty  of  human  anions,  and 
which  is  urged  for  neceility  by  modern  infidels,  was, 
that  every  afiion  refults  from  a  precedent  motive  or  ree- 
fon^  which  rcafon  or  motive  is  out  of  out  power,  [Jack^ 
fin's  anfwer  to  Cato,  p.  100.  )  We  need  not  produce 
any  pafTage  from  Mr.  Edwards  to  fhew  the  coincidence. 
His  whole  fcheme  is  founded  on  this  principle. 

We  fear  our  quotations  have  already  been  too  nti- 
fnereus,  or  it  wefe  eafy  to  add  to  them.  Wc  prefume 
they  have  been  fufficicnt  to  fatisfy  the  attentive  and 
impartial  in  regard  to  the  coincidence  we  propofed  to 
exhibit.  What  prefumption  of  the  falfhood  of  Mr. 
Edwards's  fcheme  arifeth  from  it's  agreement  with  the 
doflrine  of  thofe  who  rejcft  the  evidence  of  the  chrifti- 
an  revelation,  and  even  believed  not  (fonieof  them)  in 
the  perfections  and  moral  government  of  GOD,  we 
ihall  not  fay  ;  though  the  fufpicion  that  it  h  fallacious, 
arifing  from  the  comparifon  wc  have  made,  will  not,  we 
trufl:,  be  thought  inconftderable,  whether  it  can  or  can- 
not be  diflinCtly  perceived  where  the  fallacy  lies.  Af- 
ter all,  we  fhould  not  have  troubled  the  reader  with 
this  appendix  but  for  a  reafon  already  aHigned.  For  if 
his  fcheme  hath  the  tendency,  and  is  reducible  to  the 
confcquences,  we  have  attributed  to  it,  all  but  infidels 
will  allow  this  to  be  a  full  demonftration  of  it's  falfhood. 
Whether  the  fallacy  of  the  reafoning  of  his  book  can 
be  diftindlly  traced,  or  with  what  clafs  of  writers  it  co- 
incides, is  not  the  qucftion — But  whether  the  confe- 
ci^ucncesarejuftly  drawn. 

Ii 


:14a       A   P    f    E   N    D    t    X; 

If  any,  who  may  think  the  ^things  which  have  beajl 
^Hedged  worthy  of  being  read,  orof  fo  much  notice  at 
to  fay  much  about  them,  (kould  have  their  indignatioil 
ofdifdain  raifed,*  we  can  truly  fay,  that  we  meant  to 
i-aife  neither.  We  fat  down  with  a  determination  to 
avoid  every  thing  perfonal.  If  we  have  broken  through 
this  determination)  it  is  ail  inadvertence  we  cannot  re* 
coilc£l.  Whatever  we  think  of  Mr.  Edwards's  fyftem, 
"We  doubt  not  the  gbodnefs  of  his  heart ;  and  believe  he 
Is  entered  into  the  reward  of  a  goed  and  faithful  fervant, 
where  even  great  men  fee  they  knew  but  in  part  whiFe 
they  tabernacled  in  flefti,  and  perhaps  entertained  fome 
dangerous  errors.  For  we  have  not  fo  learned  Chrift 
as  to  infer  the  badnefs  of  any  man's  heart  from  the 
falihood  of  his  fpeculativc  opinions. 


The  Printer  defires  the  reader  to  cxcufc  fome  irre- 
gularity in  numbering  the  pages  in  the  beginning  ©f 
this  examination,  and  fome  other  typographical  errors* 
The  moft  material  that  have  been  obferved  are  herie 
pointed  out. 

P.  57. 1.  igr.  accepUd—].  10,  r.  ihat'^p.  105.  I.  I^» 
for  loofe  r.  lofe — p.  108, 1.  15.  r.  was  as — p.  11^,  1* 
15,  for  terms  r.  turns — p.  1x4, 1.  18,  r.  as  ^  ifi 
,^ere<-^p.  135. 1,  8.  for  faultier  r.  faithkfs. 


?KiCtAJi^  ^/^2- 


